Watch · 63/100 · high confidence
How the council's view has changed
The council has convened on QLYS 2 times since Jul 18, 2026. Each entry records where the score landed and what moved it — including the times nothing did.
-
Lowered 68 → 63 (-5) Watch After earnings
A ~49% price surge repriced QLYS from modestly cheap to clearly stretched, cutting the score from 68 to 63 and shifting confidence to high
Between the two assessments, the single most important change was mechanical: QLYS stock moved from $123 to $183 — a 48.8% rally driven by a Q2 earnings beat and post-earnings institutional buying — while the DCF's intrinsic value estimate barely moved ($267 to $263). That compressed the implied upside from 117% to 43% and pushed the P/E from 22x to 32x and Price/FCF from 14x to 21x. The business itself did not deteriorate; Q2 revenue of $182M grew 11% YoY, EPS of $1.50 grew 15%, and full-year guidance was raised by roughly $11M at the midpoint to $732–738M. The quality characteristics the council admired — 31% ROIC, 45% FCF margins, net-cash balance sheet, 103-104% NDR — remain intact.
The problem is entirely on the price side. At $123 the Graham/Schloss hard-avoids were already on the table, but the quality and valuation seats provided enough cushion to hold a 68/100 Watch. At $183, the same valuation constraints become decisive: Graham fell from 52 to 32 (watch to avoid), Greenblatt from 78 to 58 (pass to watch), Buffett from 75 to 62, Dalio from 72 to 55, and Greenwald from 74 to 58. The valuation referee explicitly flagged that the 7.43% WACC underpinning the 'even the bear case is above price' argument may be too low, and that normalizing to 8.5–9.5% likely erases the claimed cushion. None of this reflects a business getting worse; it reflects the contrarian entry window closing.
The one genuinely new business data point — the Q2 beat and guidance raise — was absorbed as a mild positive on fundamentals but did not resolve the council's central bear-case concerns. The AI/hyperscaler bundling risk (Microsoft, CrowdStrike) remains unpriced and unaddressed in filings, 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging carries no revenue attribution, and NDR at 103-104% shows no re-acceleration. Howard Marks's framing captures the room's conclusion: the stock is now near the peak of its popularity cycle after a ~146% run from its low, and Paul Singer joined the council at a Watch/52 reflecting exactly that skepticism.
- Stock rose 48.8% ($123 to $183) between assessments, compressing DCF upside from 117% to 43% and pushing P/E from 22x to 32x — the primary driver of the score cut
- Graham dropped from 52 to 32 (watch to avoid) and Greenblatt from 78 to 58 (pass to watch) as the higher price violated their quantitative thresholds; combined P/E x P/B now 361 versus Graham's 22.5 ceiling
- Greenwald's EPV of ~$73-78 — unchanged by the price move — now sits 76% below the current price rather than 40%, making the growth-dependency of the thesis more exposed
- Valuation referee conceded the 7.43% WACC may be too low and that at 8.5-9.5% the bear-case margin of safety likely evaporates — the 'even the bear case is above price' argument is flagged as a WACC artifact, not a true buffer
- Q2 beat (EPS +15%, revenue +11%, guidance raised $11M midpoint) confirmed execution but did not accelerate NDR above 103-104% or provide any concrete AI revenue attribution, leaving the growth-reacceleration thesis unsubstantiated
- AI/hyperscaler bundling risk (Microsoft Security Copilot, CrowdStrike) remains entirely unaddressed in filings; management's 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging has zero product specificity or revenue attribution across all available materials
Who movedBenjamin Graham -20Joel Greenblatt -20Ray Dalio -17Bruce Greenwald -16Warren Buffett -13
-
Initiated 68 Watch
First-ever rating lands at Watch 68 — quality franchise acknowledged but growth deceleration and an unproven AI thesis prevent a Buy
This is an initiation, so there is no prior score to compare against. The council rated QLYS at Watch 68 with medium confidence, reflecting a genuine tension between two well-supported positions that could not be resolved in favor of a clear Buy or Avoid.
The quality camp — Akre, Munger, Terry Smith, Mauboussin, Greenblatt, and the Valuation Referee (all 74-78) — read the fundamentals as compelling: 31% ROIC, 45% FCF margins, a net-cash balance sheet, $304M in FCF against $198M net income confirming clean accounting, and a price of 14.3x FCF for a business earning a ~2,400bps ROIC-WACC spread. The DCF pegs base intrinsic value at $267 against a $123 price, and disciplined buybacks ($1.2B since 2018, new $200M authorization) are accretive at these levels. The Christensen referee sees AI as a tailwind rather than a threat given the proprietary sensor-telemetry architecture.
The growth and timing camp — Druckenmiller, Lynch, Graham, Klarman (all 52-58) and Howard Marks (55) — focused on the second derivative: revenue guidance decelerates to 7-8% from 10%, NDR is flat at 103% with management explicitly guiding no material change, EPS guidance implies only 1-5% growth, and opex is guided up mid-teens on 7-8% revenue. Walter Schloss is the most extreme dissent at Avoid 22, citing 7.74x book value and a stock at its exact 52-week high with no asset-based floor. Greenwald, despite being a quality investor himself, is the most damaging swing vote: his EPV of $73-74 per share means the stock trades at 1.7x conservative intrinsic value and the entire $123 price embeds growth that is visibly fading.
The unresolved crux is the ETM/AI reacceleration thesis. Management has run ETM for 12-plus months, cites encouraging POC conversions and a Global 50 mid-six-figure expansion win, but has not provided adoption metrics and has explicitly deferred them to Q1 2026. The bulls' cheapness argument and the bears' growth argument are mirror images of each other: the 14x FCF multiple looks attractive only if growth holds, and the near-term evidence says it is not holding. With the stock at its 52-week high after a roughly 65% rally off May lows, the contrarian entry has passed. The council parked at Watch pending the Q1 2026 ETM disclosure.
- Revenue guidance decelerated to 7-8% from 10%, with NDR flat at 103% and management guiding no material change — the baseline growth engine is slowing
- ETM/AI reacceleration thesis is the linchpin of any re-rating but remains completely unquantified after 12-plus months live; management deferred adoption metrics to Q1 2026
- Quality metrics are genuine: 31% ROIC, 45% FCF margins, $304M FCF vs $198M net income, net-cash balance sheet, and >90% gross dollar retention confirmed by forensic review
- Valuation is split: 14.3x FCF looks cheap to the quality camp, but Greenwald's no-growth EPV of $73-74 means the $123 price already embeds meaningful growth that is currently decelerating
- Mid-teens opex growth on 7-8% revenue growth threatens margin compression; EBITDA margin guided from 47% to mid-40s
- Stock sits at its 52-week high after a roughly 65% rally off May lows — momentum-driven sentiment, no margin of safety on positioning; Schloss flags 7.74x book with zero asset floor
The full analysis
QUALYS, INC. (QLYS) — Council Assessment
🟡 WATCH · Score 63/100 · high confidence
High-quality, debt-free SaaS compounder with exceptional cash economics, but priced for its quality with a thin margin of safety and a diffuse growth story.
As of 2026-08-08. 19 lenses weighed in, 0 abstained. Sources: 8 filings, 30 news, 30 discussion, 1 earnings_call.
360 narrative — news & sentiment digest
Qualys Inc. (QLYS) — Investment Brief
Management Commentary (Earnings Call)
Q2 2026 Results & Guidance (Aug 5, 2026)
- Revenue: $182.18M, +11% YoY
- GAAP EPS: $1.50, +15.4% YoY (outpaced revenue growth)
- FY2026 Guidance Raised: $732–738M (prior: $721–727M); +~$11M midpoint uplift
- Driver: "Channel strength" cited; Q2 growth notably above company's historical pace
- Tone: Management raised full-year targets after beating Q2, signaling confidence in execution and demand
No direct earnings-call transcript excerpts are available in the material, so commentary is inferred from news summaries. However, the raise in guidance and beat on both revenue and EPS suggest management is tracking favorably on subscription/SaaS metrics.
Recent Developments
| Date | Event |
|---|---|
| Aug 5, 2026 | Q2 earnings beat (EPS $1.50 +15%, revenue $182M +11%); FY guidance raised to $732–738M |
| Aug 5, 2026 | Stock jumped 14% AH on earnings; continued rallying through Aug 6 |
| Jun 23–26, 2026 | Multiple insider sales: Chief Legal Officer Bruce Posey sold ~865 shares (~$95K); Director Wendy Pfeiffer sold 500 shares (~$55K) — both under pre-established 10b5-1 trading plans (routine, not necessarily bearish) |
| Jun 17, 2026 | Institutional activity: London Co. of Virginia sold 66.3K shares; Clark Capital bought 291K shares |
| Early–Mid Aug, 2026 | Additional institutional buying: Pacer Advisors, Empowered Funds, Sei Investments all added positions post-earnings |
Bull Narrative
- AI/Security Tailwinds: Earnings headline explicitly cited "AI-Driven Innovation" as a driver; QLYS positions itself in high-growth cybersecurity/vulnerability management, a beneficiary of enterprise AI security spending.
- Revenue Acceleration & Margin Expansion: 11% YoY revenue growth combined with 15.4% EPS growth suggests operating leverage and/or improved pricing/mix. Guidance raise ($11M midpoint) after a beat signals confidence, not caution.
- Channel Momentum: Management attributed outperformance to "channel strength," indicating partner/reseller demand is solid.
- Valuation Re-rating: Analyst price target raised to $171.94 (implying 7% upside post-rally); stock rallied 68% in prior period per InvestingPro signal; passes "Peter Lynch GARP screen" (growth at reasonable price) per ChartMill analysis.
- Institutional Accumulation: Post-earnings buying by multiple funds (Pacer, Empowered, Sei) suggests professional conviction.
- Retail Enthusiasm: Widespread bullish social-media posts around earnings; options traders positioned long (call activity noted mid-June at $130 strike).
Bear Narrative
- Valuation Stretched: Retail traders flagged stock as "way overvalued" post-earnings (+14% AH move). Prior 68% run and 7% upside target suggest limited margin of safety at current levels.
- Single-Quarter Performance: 11% revenue growth, while solid, is not exceptional for high-growth SaaS; EPS outperformance relies partly on operating leverage, not top-line acceleration.
- Insider Selling in June: While 10b5-1 plans are routine, the timing (before the earnings beat and subsequent rally) could be interpreted as insiders taking chips off the table at lower valuations.
- Modest Analyst Upside: 7% price-target upside post-rally leaves little room for disappointment; forward P/E and P/S multiples appear elevated for a mature security-software vendor.
- AI Hype Risk: Management's "AI-Driven Innovation" messaging is on-trend but lacks concrete revenue attribution or differentiation claims in available materials; could be susceptible to disenchantment if AI narrative falters.
Retail Sentiment
Overall: Bullish/Mixed with conviction concentrated among technical/options traders.
- Bullish Tone dominates (posts flagged: @Roronao, @tknofile, @Quantum_Capital_LLC, @JFDI, @topstockalerts).
- Technical Optimism: Traders note breakouts above moving averages (105 → 115 → 126 range; 4-week and 200-day break-outs cited); "character" and momentum language suggest conviction in continuation.
- Options Activity: Call spreads noted (e.g., $130 calls at $1.35–1.45 for late-July expiry in late June); indicates leverage-driven bullish positioning.
- Caveat — Regret/Caution: One trader (@Conor958) noted the stock was sold earlier (deleveraging at a portfolio-high valuation), now viewing the post-earnings rally with mixed feelings.
- Short Skepticism: A few posts (e.g., @1986iamwallstreet) called numbers "not impressive" and stock "way overvalued," but these are minority voices.
Caveats
- No Full Earnings Transcript: Summaries rely on press headlines; no direct management Q&A or forward-looking commentary beyond guidance raise. Analyst questions and management candor unknown.
- Limited Guidance Color: FY2026 raise of ~$11M on $732M base is modest (~1.5%); unclear if driven by new product wins, pricing, or volume; no segment breakdown visible.
- AI Claims Unsubstantiated: "AI-Driven Innovation" is cited as a sell-side headline but not detailed in available materials; no product demo, customer wins, or revenue % attribution provided.
- Valuation Metrics Thin: Forward P/E and P/S figures mentioned in passing but not quantified; comparability to peers (CrowdStrike, Rapid7, etc.) not addressed.
- Insider Selling Context: 10b5-1 plans are routine, but timing/magnitude relative to shares outstanding not disclosed; difficult to gauge true insider conviction.
- Retail Sources Mixed Quality: StocksToTrade, TopStockAlerts, and Stocktwits posts are sentiment signals, not fundamental analysis; high noise-to-signal ratio.
- Post-Earnings Momentum Risk: 14% AH spike and subsequent institutional buying could represent a vacuum-fill / short-squeeze dynamic rather than fundamental repricing; sustainability unclear.
Summary
Qualys delivered a solid Q2 beat with 11% revenue growth and 15% EPS growth, and raised FY2026 guidance. The stock rallied sharply on AI/security narrative tailwinds and channel momentum. Institutional buyers stepped in post-earnings, and retail traders show bullish conviction, particularly in technical setups and options. However, valuation appears stretched (7% analyst upside, prior 68% rally), EPS growth is partly leverage-driven rather than organic top-line acceleration, and AI claims lack specificity. Insider selling in June (pre-rally) and minority bearish retail calls suggest caution. A solid performer, but entry timing and downside protection should be carefully considered at current levels.
Bull case
Qualys is a genuinely exceptional business: ROIC 31.25%, ROE 35.3%, 45.5% FCF margin ($304M FCF on $669M revenue), capex of only $5M, and a net cash balance sheet (~$250M cash plus ~$485M marketable securities, no financial debt). Cash conversion is >150% of net income across all five years — the forensic short-seller confirms this is the opposite of an accrual/fraud pattern. Net dollar expansion of 103-104% signals real switching costs and durable retention. Buybacks are genuinely accretive (share count 36.5M to 35.7M). The provided DCF pegs intrinsic value at $262.85 (43% upside) with even the bear case ($201.59) above the current price — a rare configuration. Quality lenses (Fundsmith 78, Akre 78, Munger 74, Mauboussin 74) and the valuation referee (72) all pass.
Bear case
The value cohort is sharply negative: Graham (32) and Schloss (18) both AVOID on a 32x P/E, 11.3x P/B, 9.5x P/S, ~3.6% earnings yield. Greenwald's EPV puts fair value around $73-78 — roughly 2.4x below the current price — meaning the buyer is paying entirely for growth, not earnings power. Growth is only ~11% (a stalwart, not a fast grower), yielding a PEG near 2.9 (Lynch). The DCF's appeal is fragile: 81.6% of value sits in terminal value on a low 7.43% WACC (beta 0.625, arguably too low for a tech name); the referee flags that at a more normal 8.5-9.5% WACC the bear-case cushion likely evaporates. The stock is near its 52-week high after a large rally (Marks: 'buying at peak of popularity'), and every lens flags the same unpriced risk — AI/hyperscaler bundling (Microsoft, CrowdStrike) potentially commoditizing vulnerability management over 5-10 years.
Dissent — where the council disagrees
The council is genuinely split along the quality/value axis. Fundsmith, Akre, Munger, Mauboussin and the referees pass; the value contingent — Graham (32) and Schloss (18) — hard-avoids, and Greenwald's EPV work is the most decision-relevant dissent: his ~$73-78 fair value is 60% below the DCF's $262.85, and the gap is entirely a WACC/terminal-value artifact. The valuation referee himself concedes the 7.43% WACC 'may be too low' and that at 9% WACC the bear-case margin of safety may not hold. That means the entire 'even the bear case is above price' argument the quality bulls lean on rests on an assumption the referee flags as the primary unresolved risk. Druckenmiller and Fisher add that growth is not accelerating and the AI-revenue story lacks any substantiation in filings. Bottom line: this is a great business, but the clean-pass narrative is manufactured by a generous discount rate, not by an actual price discount.
Key risks
- DCF is 81.6% terminal-value dependent on a 7.43% WACC; normalizing to 8.5-9.5% likely erases the claimed margin of safety and can push intrinsic value below current price
- AI/hyperscaler bundling (Microsoft Security Copilot, CrowdStrike) could commoditize vulnerability management and compress the 103-104% net dollar expansion rate over a 5-7 year horizon — this risk is unpriced
- Growth is a mature ~11% with NDR barely above 100%; any deceleration reprices a 9.5x P/S / 32x P/E stock materially
- 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging has zero revenue attribution or product specificity in any filing — possible marketing veneer
- Stock sits near 52-week high after a ~146% run from the low; sentiment/momentum crowd, not a fear-driven entry
Catalysts
- Continued guidance raises and beats (FY2026 raised to $732-738M after Q2 beat)
- Net dollar expansion re-accelerating above 105%+ signaling genuine land-and-expand
- Accretive buybacks against the $1.6B authorization
- Concrete, attributable AI product wins that validate the innovation narrative
- Pullback toward $130-150 that would restore a real FCF-yield margin of safety (Klarman, Greenwald)
DCF valuation (finance-expert model)
two-stage DCF, Gordon terminal value, CAPM-weighted WACC.
Intrinsic value: $262.85/share vs price $183.48 → +43% (bear $201.59 · base $262.85 · bull $300.26).
| Step | Value |
|---|---|
| Base free cash flow | $304M |
| FCF growth (yrs 1-5) | 11.0% (revenue CAGR) |
| WACC (β 0.625) | 7.4% |
| Terminal growth | 2.5% |
| PV of explicit FCF | $1.7B |
| PV of terminal (residual) value | $7.4B (82% of EV) |
| Enterprise value | $9.1B |
| less Net debt | $-250M |
| = Equity value | $9.4B |
| / Shares (36M) = intrinsic/share | $262.85 |
Short-sell evaluation
🚫 AVOID SHORTING
Despite a rich valuation, Qualys is a poor short. The forensic short-seller explicitly passed it (72) — accounting is clean, cash exceeds earnings every year, revenue recognition is conservative (billed in advance), buybacks genuinely shrink the share count, and there is no debt, no restatement, no governance rot. The only short angle is valuation and mature growth, but a debt-free business with 45% FCF margins, positive momentum, a 14% post-earnings pop, institutional accumulation and active buybacks is exactly the kind of quality name that grinds shorts down and squeezes them. The bear trigger (NDR below 100%, deferred-revenue drawdown, FCF compression) is simply not present in the data. Overvaluation alone, without a catalyst or deteriorating fundamentals, is not a shortable thesis here.
Pros (the short could work)
- Rich multiples (32x P/E, 20.9x P/FCF, 9.5x P/S) against only ~11% growth leave no room for deceleration
- Greenwald's EPV (~$73-78) implies large downside if the growth premium ever unwinds
- AI/hyperscaler bundling is a real secular threat that could eventually compress the moat and pricing power
- Growth is flat-to-mature with NDR barely above 100% — limited upside surprise potential
- 81.6% terminal-value-dependent valuation is vulnerable to any rate/WACC normalization
Cons (what kills the short)
- Pristine forensic accounting — cash flow exceeds net income every year; no aggressive recognition, no capitalization games
- Fortress balance sheet: net cash ~$735M, no debt, no refinancing risk — nothing to force a decline
- Strong momentum, post-earnings pop, and institutional buying create acute squeeze risk
- Active $1.6B buyback shrinking share count provides a persistent bid
- Durable switching-cost moat and 45% FCF margins mean the business can compound through any bear thesis
- No identifiable negative catalyst; bear triggers are absent from current data — unlimited-downside asymmetry against a quality compounder
Council scorecard
| Lens | School | Stance | Score | Conf |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Chuck Akre | quality | 🟢 pass | 78 | high |
| Terry Smith (Fundsmith) | quality | 🟢 pass | 78 | high |
| Michael Mauboussin | quality | 🟢 pass | 74 | medium |
| Charlie Munger | quality | 🟢 pass | 74 | medium |
| Valuation Referee (Damodaran-style) | referee | 🟢 pass | 72 | medium |
| AI & Disruption Referee (Christensen-style) | referee | 🟢 pass | 72 | medium |
| Forensic Short-Seller (Chanos/Einhorn-style) | referee | 🟢 pass | 72 | medium |
| Warren Buffett | quality | 🟡 watch | 62 | medium |
| Philip Fisher | growth | 🟡 watch | 58 | medium |
| Joel Greenblatt | value | 🟡 watch | 58 | medium |
| Bruce Greenwald | value | 🟡 watch | 58 | medium |
| Ray Dalio | risk | 🟡 watch | 55 | medium |
| Stanley Druckenmiller | risk | 🟡 watch | 52 | medium |
| Seth Klarman | value | 🟡 watch | 52 | medium |
| Peter Lynch | growth | 🟡 watch | 52 | medium |
| Howard Marks | risk | 🟡 watch | 52 | medium |
| Paul Singer | value | 🟡 watch | 52 | medium |
| Benjamin Graham | value | 🔴 avoid | 32 | high |
| Walter Schloss | value | 🔴 avoid | 18 | high |
Member reasoning
Chuck Akre — 🟢 pass · 78/100 · high confidence
Qualys is a capital-light, high-margin SaaS franchise in cybersecurity vulnerability management that meets the Akre three-legged stool with meaningful strength on two legs and reasonable (if not exceptional) marks on the third. First leg — extraordinary business economics: ROIC of 31.25% and ROE of 35.34% (fundamentals block, FY2025) are genuinely high and are NOT leverage-driven — the company carries no net debt (cash/equivalents of $250M per 10-K filed 2026-02-20, with total marketable securities of ~$478M at Dec 31 2025 per same filing). FCF margin of 45.49% on $669M revenue (FY2025 fundamentals) and operating margin of 33.17% reflect a capital-light cloud delivery model with capex of only $4.99M against $304M FCF (fundamentals, FY2025) — near-zero reinvestment in plant/equipment, confirming structural capital efficiency. Second leg — management skill and integrity: no restatements are indicated (10-K filed 2026-02-20 cover page checks 'no' for error corrections requiring recovery analysis); critical accounting estimates unchanged per multiple 10-Qs (2026-08-04 and 2026-05-05 filings each confirm 'no material changes'); net dollar expansion rate of 103%-104% across multiple periods (10-Q 2026-08-04, 10-Q 2026-05-05, 10-K 2026-02-20) reflects genuine customer retention economics. Share count is declining — 36.48M shares as of Feb 2025 (10-K filed 2025-02-21) versus 35.68M as of Feb 2026 (10-K filed 2026-02-20), consistent with a $1.6B cumulative buyback authorization (10-K 2026-02-20 notes board expanded to $1.6B). Insider 10b5-1 sales noted in narrative are routine and small relative to market cap. Third leg — reinvestment runway: this is the most nuanced leg. Revenue CAGR of ~11% over three years (fundamentals) and net dollar expansion barely above 100% suggest the core vulnerability management market is maturing. However, management cites AI-driven innovation and channel strength (narrative, Q2 2026), and FY2026 guidance raised to $732-738M from $721-727M after Q2 beat of $182M (+11% YoY per narrative). The company is expanding into broader CAASM/risk quantification use cases, and its cloud-native delivery model is extensible. The runway is real but not explosive — this is a compounder, not a hypergrowth story. Valuation: at $183.48, the stock trades at 20.85x price-to-FCF (fundamentals) and the two-stage DCF places intrinsic value at $262.85/share (valuation block, WACC 7.43%, terminal growth 2.5%), implying 43% upside. Even the bear case in the DCF is $201.59, above current price. At ~21x FCF for a near-50% FCF-margin, no-debt, 10%+ growing franchise in critical infrastructure security, the price is GARP-reasonable by Akre standards. AI risk: AI could commoditize some scanning/detection functions over a 3-10 year horizon, but vulnerability management and compliance workflows are deeply embedded in enterprise processes with high switching costs. More likely, AI enhances Qualys's detection capabilities (consistent with the Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition noted in 10-K 2025-02-21 for network detection) rather than displacing them. Overall: two and a half legs are solidly intact. The partial concern is reinvestment runway (11% growth is solid but not spectacular, and NDR barely above 100%). The business is a genuine compounder, the balance sheet is fortress-clean, returns on capital are exceptional without leverage, and the price is reasonable relative to intrinsic value. This clears the Akre bar for a pass, though not at peak conviction.
Key points
- ROIC 31.25% and ROE 35.34% (FY2025 fundamentals) are well above cost of capital with ZERO net debt — returns are pure business economics, not leverage artifacts
- FCF margin 45.49% with capex of only $4.99M on $669M revenue (FY2025 fundamentals) — capital-light cloud model is structurally exceptional
- Share count declining from 36.48M (Feb 2025, 10-K 2025-02-21) to 35.68M (Feb 2026, 10-K 2026-02-20) under a $1.6B cumulative buyback program (10-K 2026-02-20) — management returning capital sensibly
- No restatements, no accounting-estimate changes across multiple filings (10-K 2026-02-20; 10-Qs 2026-08-04 and 2026-05-05 each confirm no material changes to critical accounting estimates)
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85/share vs $183.48 current price (valuation block) — 43% upside; bear case $201.59 still above current price providing margin of safety
- Net dollar expansion rate 103-104% across five consecutive measurement periods (FY2024, FY2025 in 10-K 2026-02-20; Q1, Q2, Q3 2025 in quarterly filings) — durable retention economics
- AI/ML capability added via Blue Hexagon acquisition (10-K 2025-02-21) positions platform for AI-enhanced detection rather than AI displacement
Red flags
- Revenue CAGR only ~11% over 3 years (fundamentals) and net dollar expansion barely at 103-104% — reinvestment runway (third Akre leg) is real but not expansive; market appears to be maturing
- Narrative notes 7% analyst price target upside post Q2 rally, suggesting market may be partially efficient here even if DCF shows more upside
- AI commoditization risk over 5-10 years: if AI-native point solutions (e.g., from CrowdStrike, Wiz, or open-source tools) lower the barrier to vulnerability scanning, Qualys's per-seat pricing power could erode — not imminent but structurally worth monitoring
- Insider selling in June 2026 (CLO, Director per narrative) pre-dated the earnings rally — routine 10b5-1 plans but worth noting; no offsetting insider buying disclosed in available materials
- 82% of DCF value sits in terminal value (valuation block residual_value_pct 0.816) — highly sensitive to terminal growth and WACC assumptions; a modest terminal growth haircut or WACC increase would meaningfully compress intrinsic value
Terry Smith (Fundsmith) — 🟢 pass · 78/100 · high confidence
Qualys passes the Fundsmith quality screen on nearly every dimension I care about. The business is asset-light, subscription-based cybersecurity SaaS with no debt, exceptional cash conversion, and a durable moat rooted in switching costs and mission-critical positioning in enterprise vulnerability management. Let me work through the criteria systematically. ROCE/returns on capital: ROIC of 31.25% (fundamentals block) and ROE of 35.3% for FY2025 are well above any plausible cost of capital. Operating margin of 33.2% and net margin of 29.6% (FY2025, fundamentals) are both high and have been improving — net income grew from $71M in 2021 to $198M in 2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20). These are not single-year aberrations. Cash conversion: FCF of $304M vs net income of $198M in FY2025, giving a FCF/net income conversion ratio of 153% — exceptional. The business generates more cash than it reports in profit, which is exactly what I look for. FCF margins have been consistently 38-45% across the five-year history (fundamentals block), never materially dipping. This is not an accrual story. Capital intensity: Capex of only $5.0M against $669M revenue (0.75% of revenue, FY2025), and $4.99M capex per fundamentals. The company describes capital expenditures as 'mainly related to purchases of computer equipment' (10-Q filed 2026-08-04). This is about as asset-light as a business can be. Recurring revenue: Qualys is a pure subscription model — deferred revenue balances confirm advance billing; net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-05-05 cites 104% as of March 2026; 10-K filed 2026-02-20 cites 103% for both 2025 and 2024). Customers are staying and spending slightly more each year. The repeat-purchase nature of security subscriptions is precisely the kind of 'essential consumable sold repeatedly' that I favour. Balance sheet: Net cash position — $250M cash (fundamentals) plus ~$487M in marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04 shows total fair value of marketable securities of $485M at June 2026), against total liabilities of only $534M, of which a large portion is deferred revenue (a quality liability, not financial debt). Debt-to-equity is listed as null, implying no financial debt. This is a fortress balance sheet. Acquisitions: The only disclosed acquisitions are small tuck-ins — Blue Hexagon for $10M in 2022 and TotalCloud for a small sum in 2021 (10-K filed 2025-02-21). No serial roll-up, no large goodwill creation, no 'adjusted' earnings masking integration costs. Total intangibles net are only ~$3M at June 2026 (10-Q filed 2026-08-04). Valuation: Price-to-FCF of 20.85x (fundamentals) is the key metric for me. An FCF yield of ~4.8% for a business compounding FCF at 10-11% (revenue CAGR 10.96% per fundamentals) with 45% FCF margins is not cheap, but it is defensible for quality of this calibre. The two-stage DCF gives intrinsic value of $262.85 vs current price of $183.48, implying ~43% upside (valuation block, WACC 7.43%). Even the bear case DCF of $201.59 is above current price. P/E of 32x and P/S of 9.5x are elevated in absolute terms but the FCF yield and cash conversion make the FCF multiple the right lens — and 20.85x FCF for a 30%+ ROIC, near-zero capex, recurring-revenue business is not overvaluation in my framework. I score this 78 rather than higher because: (1) revenue growth of ~11% is solid but not exceptional for a security SaaS — the net dollar expansion rate of 103% suggests modest upsell dynamics, not a land-and-expand powerhouse; (2) the stock has rallied sharply (near 52-week high, up from $74.51 low) so the margin of safety has compressed; (3) AI disruption risk (see below) is real even if manageable. On AI: vulnerability management and asset risk scoring are becoming AI-augmented, which could be a tailwind (Qualys integrating AI into its platform, narrative cites 'AI-Driven Innovation') or a headwind if AI-native competitors undercut on price. The switching-cost moat from deep enterprise integration provides near-term protection, but this is a space to monitor over a 5-10 year horizon. Overall: a high-quality, cash-generative, asset-light SaaS business with strong returns on capital, clean financials, no debt, and a price that offers a reasonable margin of safety relative to intrinsic value. A pass.
Key points
- ROIC 31.25%, ROE 35.3% FY2025 — well above cost of capital, sustained across multi-year history (fundamentals block)
- FCF $304M vs net income $198M FY2025: cash conversion 153% — profits are real, not accruals (fundamentals)
- Capex only $5.0M on $669M revenue (0.75% intensity) — textbook asset-light model (fundamentals; 10-Q 2026-08-04)
- Net dollar expansion rate 103-104% confirms sticky, recurring subscription revenue (10-Q 2026-05-05; 10-K 2026-02-20)
- Fortress balance sheet: $250M cash + ~$485M marketable securities, no financial debt (fundamentals; 10-Q 2026-08-04)
- Operating margin 33.2%, net margin 29.6% — durable, high margins signalling real pricing power (fundamentals FY2025)
- Only small tuck-in acquisitions; negligible goodwill/intangibles ($3M net book value) — no roll-up risk (10-Q 2026-08-04; 10-K 2025-02-21)
- Price-to-FCF 20.85x (~4.8% FCF yield) for 30%+ ROIC business is fair, not stretched; DCF bear case $201.59 above current price (valuation block)
- $1.6B cumulative share repurchase authorization signals capital discipline and shareholder-friendly capital return (10-K 2026-02-20)
Red flags
- Revenue growth ~11% YoY is solid but modest for SaaS; net dollar expansion 103% suggests limited upsell velocity — compounding inside the customer base is not aggressive
- Stock near 52-week high ($183 vs $201.54 high) after 14% post-earnings spike — margin of safety has compressed materially from the $74.51 low
- AI-driven vulnerability management could attract well-funded AI-native entrants (CrowdStrike, Wiz, others) who could commoditize point-scanning offerings; 'AI-Driven Innovation' narrative from management lacks concrete revenue attribution per narrative caveats
- Insider selling in June 2026 (CLO and Director, 10b5-1 plans) pre-rally noted; not alarming but worth monitoring
- 82% of DCF value sits in terminal value (valuation block: residual_value_pct 0.816), making the intrinsic value highly sensitive to long-run growth assumptions — caveat on DCF confidence
Michael Mauboussin — 🟢 pass · 74/100 · medium confidence
Qualys presents a compelling ROIC-vs-WACC spread that is the core question for this lens. ROIC of 31.25% against a WACC of 7.43% (per the valuation block) represents a ~24-point spread — wide by any standard. The franchise is grounded in real, identifiable moat sources: switching costs (cloud-delivered vulnerability management platform creates deep workflow integration and compliance-reporting dependencies), scale economics (shared cloud platform spreads infrastructure costs across ~10,000+ enterprise customers, enabling the exceptional 45.5% FCF margin on $669M revenue per fundamentals block), and network/data effects (aggregated scan data across the installed base creates proprietary threat-intelligence signals competitors cannot replicate easily). The net dollar expansion rate of 103–104% (cited in both the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04) confirms customers are not leaving and are expanding — the clearest real-time moat validator I track. The expectations question is where I must be careful: the DCF implies an intrinsic value of $262.85/share versus $183.48 current price — a 43% margin of safety in the base case. The DCF uses 11% FCF growth (the 3-year revenue CAGR), a 7.43% WACC, and a 2.5% terminal growth rate. That 11% growth assumption is achievable — Q2 2026 delivered 11% YoY revenue per the narrative, and FY2026 guidance of $732–738M (raised post-Q2 per narrative) implies roughly 9–10% full-year growth. So the embedded expectation is not heroic; in fact the current price embeds a growth assumption below the DCF base. The bear case DCF at $201.59 still sits above the current $183.48 — a rare configuration where even a pessimistic scenario suggests upside. That said, I must temper conviction: 81.6% of the DCF enterprise value sits in the terminal value (per valuation block 'residual_value_pct': 0.816), which is extreme sensitivity. A 100bp increase in WACC or a 50bp reduction in terminal growth dramatically compresses that value. The moat trajectory question is the key risk: AI-enabled security platforms (CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, etc.) are converging on vulnerability management from adjacent positions, which could compress Qualys's pricing power and expansion rate over a 5–7 year horizon — the very window that dominates terminal value. The 'AI-Driven Innovation' headline in the narrative is unsubstantiated with specific revenue attribution in any filing, which is a yellow flag. Capital allocation is disciplined: capex is trivially small ($5.0M in 2025 per fundamentals), buybacks are active (share count fell from 36.5M in Feb 2025 to 35.7M in Feb 2026 per 10-K filings), and the $1.6B cumulative buyback authorization per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 reflects an ongoing program. FCF conversion from net income is excellent — $304M FCF on $198M net income in 2025. The base rate concern: high-ROIC software franchises with 30%+ spreads do mean-revert, but the timeline is often 10+ years when switching costs are real. The 104% NDE rate is the most important leading indicator — if it drops below 100%, the moat is eroding. For now it is stable-to-improving.
Key points
- ROIC of 31.25% vs WACC of 7.43% = ~24-point spread, wide and sustained across 2021–2025 FCF history (FCF margin: 42.9%, 37.5%, 42.5%, 38.2%, 45.5% — fundamentals history block)
- Net dollar expansion rate of 103–104% over multiple periods (10-K 2026-02-20; 10-Q 2026-08-04 and 2026-05-05) is the real-time moat validator; stable NDE above 100% confirms switching costs are real
- DCF bear case of $201.59 exceeds current price of $183.48 — the embedded growth expectations in the market price appear below the DCF base assumption of 11% FCF growth, creating genuine margin of safety
- Capex of $5.0M on $669M revenue (2025 fundamentals) = asset-light model with operating leverage; SBC-adjusted FCF of $304M in 2025 confirms quality of earnings
- Share count reduction from ~36.5M (Feb 2025) to ~35.7M (Feb 2026) per 10-K filings signals disciplined buyback below what appears to be intrinsic value
- FY2026 guidance raised to $732–738M after Q2 beat (narrative); implies management confidence without requiring heroic growth assumptions
- No debt (debt_to_equity: null in fundamentals); net cash position with $250M cash plus ~$485M+ in marketable securities (10-Q 2026-08-04 excerpt) — fortress balance sheet eliminates financial risk from the distribution
Red flags
- Terminal value represents 81.6% of enterprise value (valuation block 'residual_value_pct') — extreme sensitivity to WACC and terminal growth assumptions; 100bp WACC increase or 50bp terminal growth cut would materially compress fair value
- AI-native competitors (unverifiable against this fact base but a known structural threat) converging on vulnerability management from broader platforms could compress NDE rate over the 5–7 year horizon that drives terminal value — the moat's trajectory is the key unresolved question
- 'AI-Driven Innovation' cited as a growth driver in narrative but no specific revenue attribution, product differentiation metrics, or customer win data visible in any filing — risk of narrative inflation without fundamental support
- Revenue growth of 3-year CAGR at 10.96% is solid but not accelerating; Q2 2026 at 11% YoY (narrative) and full-year guidance implying ~9–10% do not suggest re-acceleration, making the DCF's 11% assumption roughly at-the-limit rather than conservative
- Insider selling by CLO and a Director in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (narrative) is routine but worth monitoring if pace accelerates — insiders sold ahead of the +14% earnings rally, which limits the negative signal but reduces the positive one
Charlie Munger — 🟢 pass · 74/100 · medium confidence
Qualys is a durable, asset-light cloud security business that passes the most important Munger tests: consistently high returns on capital, genuine switching costs, clean accounting with FCF well in excess of GAAP earnings, and a balance sheet with net cash. The business model is easy to understand — subscription-based vulnerability management and security compliance delivered via a multi-tenant cloud platform, billed in advance, generating large and predictable deferred-revenue balances. ROIC of 31.3% (fundamentals block, fiscal year 2025) and ROE of 35.3% are well above any reasonable hurdle rate and have been sustained across multiple years in the history provided. FCF conversion is exceptional: $304M of free cash flow on $198M of net income in FY2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20), a ratio greater than 1.5x, which is the hallmark of high-quality earnings. Operating margins of 33% and FCF margins of 45% are not accidental — they reflect the platform's genuine operating leverage and low incremental delivery cost once the cloud infrastructure is built. The moat is real but debatable in permanence: enterprise security buyers face high switching costs (deep integration with IT asset inventories, compliance workflows, audit trails), and Qualys's cloud-native, agent-based architecture creates stickiness evidenced by a net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Qs filed 2026-05-05 and 2026-08-04), meaning the installed base grows without net churn. This is a moat characteristic, not a commodity. Capital allocation has been disciplined: capex of only $5M on $669M of revenue (10-K FY2025) makes this an almost capital-free business in the physical sense, and the board has authorized $1.6 billion in cumulative repurchases (10-K filed 2026-02-20), returning cash to shareholders rather than empire-building. Shares outstanding have declined (36.5M at Feb 2025 vs 35.7M at Feb 2026 per 10-K filings), confirming real per-share accretion rather than dilution. Debt-to-equity is null in the data, and the balance sheet shows $250M cash plus ~$485M in marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04) against $534M total liabilities, yielding a strongly net-cash position — exactly the fortress balance sheet Munger prefers. Accounting is clean: no goodwill bloat (intangible assets net only $3M as of June 2026 per 10-Q), no restatements flagged, no aggressive revenue recognition red flags, and the 10-K explicitly confirms no material changes to critical accounting estimates. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85/share versus a current price of $183.48 implies 43% upside at base case assumptions (WACC 7.4%, 11% near-term FCF growth, 2.5% terminal). Even the bear case of $201.59 is above today's price, providing a margin of safety. The price-to-FCF of 20.9x for a business compounding owner earnings at 10%+ with 45% FCF margins and net cash is not cheap, but it is fair — precisely the 'great business at a fair price' that Munger pays up for rather than a cigar butt. The PEG of 2.92 and P/S of 9.5x are elevated but not heroically so for this quality tier. On AI disruption: this is the key risk to assess carefully. AI could cut both ways — it could commoditize vulnerability scanning tools as open-source LLM-powered alternatives emerge, threatening the moat from below; but it also expands the attack surface enterprises must manage and elevates the urgency of what Qualys sells. Management cited 'AI-Driven Innovation' in Q2 2026 (narrative), though specific product detail is not in the fact base. On balance, AI is likely a modest tailwind near-term and a medium-term watch item rather than an existential threat, given the depth of enterprise integration. Key concerns preventing a higher score: revenue CAGR of only 11% (fundamentals block) is modest for a SaaS company at this valuation; the competitive landscape includes well-resourced rivals (Tenable, CrowdStrike, Rapid7) whose dynamics are not detailed in the fact base; and the narrative notes insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans, which is routine but worth noting. The stock's 68% prior-period run and only ~7% sell-side upside (narrative) suggest the market has already partially recognized quality. Nevertheless, on a Munger quality screen, this is a genuine pass — not a screaming bargain but a high-quality compounder at a fair price that one could hold for years.
Key points
- ROIC of 31.3% and ROE of 35.3% in FY2025 (fundamentals block) — well above 15% quality threshold, sustained across the full 2021-2025 history
- FCF of $304M on net income of $198M in FY2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20) — FCF/NI ratio of 1.54x confirms high-quality, cash-backed earnings; no accounting inflation
- Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Qs filed 2026-05-05 and 2026-08-04) evidences sticky installed base with real switching costs — a moat marker
- Capital-light model: capex only $5M on $669M revenue (fundamentals, FY2025); ~1.6B total authorized buybacks and declining share count confirm owner-minded, non-dilutive capital allocation
- Net cash position — $250M cash plus ~$485M marketable securities against $534M total liabilities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04) — survives any cyclical downturn without stress
- DCF bear case of $201.59/share exceeds current price of $183.48, providing margin of safety even under conservative assumptions (valuation block)
- Business model is simple and understandable: SaaS vulnerability management billed in advance, multi-tenant cloud, no physical delivery — squarely within a readable circle of competence
Red flags
- Revenue CAGR of only 11% (fundamentals block) is moderate for a 9.5x P/S valuation; any deceleration would compress the multiple materially
- AI could commoditize vulnerability scanning from below — specific AI product differentiation is asserted by management (narrative) but not detailed in available filings; must monitor
- Competitive dynamics vs. Tenable, CrowdStrike, Rapid7 not quantified in fact base — moat durability assertion relies on switching-cost logic rather than market share data
- Insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (narrative) is routine but directionally bears watching; no insider buying on record in the fact base
- 82% of DCF value is in the terminal value (valuation block: residual_value_pct 0.816), meaning the investment thesis is highly sensitive to long-run growth and WACC assumptions — a known fragility of any DCF on a quality compounder
Valuation Referee (Damodaran-style) — 🟢 pass · 72/100 · medium confidence
The DCF provided in the fact base produces an intrinsic value of $262.85/share versus a current price of $183.48, implying ~43% upside at the base case. The bear-case sensitivity is $201.59 — still above the current price — which means QLYS trades below even the conservative scenario in this model. That is a meaningful margin of safety by Damodaran standards. Let me stress-test the underlying assumptions before accepting that conclusion.
GROWTH ASSUMPTION: The DCF uses 10.96% FCF growth (sourced from the 3-year revenue CAGR per the fact base). Historical revenue: $411M (2021) → $489M (2022) → $554M (2023) → $608M (2024) → $669M (2025). The 3-year CAGR 2022-2025 is approximately 10.9%. Q2 2026 revenue was $182M (+11% YoY) per the narrative, and FY2026 guidance was raised to $732-738M, implying ~10% growth. So 10.96% is consistent with both recent history and near-term guidance — not heroic. The expectation implied is not above-base-rate; it matches demonstrated performance.
MARGIN/FCF QUALITY: FCF margin has been remarkably consistent: 42.9% (2021), 37.5% (2022), 42.5% (2023), 38.2% (2024), 45.5% (2025). The 2025 FCF of $304M on $669M revenue is exceptional. Operating margin was 33.2% (2025 per fundamentals). Net dollar expansion rate was 103-104% (per 10-Q filings), indicating durable retention with modest upsell. These are genuine numbers from filings, not narrative.
ROIC vs. WACC: ROIC is reported at 31.25% (fundamentals block) vs. a WACC of 7.43% used in the DCF. The spread is enormous — well above cost of capital — meaning growth is genuinely value-creating. Capex is minimal ($5.0M in 2025 per fundamentals), consistent with a capital-light SaaS model. Sales-to-capital ratio is very high; reinvestment needs are low relative to the growth delivered, which is internally consistent for a cloud-based SaaS business.
WACC CRITIQUE: The 7.43% WACC uses beta of 0.625. This is a low beta for a technology company. A reasonable challenge: at beta of 0.8-1.0, cost of equity rises to ~8.5-9.5%, compressing the DCF value. Using a 9% WACC with the same growth assumptions, the terminal value would shrink materially. However, even under that stress, given the 43% upside in the base case, there is likely still positive margin of safety — though the bear case at $201.59 might not hold. The fact base does not provide enough detail to compute a full re-run, so I flag this as the primary uncertainty.
TERMINAL VALUE RISK: 81.6% of enterprise value is in terminal value (per the valuation block). Terminal growth of 2.5% is roughly at nominal GDP — defensible. But with 81.6% terminal value weight, WACC sensitivity is very high. This is a legitimate concern: if WACC is 1-2% higher than modeled, the intrinsic value could fall below current price.
REINVESTMENT CONSISTENCY: Capex was $5.0M in 2025 (per fundamentals). OCF was $309M. The growth story is funded primarily by platform economics, not heavy capital expenditure — consistent with a SaaS business where R&D (partially expensed) and the shared cloud platform drive growth. The 10-Q (filed 2026-08-04) notes capital expenditures of $5.4M for the six months ended June 30, 2026, still minimal.
STORY-TO-NUMBERS CHECK: The narrative cites 'AI-Driven Innovation' and channel strength. From a Damodaran perspective, these are plausible but need to be grounded. The 103-104% net dollar expansion rate (from both 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) is the key metric — it confirms customers are staying and modestly expanding, consistent with a sustainable mid-single-digit to low-double-digit growth story. No heroic assumptions needed.
AI DISRUPTION (DAMODARAN FRAME): Qualys operates in vulnerability management/cybersecurity. AI could be a double-edged sword: it may enhance Qualys's product (they acquired Blue Hexagon's AI/ML network detection per 10-K filed 2025-02-21), but it also lowers barriers for new entrants and could commoditize vulnerability scanning. The net effect is uncertain over 3-10 years. For valuation purposes, the growth rate of ~11% already embeds a deceleration scenario (not hypergrowth), so AI disruption risk is partially priced into the conservative assumption set.
WHY NOT HIGHER SCORE: (1) WACC of 7.43% may be too low for a tech company — this is the biggest DCF risk and I cannot fully resolve it from the fact base; (2) 81.6% terminal value dependency means intrinsic value is highly sensitive to discount rate; (3) The narrative's 'AI-Driven Innovation' claims are unsubstantiated in filings — no product revenue attribution; (4) Competition from larger platforms (not quantified in available data) could erode the 103% net expansion rate. Score of 72 reflects a genuine but not slam-dunk margin of safety that depends partly on accepting a sub-8% WACC.
Key points
- Base-case DCF intrinsic value $262.85 vs. current price $183.48 = 43% upside; bear-case sensitivity $201.59 still above market price (valuation block)
- 10.96% growth assumption matches actual 3-year revenue CAGR and FY2026 raised guidance of $732-738M (narrative/10-Q 2026-08-04) — not heroic
- ROIC 31.25% vs. WACC 7.43% = massive value-creating spread; growth is genuinely additive to intrinsic value
- FCF margin 45.5% in FY2025 ($304M on $669M revenue) and consistent 38-45% range over 4 years confirms quality of cash generation (fundamentals history block)
- Net dollar expansion rate 103-104% confirmed in multiple filings (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-05-05, 2026-08-04) — durable retention underpins growth assumption
- Capex minimal ($5.0M FY2025, $5.4M H1 2026 per 10-Q 2026-08-04) — capital-light SaaS model makes high FCF margin internally consistent with growth story
- Terminal growth of 2.5% at or near nominal GDP — not inflated; terminal value is 81.6% of EV, which is standard but creates WACC sensitivity risk
Red flags
- WACC of 7.43% derived from beta of 0.625 — low for a technology company; at beta 0.85-1.0, WACC rises to ~8.5-9.5%, potentially eroding the bear-case margin of safety significantly
- 81.6% of enterprise value sits in terminal value (valuation block) — model is extremely sensitive to discount rate; 1% WACC increase could compress intrinsic value by 20-25%
- AI disruption risk to vulnerability management is real and unquantified: lower barriers to entry could compress net expansion rates over the 3-10 year DCF horizon
- 'AI-Driven Innovation' narrative cited in earnings (narrative section) is unsubstantiated in SEC filings — no product revenue attribution or customer win data available to validate the story-to-numbers connection
- No earnings call transcript available (narrative caveat); management's forward commentary and competitive positioning cannot be fully assessed
- Modest analyst price target of $171.94 implied post-rally (narrative) vs. $262.85 DCF — significant disagreement with sell-side consensus warrants checking whether DCF inputs (especially WACC and terminal growth) are market-consensus or optimistic
AI & Disruption Referee (Christensen-style) — 🟢 pass · 72/100 · medium confidence
Qualys occupies a specific and defensible position in the cybersecurity stack: cloud-based vulnerability management, compliance, and attack surface management delivered as an agent-based and agentless SaaS platform. The Christensen disruption test requires asking whether AI can do the job Qualys does — continuously scanning, cataloguing, and prioritizing vulnerabilities across enterprise assets — cheaper, faster, or good-enough without Qualys. The answer is nuanced but ultimately more favorable than the average software intermediary.
The core job Qualys does is NOT a knowledge-work or matching intermediary function. It is a technical sensing and classification system: its scanners ingest telemetry from agents deployed on endpoints, cloud workloads, and network devices, match observed states against a curated vulnerability knowledge base (including CVE mapping, CVSS scoring, and proprietary intelligence), and produce prioritized remediation queues. This is infrastructure, not arbitrage. The stickiness comes from agent deployment at the endpoint level, integration into ITSM/CMDB workflows, and compliance reporting tied to audit requirements (10-K filed 2026-02-20 references subscription-based recurring revenue collected in advance, consistent with deep workflow integration). Net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% across 2024-2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20; 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) confirm customers are not quietly churning or shrinking spend.
AI as a threat vector: The legitimate disruption risk is that generative AI and LLM-based security tools (from CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender/Security Copilot, or AI-native entrants) could commoditize vulnerability prioritization — the analytical layer on top of the scan data. Microsoft Security Copilot, for instance, can already help a security analyst interpret CVE data and draft remediation plans. If customers perceive that 'good-enough' AI-driven triage is available through their existing Microsoft/Google/CrowdStrike bundle, Qualys's analytical premium could erode. This is the hyperscaler bundling risk and it is real. However, it attacks the highest-layer analytical product, not the core sensor/agent infrastructure, which is where switching costs are deepest.
AI as a tailwind: The narrative (Aug 5 2026 earnings call summary in the fact base) cites 'AI-Driven Innovation' as a growth driver. The Blue Hexagon acquisition (10-K filed 2025-02-21) introduced AI/ML-based network detection capabilities — 'behavior patterns including active vulnerability exploitation, identification of advanced network threats, and adaptive risk mitigation.' This suggests Qualys is embedding AI into its own detection engine rather than being bypassed by it. The expansion of the attack surface driven by AI-generated code, shadow IT proliferation, and cloud-native workloads structurally enlarges the vulnerability management TAM — more assets to scan, more CVEs to track, more compliance regimes to satisfy. Qualys as the scanning infrastructure benefits from these tailwinds even if the analytics layer commoditizes.
The falsifiable call: Evidence that AI IS displacing Qualys would be: net dollar expansion rates falling below 100% (contraction in existing accounts), customers citing Microsoft or CrowdStrike as replacement for VM workloads, average contract values declining despite expanding asset footprints, or an AI-native entrant (e.g., a cloud-provider-native scanner) undercutting on price. Evidence that AI is NOT displacing it: continued 103-104%+ NDE, growing compliance and CNAPP product attach, and rising FCF margins (FCF margin rose to 45.5% in FY2025 from 38.1% in FY2024 per fundamentals block). Current evidence tilts toward the latter but the Microsoft Security Copilot bundling risk deserves monitoring. Management's framing of AI as pure tailwind (per narrative) with no disclosed discussion of displacement risk is a modest concern — but the acquisition of Blue Hexagon and the agent-infrastructure moat suggest this is not pure denial.
Net: Qualys is not a disintermediation target in the classical sense. Its moat is technical infrastructure (agents on endpoints, proprietary scan data, compliance workflow integration), not matching/optimization that a model can replicate from the outside. The hyperscaler bundling risk is real at the analytics layer. Score 72 — a cautious pass that acknowledges the risk is manageable if the company continues embedding AI into its own platform and if NDE rates hold.
Key points
- Core product is technical scanning infrastructure (agents on endpoints, cloud workloads) — not a matching/optimization intermediary that AI can trivially displace from the outside
- Net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% (10-K 2026-02-20; 10-Q 2026-05-05) show no current churn or contraction signals that would indicate quiet commoditization
- Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition (noted in 10-K 2025-02-21) embeds AI into the detection engine — Qualys is attempting to BE the AI layer, not be bypassed by it
- FCF margins expanded to 45.5% in FY2025 from 38.2% in FY2024 (fundamentals block) — no margin compression consistent with commoditization pressure yet
- Expanding attack surface from AI-generated code, cloud proliferation, and new compliance regimes (OBBBA referenced in 10-Q 2026-08-04) structurally enlarges TAM for vulnerability management
- Subscription revenue collected in advance with deep ITSM/CMDB integration creates workflow switching costs that resist 'good-enough' AI substitution
Red flags
- Microsoft Security Copilot and CrowdStrike Falcon bundling represent a credible hyperscaler risk — if VM analytics get bundled into existing enterprise security suites, Qualys's analytical layer pricing could compress even if infrastructure remains sticky
- Management's 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging (narrative, Aug 2026) lacks specificity — no disclosed revenue attribution, customer win data, or differentiated AI capability claims that would confirm genuine AI product leadership rather than marketing veneer
- 10% revenue CAGR (3-year, fundamentals block) is solid but not exceptional; if AI-native entrants offer comparable scanning at lower price points, growth could decelerate before the DCF terminal-value assumption of 2.5% growth is reached
- Residual value is 81.6% of DCF enterprise value (valuation block) — highly sensitive to terminal assumptions; any structural demand impairment from bundling or commoditization would hit intrinsic value disproportionately
- No evidence in filings of management explicitly naming displacement risk or showing a funded, differentiated AI data-moat strategy beyond the Blue Hexagon integration
Forensic Short-Seller (Chanos/Einhorn-style) — 🟢 pass · 72/100 · medium confidence
Applying forensic short-seller tests to Qualys, the accounting quality is genuinely strong, which is the primary finding — this is not a short. The core Chanos/Einhorn test (earnings vs. cash) comes out clean or better: net income of $198.3M in FY2025 is actually LOWER than operating cash flow of $309.4M and free cash flow of $304.4M (fundamentals block). FCF margin of 45.5% on FY2025 revenue of $669M is exceptional for a SaaS company. Across the historical table, FCF has consistently exceeded or tracked near net income every year (2021: NI $71M vs FCF $176M; 2022: NI $108M vs FCF $183M; 2023: NI $151.6M vs FCF $235.8M; 2024: NI $173.7M vs FCF $231.8M; 2025: NI $198.3M vs FCF $304.4M). This is the opposite of an accrual fraud pattern — cash consistently and materially exceeds reported earnings, suggesting conservative revenue recognition and real cash conversion. Revenue recognition: Qualys collects subscription fees in advance (noted in both the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and 10-Q filed 2026-08-04 under market risk discussion: 'limit credit exposure by collecting subscription fees in advance'). Deferred revenue on the balance sheet ($467M current liabilities as of 2025-12-31 per fundamentals) acts as a cash-in-advance buffer. This structure is the opposite of aggressive revenue recognition — revenue is recognized after cash is received. Net dollar expansion rate: 103-104% as disclosed across multiple filings (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-05-05 citing 104% as of March 31, 2026), indicating modest but stable customer expansion with no evidence of cohort decay. Capitalized costs: Intangible assets from acquisitions are de minimis and rapidly amortizing — developed technology net book value was only $4.2M as of December 31, 2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20), down from $6.8M at end of 2024. Capex is micro at $5.0M for FY2025 (fundamentals block), confirming the asset-light cloud delivery model. No evidence of aggressive capitalization of R&D or customer acquisition costs. Share count and buybacks: Shares outstanding fell from approximately 36.5M (Feb 2025 per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) to 35.7M (Feb 2026 per 10-K filed 2026-02-20), confirming buybacks are actually reducing share count, not merely offsetting SBC dilution. The board authorized $200M additional repurchase in FY2025, bringing total authorized to $1.6B (10-K filed 2026-02-20) — this is accretive repurchase by the evidence available. Balance sheet: No debt disclosed (debt_to_equity is null in fundamentals; total liabilities of $533.9M vs. current liabilities of $467.3M suggests the bulk is deferred revenue, not financial debt). Net cash position: $250.3M cash plus ~$485M in marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04 shows total marketable securities fair value of $485.4M), giving a substantial net cash position. No refinancing risk whatsoever. Governance: No auditor changes, no restatements indicated (10-K cover page language confirms no error corrections requiring recovery analysis, per both 10-K filings). Insider selling flagged in narrative (CLO and director sold modest amounts in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans) — amounts are small (~$95K and ~$55K per narrative) and pre-established, not a red flag. No CFO turnover or related-party issues found in filings. Bears and red flags worth noting: (1) Valuation is rich — P/FCF of ~20.8x and P/S of ~9.5x (fundamentals) for ~11% revenue CAGR is not cheap; the forensic lens does not score on valuation richness per se but notes that if growth decelerates, the multiple compression risk is real. (2) Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% is only barely above 100% — not the 120%+ land-and-expand story; customer base is not rapidly expanding ARPU. (3) AI narrative cited as driver in Q2 2026 earnings (narrative) lacks specificity in available filings — 'AI-Driven Innovation' headline without revenue attribution is a governance/disclosure concern worth watching. (4) The kill question: What would make this a short? A sustained deceleration in revenue growth below ~8% combined with FCF margin compression AND evidence of deferred revenue drawdown (current deferred revenue shrinking) would signal demand exhaustion. None of those signals are present in current data. The bear case is not falsifiable from current filings. Overall forensic verdict: This is an accounting-quality name, not a short candidate. The only lens-appropriate score below 70 would require finding earnings-cash divergence, aggressive capitalization, or governance rot — none of which are present. Score 72 reflects the clean accounting (strong pass on core tests) offset by the rich valuation and modestly decelerating growth metrics that a forensic analyst would flag as forward risk.
Key points
- Core Chanos test passes cleanly: FCF of $304.4M exceeds net income of $198.3M in FY2025; pattern holds across all 5 years of historical data — cash consistently and materially exceeds reported earnings (fundamentals history block)
- Revenue recognition is conservative: subscription fees collected in advance per 10-K and 10-Q filings; deferred revenue (bulk of ~$467M current liabilities) acts as a cash-ahead buffer, the opposite of aggressive recognition
- Capex is micro at $5.0M for FY2025 (fundamentals), no material capitalization of R&D or customer acquisition costs; intangible net book value falling rapidly to $4.2M at end of 2025 per 10-K filed 2026-02-20
- Buybacks are genuinely accretive: share count fell from ~36.5M (Feb 2025) to ~35.7M (Feb 2026) per respective 10-K filings; SBC not masking dilution
- Balance sheet has no financial debt evident; net cash + marketable securities position substantial (>$700M combined); zero refinancing risk
- Net dollar expansion rate stable at 103-104% across multiple periods (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-05-05, 10-Q 2025-11-04) — no cohort decay signal but also no acceleration
- No auditor changes, restatements, or going-concern language in either 10-K; internal controls affirmed in both annual filings
Red flags
- Net dollar expansion of only 103-104% is barely above churn-replacement level; if it dips below 100%, the revenue model faces meaningful headwind — worth monitoring quarterly
- AI narrative ('AI-Driven Innovation') cited in earnings headline (narrative) but unsupported by specific revenue metrics or product attribution in available SEC filings — promotional language without backing disclosure warrants skepticism
- Modest insider sales in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (CLO ~$95K, director ~$55K per narrative) are routine but pre-dated the August earnings beat; insufficient in magnitude to be a red flag but noted for pattern-tracking
- Revenue CAGR of ~11% (fundamentals) for a stock at 9.5x P/S and 20.8x P/FCF leaves no room for deceleration — not a forensic accounting issue but a valuation/catalyst risk the short-seller would identify as the primary bear trigger
- Kill question: Short thesis would require evidence of deferred revenue drawdown, net dollar expansion falling below 100%, or FCF margin compression — none present in current data; bear case is currently not falsifiable from filings
Warren Buffett — 🟡 watch · 62/100 · medium confidence
Qualys presents several characteristics I find genuinely attractive: a capital-light SaaS subscription model with very high free cash flow conversion (~45% FCF margin in 2025 per fundamentals), consistent profitability with net margins near 30%, and essentially zero debt (net cash position with ~$250M cash plus ~$478M in marketable securities per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20). ROIC of 31% and ROE of 35% are exceptional and achieved without leverage — that is exactly the kind of return profile I associate with genuine competitive advantage. Capex is trivially small ($5M on $669M revenue in 2025 per fundamentals), so owner earnings closely approximate reported free cash flow. The net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (cited across multiple 10-Q filings for 2025-2026) suggests customers stay and modestly expand — a hallmark of switching costs in enterprise software. Revenue has grown steadily from $411M (2021) to $669M (2025), a 3-year CAGR of ~11%, and Q2 2026 showed 11% YoY growth with guidance raised to $732-738M per the narrative. The share count has been shrinking — from 36.5M shares (Feb 2025 per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) to 35.7M (Feb 2026 per 10-K filed 2026-02-20) — indicating management is buying back stock, which is rational capital allocation when the business generates substantial excess cash. The repurchase authorization has grown to $1.6B total per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20. These are marks of honest, shareholder-friendly stewardship. However, I have meaningful reservations. First, valuation: at $183.48 with a P/E of 32x and price-to-FCF of ~20.8x, I am paying a full price. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85/share implies 43% upside, which sounds appealing, but 82% of that value sits in the terminal value — a highly assumption-sensitive figure. The bear case of $201.59 is only modestly above current price, offering thin margin of safety. A wonderful business at a fair price beats a fair business at a wonderful price, but I still want a cushion. Second, the moat's durability is my principal uncertainty. Vulnerability management and cloud security is a contested space. I can observe that margins have held or improved and the dollar expansion rate has been stable, but I cannot fully assess whether Qualys's technological position versus CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Tenable, and others is widening or narrowing from this fact base. The competitive dynamics in enterprise cybersecurity software are genuinely difficult to forecast a decade out — this is at the edge of my circle of competence. Third, AI represents a double-edged risk here: management cites 'AI-Driven Innovation' (narrative), but the fact base provides no revenue attribution or product specifics. AI could enhance Qualys's threat detection capabilities (the Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition per 10-K 2025-02-21 is directionally positive), but it could also commoditize vulnerability scanning if larger platform players (Microsoft, CrowdStrike) bake equivalent capability into broader security suites at lower incremental cost. That risk is real and unresolved. The business quality is genuinely high — this is not a mediocre business. But at current prices, with a thin bear-case margin of safety and moat durability questions I cannot fully resolve, I would watch for a better entry rather than act today.
Key points
- Exceptional capital-light economics: FCF margin of 45.5% in 2025 and capex of only $5M on $669M revenue (fundamentals), meaning owner earnings ≈ reported FCF
- Outstanding unleveraged returns: ROIC 31%, ROE 35% with net debt negative (net cash ~$250M cash + ~$478M marketable securities per 10-K filed 2026-02-20)
- Subscription stickiness evidenced by net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% consistently across 2024-2026 (10-K filed 2026-02-20, 10-Q filed 2026-05-05, 10-Q filed 2026-08-04)
- Rational capital allocation: share count reduced from 36.5M to 35.7M over one year (10-Ks 2025-02-21 and 2026-02-20); $1.6B total buyback authorization (10-K 2026-02-20)
- Revenue growing steadily and profitably: $411M (2021) to $669M (2025), net income $71M to $198M over same period (fundamentals history); Q2 2026 beat with guidance raised to $732-738M (narrative)
- Conservative balance sheet with no meaningful debt, extensive liquid investment portfolio in Treasuries and high-grade bonds (10-Q 2026-08-04)
Red flags
- Valuation offers thin margin of safety: bear-case DCF of $201.59 is only ~10% above current price of $183.48; 82% of DCF value resides in terminal value (valuation block) — small assumption changes could eliminate the cushion
- Moat durability is uncertain: cybersecurity is intensely competitive with large-platform incumbents (Microsoft, CrowdStrike); fact base does not provide gross margin trend or market share data to confirm widening moat
- AI disruption risk unresolved: management touts 'AI-Driven Innovation' (narrative) but no revenue attribution or product differentiation detail available; larger platform players could commoditize vulnerability scanning
- Circle of competence concern: predicting the competitive dynamics of enterprise cybersecurity software a decade out is genuinely difficult; this is closer to the edge of what I can underwrite with confidence
- Insider selling in June 2026 pre-earnings (narrative) — described as 10b5-1 plan routine, but worth noting insiders did not hold through the 14% post-earnings jump
- AI claims lack specificity in available materials — 'AI-Driven Innovation' headline without concrete product wins or revenue attribution could reflect marketing rather than durable differentiation
Philip Fisher — 🟡 watch · 58/100 · medium confidence
Qualys is a legitimate SaaS cybersecurity business with real recurring revenue, high margins, and strong cash generation — all features I admire. However, through my growth lens, the critical question is whether the organic sales growth runway is long, visible, and accelerating or at least durable at above-industry rates. The fact base reveals a 3-year revenue CAGR of roughly 11% (10-K filed 2026-02-20, fundamentals block), which is respectable but not exceptional for a cybersecurity SaaS firm operating in a market where peers like CrowdStrike are growing 20-30%+. The net dollar expansion rate — a clean proxy for organic expansion within the installed base — was 103% for fiscal year 2025 and 104% as of Q1/Q2 2026 (10-Q filed 2026-05-05, 2026-08-04). This is healthy but not outstanding; it indicates modest upsell/cross-sell momentum, not a platform that is rapidly capturing wallet share. Revenue grew 11% YoY in Q2 2026 per the narrative, and full-year 2026 guidance of $732-738M implies approximately 10% growth — consistent with the historical trend but showing no acceleration. On margins, Qualys is genuinely impressive: operating margin of 33.2% and FCF margin of 45.5% for fiscal 2025 (fundamentals block) are among the best in software. These are margins I associate with a durable, well-run franchise. The model is asset-light with capex of only $5M on $669M revenue (10-K filed 2026-02-20), and operating cash flow of $309M demonstrates real cash generation, not accounting fiction. The concern is whether these superior margins reflect pricing power and genuine competitive moat, or whether they come partly at the cost of underinvestment in R&D and go-to-market relative to faster-growing rivals. The fact base does not provide explicit R&D dollar amounts or R&D-as-a-percent-of-revenue, which is a significant gap for my assessment — I cannot verify whether Qualys is investing adequately in its product pipeline to sustain the franchise. The Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition for $10M (10-K filed 2025-02-21) and TotalCloud acquisition were small tuck-ins, not transformative product bets; total acquired intangible cost is $40.1M (10-Q filed 2026-08-04), suggesting a relatively modest acquisition-driven R&D supplement. Management's 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging is noted in the narrative but lacks substantiation — no concrete product launches, no revenue attribution, no customer wins are documented in the available fact base. This is precisely the kind of promotional language I am skeptical of without corroboration. The scuttlebutt dimension is thin: the narrative provides retail sentiment and some institutional buying signals, but no independent customer, supplier, or competitor color that would let me assess whether Qualys truly owns a defensible position in vulnerability management or is slowly being commoditized by better-resourced competitors. The share repurchase program totaling $1.6B authorized (10-K filed 2026-02-20) is capital return to shareholders rather than reinvestment in growth — not inherently wrong, but it signals a business in harvest mode more than a high-growth compounder. Shares outstanding declined from 36.5M (2024 10-K) to 35.7M (2025 10-K), confirming meaningful buyback activity. For a Fisher-style long-term growth holding, I want to see management plowing capital into the franchise, not primarily returning it. On management integrity: no restatements, clean audit opinions, and the 10-K cover pages confirm no error corrections (10-K filed 2026-02-20). The fact base does not reveal candor issues or evasiveness, but the lack of a full earnings transcript limits my ability to apply the scuttlebutt test to management communication quality. AI disruption is a double-edged sword for Qualys: cybersecurity spending is accelerating partly because AI creates new attack surfaces, which benefits QLYS as a vulnerability management platform. However, AI also enables better-resourced platform players (Microsoft, Palo Alto) to bundle vulnerability management into broader security suites, potentially commoditizing QLYS's standalone offering. The 'AI-Driven Innovation' narrative suggests management is aware of this but the product response is not yet documented with specificity. The DCF from the valuation block shows $262.85 intrinsic value per share versus $183.48 current price, a 43% upside, using 11% FCF growth and 7.43% WACC. The bear case of $201.59 still implies upside, suggesting the price is not egregiously stretched on a DCF basis. However, the terminal value represents 81.6% of enterprise value, making the valuation highly sensitive to long-term growth assumptions — and 11% terminal-period growth fading to 2.5% perpetuity is the key risk if competitive intensity accelerates. Synthesis: Qualys is a high-quality, well-managed business with genuinely superior economics, but it is growing at a rate more consistent with a mature market leader than a Fisher-style compounding grower. The missing R&D data, unsubstantiated AI claims, and lack of independent scuttlebutt corroboration prevent a confident pass. I assign a watch rather than a clear buy.
Key points
- Revenue CAGR of ~11% over 3 years (fundamentals block) is solid but below the pace I associate with long-term compounders; FY2026 guidance of $732-738M implies ~10% growth with no visible acceleration
- Operating margin 33.2% and FCF margin 45.5% for fiscal 2025 (fundamentals block) are genuinely exceptional — among the best in software — and indicate real pricing power or scale advantage
- Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-08-04; 10-K filed 2026-02-20) is healthy but not outstanding; cross-sell/upsell velocity within the installed base is modest
- Asset-light model with capex of only $5M on $669M revenue (10-K filed 2026-02-20); operating cash flow $309M represents genuine cash generation
- Share repurchase program totaling $1.6B authorized (10-K filed 2026-02-20) suggests capital allocation in harvest mode rather than aggressive reinvestment in growth franchise
- Clean financial reporting: no restatements, unqualified audit opinion, no material accounting estimate changes per multiple 10-Q filings; management integrity not questioned by available evidence
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85 vs. $183.48 current price (valuation block) suggests meaningful upside, though 81.6% of value resides in terminal value — highly sensitive to long-run growth assumptions
Red flags
- R&D spending as a percentage of revenue is not disclosed in available fact base — a critical gap; cannot verify whether Qualys is investing adequately in the product pipeline to sustain competitive position against better-resourced rivals
- 'AI-Driven Innovation' management messaging (narrative) is promotional and lacks any concrete product specificity, revenue attribution, or customer validation — exactly the type of claim I require scuttlebutt to corroborate before crediting
- Acquisition-driven R&D supplement is modest: total acquired intangible cost of $40.1M (10-Q filed 2026-08-04), suggesting no major platform-expanding bets; Blue Hexagon at $10M and TotalCloud were small tuck-ins
- Growth rate of ~10-11% is not clearly above-industry for cybersecurity SaaS; if faster-growing platform players (bundling VM into broader suites) accelerate share gains, Qualys's organic growth could decelerate further
- Capital return priority ($1.6B buyback authorization) over aggressive reinvestment is inconsistent with a Fisher-style long-duration compounder; indicates management views the growth runway as limited relative to excess cash generation
- No independent scuttlebutt evidence in the fact base — no customer, supplier, competitor, or ex-employee commentary to corroborate franchise quality or management depth claims
- Retail sentiment is predominantly noise (Stocktwits, options traders per narrative); institutional buying post-earnings may reflect short-squeeze dynamics rather than fundamental conviction
Joel Greenblatt — 🟡 watch · 58/100 · medium confidence
Qualys is a genuinely high-quality business — its ROIC and FCF characteristics are exceptional — but the earnings yield (EBIT/EV) is too thin to earn a full Magic Formula pass. Let me work through the inputs. EBIT for FY2025 is $221.952M (fundamentals block). Enterprise Value: market cap $6,347M + net debt (negative, so subtract excess cash). Cash and equivalents are $250.258M per fundamentals, but the 10-K and 10-Q filings show substantial additional marketable securities — short-term ($195.7M at Dec 31 2025) and long-term ($250.9M at Dec 31 2025), totaling roughly $696M in cash+securities. No meaningful debt is evident from filings (debt-to-equity is null in fundamentals; no debt schedule cited in excerpts). So EV ≈ $6,347M - $696M = ~$5,651M. EBIT/EV = $221.952M / $5,651M ≈ 3.9%. That is a low earnings yield — roughly a 25x EBIT multiple — which is expensive on a Greenblatt basis. The bar for a Magic Formula pass is typically earnings yields in the high single digits or above. On ROIC, the picture is far better. Using Greenblatt's preferred denominator (net working capital + net fixed assets): net working capital = current assets $657.6M - current liabilities $467.3M = $190.3M; net fixed assets are minimal given the asset-light SaaS model (capex only $5M/year, no heavy PP&E disclosed in excerpts). Greenblatt ROIC = $221.952M / ~$190M (approximating net fixed assets as near-zero for a cloud-native SaaS) = very high, likely well above 100% on tangible capital. This is a superb business on quality. The problem is price. At ~3.9% earnings yield, the stock fails the cheapness screen decisively. The DCF model (valuation block) shows a base intrinsic value of $262.85 vs. current price $183.48, implying 43% upside — which is encouraging — but the DCF leans heavily on terminal value (81.6% of EV per valuation block), making it sensitive to growth and WACC assumptions. There is no special-situation catalyst visible (no spinoff, restructuring, or recapitalization disclosed in any filing). Revenue CAGR is 11%, net dollar expansion rate is 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-08-04 and 10-K filed 2026-02-20), and FCF margin is 45.5% (FY2025) — all hallmarks of a durable, high-quality franchise. But Greenblatt's formula demands both axes. On quality: strong pass. On price/earnings yield: fail at current levels. AI risk is real but double-edged: AI-driven vulnerability surface expansion likely increases demand for Qualys's cloud-based scanning and risk quantification, but AI could also accelerate commodity competition from hyperscalers. No concrete AI revenue attribution is available in the fact base. Net: AI is modestly positive for demand, modestly negative for competitive moat durability — not a decisive factor either way at this juncture.
Key points
- EBIT FY2025: $221.952M (fundamentals block); operating margin 33.2% — robust and repeatable
- Estimated EV ~$5,651M after subtracting ~$696M in cash+marketable securities (10-K Dec 31 2025 filing); earnings yield ~3.9% — expensive on Greenblatt's metric
- Greenblatt ROIC on tangible capital is exceptionally high (net working capital ~$190M, near-zero net fixed assets for cloud SaaS) — likely well above 100%
- FCF $304.4M in FY2025, FCF margin 45.5% — genuine cash conversion, not accrual-inflated earnings
- Net dollar expansion rate 103-104% (10-Q 2026-08-04 and 10-K 2026-02-20) confirms sticky, recurring subscription economics
- No special-situation catalyst (no spinoff, restructuring, or recapitalization visible in any filing)
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85 vs $183.48 current price (valuation block) — 43% upside in base case, but 81.6% terminal-value-dependent
- Shares outstanding fell from ~36.5M (Feb 2025 per 10-K 2025-02-21) to ~35.7M (Feb 2026 per 10-K 2026-02-20) — $1.6B authorized buyback program demonstrates capital return discipline
Red flags
- Earnings yield ~3.9% (EBIT/EV) is well below Greenblatt's threshold for a cheap stock; single-axis quality score without cheapness does not clear the Magic Formula bar
- No special-situation catalyst to close any valuation gap — this is a steady compounder, not a mispriced special situation
- Terminal value is 81.6% of DCF enterprise value (valuation block) — intrinsic value estimate is highly sensitive to long-run growth and WACC assumptions, providing less margin of safety than a near-term earnings-yield argument would
- Revenue growth of ~11% CAGR (fundamentals) and 11% YoY Q2 2026 (narrative) is solid but not exceptional for a premium-valued SaaS; EPS growth partly leveraged by buybacks rather than purely organic
- AI competitive risk: hyperscalers and AI-native security vendors could commoditize vulnerability scanning over a 5-10 year horizon, potentially compressing the earnings yield further if growth decelerates
Bruce Greenwald — 🟡 watch · 58/100 · medium confidence
Qualys has genuine franchise characteristics — high ROIC (31%), fat FCF margins (~45%), recurring subscription revenue, and net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% — that suggest real customer captivity through switching costs and scale economics within vulnerability management. The EPV case is compelling in isolation, but the market price demands significant growth assumptions that require validating the durability of the moat against intensifying competition and AI disruption. My EPV calculation: normalized NOPAT ≈ operating income of ~$222M (2025, from fundamentals) adjusted for taxes at ~21% effective rate ≈ ~$175M NOPAT; maintenance capex appears minimal (capex $5M vs. D&A which is larger), so distributable earnings are roughly at or above NOPAT. Capitalizing ~$175-190M at WACC of 7.43% yields EPV of roughly $2.35-2.55B enterprise value, or ~$73-78/share after adding back ~$250M net cash (35.7M shares). The current price of $183.48 is roughly 2.4x my EPV estimate — meaning the market is paying heavily for growth, not just earnings power. The two-stage DCF in the fact base yields $262.85/share but 81.6% of that value sits in the terminal value, which is precisely the Greenwald trap — far-horizon speculation masquerading as value. Asset reproduction value: Qualys's tangible assets are modest (total assets $1.1B, largely financial assets/marketable securities ~$485M plus receivables); the hard-to-reproduce asset is the installed customer base and cloud platform built over 25+ years. Rebuilding that customer captivity would take a competitor enormous sales, marketing, and engineering spend over many years — this intangible reproduction cost is real and substantial, validating that EPV >> tangible reproduction value and suggesting a genuine moat exists. The moat test passes directionally: EPV far exceeds tangible assets, confirming franchise economics. However, the current price is 2.4x EPV, meaning I am being asked to pay for 15+ years of moat-protected growth at the current margin of 0%, not 30-40% safety. Revenue CAGR of ~11% (3-year, from fundamentals) is respectable but not explosive, and net dollar expansion at 103-104% (10-K filed 2026-02-20; 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) is solid but not accelerating. Q2 2026 revenue of $182M at +11% YoY (narrative) with FY2026 guidance of $732-738M implies continued ~10-11% growth — adequate but not the high-growth justification needed to pay 2.4x EPV. The FCF margin of 45.5% (2025) and price-to-FCF of 20.85x are more palatable than the EPV gap suggests, but FCF yield of ~4.8% at current price is thin for a value investor who needs a margin of safety. AI dimension: Qualys positions itself as an AI-enhanced security platform (narrative cites 'AI-Driven Innovation'), and the 2022 acquisition of Blue Hexagon's AI/ML network detection capability (10-K filed 2025-02-21) suggests organic integration of AI into the product. However, AI also represents a disruption risk — larger platforms (Microsoft, CrowdStrike, Palo Alto) are embedding vulnerability management into broader AI-driven security suites, potentially commoditizing Qualys's niche. The switching cost moat (agents deployed, workflows embedded) is real but not impregnable against platform consolidation. Insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (narrative) is routine but noted. No restatements, no related-party concerns, no aggressive accounting flags in the filings reviewed. Critical accounting estimates are unchanged per 10-Q filed 2026-08-04. The verdict is 'watch' rather than 'pass' because while the franchise quality is genuine, the price-to-EPV ratio of ~2.4x demands growth assumptions I am unwilling to pay for without a margin of safety. A price in the $100-120 range (1.3-1.5x EPV, providing ~25-35% safety margin) would be a clear buy; at $183 I am paying for the growth story, not the earnings power.
Key points
- EPV estimated at ~$73-78/share (NOPAT ~$175-190M capitalized at 7.43% WACC, plus $250M net cash, 35.7M shares) — current price of $183.48 is roughly 2.4x EPV, demanding significant growth premium
- Franchise moat confirmed: EPV >> tangible reproduction value; customer captivity through embedded cloud agents, 25+ year installed base, and switching costs in VM workflows
- FCF margin of 45.5% (2025, fundamentals) and ROIC of 31.25% (fundamentals) are genuine franchise-quality metrics, not accounting artifacts
- Net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% (10-K 2026-02-20; 10-Q 2026-05-05; 10-Q 2026-08-04) confirm retention economics but show no acceleration
- Revenue CAGR of ~11% (3-year, fundamentals) and FY2026 guidance of $732-738M (narrative) imply moderate, steady growth — not the breakout needed to justify 2.4x EPV at a margin of safety
- Minimal capex ($5M, 2025 fundamentals) vs. large operating cash flows confirms capital-light model; maintenance capex well below D&A — a positive EPV adjustment
- Provided DCF intrinsic value of $262.85 is 81.6% terminal value (valuation block) — classic Greenwald red flag; I do not anchor to this figure
- AI integration via Blue Hexagon acquisition (10-K 2025-02-21) is constructive; but platform consolidation risk from larger vendors embedding VM is a real moat threat over 5-10 year horizon
Red flags
- Price of $183.48 is approximately 2.4x my EPV estimate of ~$73-78/share — no margin of safety; buyer is purely paying for growth
- 81.6% of the provided DCF value sits in terminal value (valuation block) — the bulk of the bull case rests on speculative far-horizon assumptions I explicitly distrust
- Platform consolidation risk: Microsoft, CrowdStrike, Palo Alto embedding vulnerability management into broader suites could erode Qualys's switching-cost moat over a 5-10 year horizon
- AI narrative ('AI-Driven Innovation' per narrative) lacks concrete revenue attribution or quantifiable differentiation in available materials — possible hype without substance
- Analyst price target of $171.94 (narrative) implies only ~7% upside post-earnings rally — even sell-side sees limited room; at my EPV the stock needs to roughly halve to offer value-investor entry
- No margin of safety at current price — a value investor requires 25-40% discount to EPV, not a 140% premium
Ray Dalio — 🟡 watch · 55/100 · medium confidence
Qualys presents an interesting macro case: it is a cloud-native cybersecurity subscription business with exceptional balance-sheet resilience and cash generation, but it is nonetheless a single-regime dependent name — its valuation primarily reflects a low-WACC, high-growth, disinflation environment, and it shows limited regime robustness across Dalio's four boxes. The positives from a macro/risk lens are real: net cash position (cash and equivalents of $250.3M per fundamentals block, plus ~$485M in marketable securities per the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, against negligible capex of ~$5M and total liabilities of $534M), FCF margin of 45.5% (FY2025, fundamentals), and near-zero debt — meaning no floating-rate refinancing exposure, no maturity wall, and no dependence on capital markets to fund operations. This passes the balance-sheet resilience and self-funding test cleanly. The subscription model with up-front billing (deferred revenue visible in working capital flows per both 10-Qs) provides some insulation against demand shocks, and cybersecurity spending has historically been relatively non-discretionary. The net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (per 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) suggests reasonable retention stickiness. However, from a regime-robustness perspective, Qualys is a high-multiple tech equity that embeds multiple years of growth at a 7.43% WACC (per DCF). In a stagflationary scenario — rising inflation eroding real returns, rates higher for longer compressing terminal value multiples — the stock's 81.6% terminal-value dependency (per valuation block) is a significant vulnerability. The intrinsic value is $262.85 (base DCF) vs. $183.48 current price, implying upside, but that DCF assumes 10.96% FCF growth and a 7.43% WACC; a 200bp WACC increase would substantially compress the terminal value. Inflation pass-through is untested: while SaaS pricing can be adjusted at renewal, the 103% net dollar expansion rate is only modestly above flat, suggesting pricing power exists but is not exceptional. Revenue CAGR of ~11% (3-year, per fundamentals) is solid but not transformational, and the stock at 9.49x P/S and 20.85x P/FCF assumes the current growth/disinflation regime persists. Geographic diversification is partial — some international exposure (EUR, GBP, INR, CAD hedged per 10-Q filings) but concentration data not provided in the fact base. AI disruption is a dual-edged factor: Qualys benefits from AI driving more complex attack surfaces requiring vulnerability management, but AI could also enable lower-cost competitive entry or allow platform vendors (Microsoft, CrowdStrike) to bundle equivalent capabilities, compressing Qualys's pricing power over a 5-10 year horizon — a real tail risk that is not reflected in the current valuation. The DCF's terminal growth assumption of 2.5% against a 10.96% near-term growth phase assumes a smooth landing that Dalio's framework would stress-test harder. The stock is not a disaster from a macro lens — the clean balance sheet and recurring revenue base make it meaningfully more resilient than most tech equities — but it is not a regime-agnostic compounder either; it is a quality growth name priced for a benign macro environment.
Key points
- Net cash balance sheet: $250M cash + ~$485M marketable securities (10-Q 2026-08-04) vs. negligible debt — no refinancing risk, no floating-rate exposure, passes the debt-cycle resilience test cleanly
- FCF margin of 45.5% (FY2025, fundamentals) and $304M in annual FCF are self-funding at any reasonable macro scenario; capex of only $5M means no capital markets dependence
- Subscription/deferred-revenue model with up-front billing (per working capital commentary in 10-Q filings) provides demand smoothing; cybersecurity is relatively non-discretionary enterprise spend
- Net dollar expansion rate 103-104% (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-05-05) indicates modest but real pricing stickiness — some inflation pass-through at renewal, though not exceptional
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85 vs. $183.48 price suggests a margin of safety exists, but 81.6% terminal value dependency means sensitivity to WACC/terminal growth assumptions is very high
- Revenue CAGR of 11% (3-year) is solid; Q2 2026 beat with 11% YoY revenue and guidance raise to $732-738M (narrative) suggests near-term execution is on track
- Beta of 0.625 (fundamentals) implies lower market correlation than typical tech — modestly positive for diversification value in a portfolio context
Red flags
- Single-regime dependence: valuation (9.49x P/S, 20.85x P/FCF) is priced for low rates + sustained growth + disinflation; a 200bp WACC shock would materially impair the terminal value given 81.6% TV dependency
- No explicit inflation pass-through mechanism: 103% net dollar expansion is only modestly above flat, and the fact base does not disclose contractual inflation escalators or pricing re-set cadence
- AI competitive disruption risk: platform consolidation by Microsoft, CrowdStrike, and others could commoditize standalone vulnerability management over a 5-10 year horizon, compressing Qualys's pricing power — not reflected in the DCF's 10.96% perpetual growth path
- Geographic concentration risk: international operations disclosed (EUR/GBP/INR/CAD hedged per 10-Q filings) but revenue breakdown by geography not available in fact base — difficult to assess real-world-order/reserve-currency exposure
- Terminal value assumptions (2.5% terminal growth, 7.43% WACC) are aggressive in a higher-for-longer rate regime; the DCF bear case of $201.59 is only marginally above current price, suggesting limited cushion if macro deteriorates
- Insider selling in June 2026 (narrative) under 10b5-1 plans is routine but directionally cautionary at a time when insiders had visibility into near-term demand trends
Stanley Druckenmiller — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence
QLYS is a clean, profitable, high-FCF SaaS security business that just delivered an earnings beat with raised guidance — the fundamental direction is modestly positive. However, assessed through the Druckenmiller lens, the setup falls short of a high-conviction, asymmetric, catalyst-driven position. The second derivative of growth (rate of change acceleration) is insufficiently dramatic: revenue grew ~11% YoY in Q2 2026 (narrative digest, 10-Q filed 2026-08-04) and the 3-year revenue CAGR per fundamentals block is 10.96% — solid but not inflecting sharply upward. EPS grew 15.4% YoY (narrative), partly from operating leverage rather than top-line acceleration. The FY2026 guidance raise of ~$11M on a ~$732-738M base (narrative) is constructive but only a ~1.5% uplift — not the kind of explosive estimate revision that warrants maximum sizing. Net dollar expansion rate has been stable at 103-104% (10-Q filings, 2026-08-04 and 2026-05-05; 10-K 2026-02-20) — respectable retention, but not accelerating. On the liquidity/macro front, the fact base provides no explicit Fed or monetary regime data, which limits confidence; QLYS carries no debt (debt_to_equity is null per fundamentals, net cash position of ~$250M cash per 10-K 2026-02-20), so it is not a rate-sensitive leveraged story — a neutral, not a tailwind. The tape is the brightest signal: stock rallied 14% after-hours on Q2 earnings (narrative), is ~9% below the 52-week high ($201.54), has bounced sharply off the 52-week low of $74.51, and institutional buyers stepped in post-earnings (narrative). Price action confirms the bull thesis — this is not a broken tape. However, the 68% prior-period rally cited in the narrative means much of the re-rating may already be priced. The DCF intrinsic value (valuation block) implies 43% upside at $262.85/share vs. $183.48 current, which is real margin of safety — but the DCF is a long-duration instrument (81.6% terminal value weight), making it macro-rate sensitive and not the tight, time-bound asymmetric bet Druckenmiller prefers. The 'why now' catalyst is somewhat diffuse: AI-driven security tailwinds are real but the AI revenue attribution is unsubstantiated per the narrative caveats. No specific product cycle, policy shift, or hard inflection point is identifiable with conviction. This is a good business on a positive trajectory — pass for a quality-growth investor — but lacks the explosive second-derivative acceleration, the defined catalyst timing, and the macro-liquidity tailwind that would justify a concentrated, maximum-conviction Druckenmiller-sized position. It sits in 'watch' territory: hold/initiate small, wait for a clearer inflection signal or a macro regime shift that turns liquidity conditions more explicitly favorable.
Key points
- Q2 2026 revenue +11% YoY, EPS +15.4% YoY with FY2026 guidance raised to $732-738M (narrative digest, Aug 5 2026) — positive directional signal but not an explosive inflection
- 3-year revenue CAGR of 10.96% and net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% consistently (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-08-04) — steady, not accelerating
- FCF margin of 45.5% in FY2025 ($304.4M FCF on $669.1M revenue per fundamentals) and operating margin of 33.2% — very clean financials that make the earnings trajectory readable
- Net cash balance sheet (~$250M cash per fundamentals, no debt) eliminates rate-risk on the balance sheet but also means no leverage amplifier to a liquidity tailwind
- Price action confirms the thesis: 14% post-earnings rally, institutional buying post-results (Pacer, Empowered, Sei per narrative), stock ~9% below 52-week high — tape is constructive
- DCF base case $262.85 implies 43% upside (valuation block) but is terminal-value dominated (81.6%) and rate-sensitive; not a tight, near-term asymmetric payoff structure
- Share count declining slightly (36.48M in Feb 2025 per 10-K 2024-12-31 vs. 35.68M in Feb 2026 per 10-K 2026-02-20) — disciplined capital return via repurchases ($1.6B authorized per 10-K 2026-02-20)
Red flags
- Second derivative of revenue growth is flat-to-modest — 10-11% range for multiple years, not an inflecting acceleration that would justify max sizing under Druckenmiller framework
- FY2026 guidance raise of ~$11M midpoint (~1.5% lift) is constructive but not the magnitude of positive estimate revision that signals an earnings breakout
- AI-driven revenue attribution is unsubstantiated: narrative explicitly flags 'AI-Driven Innovation' as a headline but notes no product demo, customer wins, or revenue percentage attribution — AI narrative could be hype overlay
- Macro/Fed regime data absent from fact base — cannot confirm a liquidity tailwind; without explicit easing signal, one of Druckenmiller's primary reward criteria cannot be scored
- At ~9% below 52-week high and after a 68% prior-period rally (narrative), asymmetry may be compressed — much of re-rating potentially complete
- Insider selling in June 2026 pre-rally (CLO and Director sold shares under 10b5-1 plans per narrative) — routine but removes one confirming signal
- No identifiable near-term hard catalyst (product cycle, regulatory trigger, large contract announcement) with defined timing — the 'why now' is diffuse
Seth Klarman — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence
Qualys is a high-quality SaaS cybersecurity business with genuinely exceptional cash flow characteristics — 45.5% FCF margins in FY2025 ($304M on $669M revenue per fundamentals block), a net cash balance sheet (cash and equivalents of $250M per FY2025 fundamentals, with large marketable securities portfolio visible in both the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04), and no meaningful financial leverage (debt-to-equity is null/not reported, current ratio 1.41). The company is real and the cash flows are real. However, from a strict Klarman margin-of-safety standpoint, the entry price does not offer a compelling discount to a deliberately conservative intrinsic value. The DCF in the fact base pegs intrinsic value at $262.85/share with 43% upside from the $183.48 close — that is encouraging at face value — but the DCF relies on the revenue CAGR of ~11% as the FCF growth rate, a 7.43% WACC (using a low beta of 0.625), and an 81.6% terminal value weight. These are not conservative inputs by my standards: any disappointment in growth, any multiple compression, or any WACC normalization collapses the terminal value which dominates at 82% of enterprise value. A stress test at 6% growth and 9% WACC would produce a materially lower intrinsic value, likely near or below current price — the bear case sensitivity of $201.59 is only 10% above market, providing thin downside protection. The business does not offer asset-value downside protection in the Klarman sense: P/B is 11.3x, tangible assets are negligible relative to market cap (intangible assets net book value is only ~$3-4M per the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04 and 10-K filed 2026-02-20), and a liquidation scenario would return far less than market price. The 'floor' is entirely a going-concern cash-flow story. Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (per multiple 10-Q filings and the 10-K filed 2026-02-20) is solid but not exceptional, and 3-year revenue CAGR of ~11% is moderate for a company priced at 9.5x sales and 20.9x FCF. There is no special-situation catalyst — no forced selling, no restructuring, no complexity creating an orphaned security; the post-earnings +14% rally noted in the narrative suggests the opposite of forced selling. Insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (noted in narrative) is routine but directionally unhelpful. AI risk is a genuine two-sided factor: Qualys benefits from AI-driven security spending tailwinds, but AI could also commoditize vulnerability scanning and expose the company to better-resourced competitors (CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Palo Alto). Management cited 'AI-Driven Innovation' but the narrative explicitly notes this lacks concrete revenue attribution — unverified as a differentiator. Balance sheet quality is genuinely strong: large marketable securities portfolio ($485M fair value as of June 30, 2026 per the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, plus $218M cash excluded from that total), share repurchase program with $1.6B total authorized (per 10-K filed 2026-02-20), and capex of only $5M/year. This is a company with real capital return discipline. At roughly 20-21x FCF, the price is fair-to-slightly-elevated for a steady ~11% grower — not the deep discount that warrants conviction. I would watch for a pullback toward $130-150 where the FCF yield rises to 6-7% and the margin of safety becomes real rather than notional.
Key points
- Exceptional FCF generation: 45.5% FCF margin in FY2025 ($304M per fundamentals), consistent across all years in the history block (37-45% range 2021-2025)
- Net cash balance sheet: $250M cash plus ~$485M marketable securities as of June 30, 2026 (10-Q filed 2026-08-04); no meaningful debt reported
- Price-to-FCF of 20.85x is fair but not deeply discounted; at $183.48, earnings yield is only 3.6% — insufficient margin of safety for a Klarman-style entry
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85 is 43% above current price, but 81.6% of EV is terminal value using optimistic inputs (11% growth, 7.43% WACC, 2.5% terminal) — not a conservative appraisal
- Net dollar expansion rate stable at 103-104% (10-K filed 2026-02-20, 10-Q filings 2025-2026); solid retention but not accelerating
- Share repurchase program totaling $1.6B authorized (10-K filed 2026-02-20) is shareholder-friendly capital allocation; shares outstanding declined from ~36.5M to ~35.7M
- No tangible asset floor: net book value of intangibles only ~$3M (10-Q filed 2026-08-04); P/B of 11.3x means liquidation value is a small fraction of market cap
Red flags
- No genuine margin of safety at current price: bear-case DCF sensitivity of $201.59 is only ~10% above market, providing minimal downside cushion if growth decelerates
- Terminal value dominates at 81.6% of enterprise value — the entire investment thesis rests on optimistic perpetuity assumptions, exactly the value-as-story risk Klarman avoids
- Post-earnings +14% AH rally (narrative) suggests momentum/sentiment buying rather than a technical mispricing or forced-seller dislocation — opposite of the Mr. Market opportunism I seek
- No special-situation catalyst: fully covered, institutionally followed, no complexity or orphaned dynamic; multiple institutional buyers post-earnings (Pacer, Empowered, Sei per narrative) means the mispricing argument is weak
- AI commoditization risk: vulnerability scanning is increasingly addressable by well-resourced platform players; 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging is unsubstantiated by concrete revenue data (narrative explicitly flags this)
- Insider selling in June 2026 (CLO Bruce Posey, Director Wendy Pfeiffer per narrative) pre-earnings rally, albeit under 10b5-1 plans — directionally unhelpful
- Revenue CAGR of only ~11% (3-year) priced at 9.5x sales is a growth-at-premium-price story, not a value story; any deceleration would reprice materially
Peter Lynch — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence
Qualys is a stalwart/slow-grower cybersecurity SaaS company — not a fast grower by Lynch criteria. Revenue CAGR is ~11% over 3 years (fundamentals block), and the business is easily explainable in one sentence: Qualys sells cloud-based vulnerability management and security compliance subscriptions to enterprises. The story is clean, recurring, and understandable. But the PEG is the killer here: the fact base reports a PEG of 2.92 (fundamentals block), which is nearly 3x Lynch's preferred ceiling of 1.0. At a P/E of 32 (fundamentals block) against a revenue CAGR of ~11% and EPS growth implied at roughly 10-15%, the stock is priced like a fast grower while growing like a stalwart. Lynch's rule is simple: you want to pay a P/E at or near the growth rate; you're paying more than double. On the positive side, the balance sheet is excellent — net cash position (cash and equivalents $250M per 2025 10-K, plus ~$479M in marketable securities per filings, against minimal debt; debt-to-equity shown as null suggesting no meaningful funded debt), FCF margin of 45.5% (fundamentals block), and operating cash flow of $309M against capex of only $5M (fundamentals block) — this company funds itself entirely internally, which Lynch loves. The net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Q filings, both March and June 2026 periods) confirms modest but durable customer retention and upsell. There is no diworsification risk — the company's only acquisitions are small tuck-ins (Blue Hexagon for $10M in 2022 per 10-K filed 2025-02-21, TotalCloud in 2021), consistent with core-focused capital discipline. Share buybacks are active ($1.6B total authorization per 10-K filed 2026-02-20), which is shareholder-friendly. Q2 2026 showed $182M revenue +11% YoY and EPS +15.4% YoY (narrative), with FY2026 guidance raised to $732-738M — these are stalwart-type results, steady and predictable. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85 vs. current price $183.48 (valuation block) suggests 43% upside on a base case, which is genuinely attractive for a stalwart if the growth sustains. However, Lynch would note that institutional ownership is substantial (multiple large institutions referenced in narrative), analyst coverage is active, and the stock just ran 14% AH on earnings and 68% prior — the neglected-stock edge is entirely absent. AI/technology disruption is a dual-edged factor: AI security spending is a tailwind for vulnerability management (Qualys explicitly cited 'AI-Driven Innovation' in Q2 narrative), but AI could also commoditize scanning and assessment tools, enabling open-source or hyperscaler-native alternatives to erode QLYS's moat over a 5-10 year horizon. This is a real risk for a subscription business whose core product (cloud-based vulnerability scanning) is becoming a commodity in cloud-native environments. Net assessment: solid stalwart with excellent cash generation and clean balance sheet, but the PEG of ~2.9 is far above Lynch's comfort zone, the stock is well-followed and not neglected, and growth is steady rather than accelerating. A Lynch stalwart target would be to take 30-50% gains and move on — but at current valuations, the entry point for that trade is questionable. Watch, not buy.
Key points
- PEG of 2.92 (fundamentals block) is nearly 3x Lynch's 1.0 ceiling — the primary disqualifier at current price
- Stalwart classification: ~11% revenue CAGR (fundamentals block), 103% net dollar expansion rate (10-Q filings), steady not spectacular
- Excellent balance sheet: $250M cash + ~$479M marketable securities, minimal debt, 45.5% FCF margin (fundamentals block, 10-K 2026-02-20)
- Capital-light model: $309M operating cash flow vs. $5M capex (fundamentals block) — fully self-funding
- Active buybacks ($1.6B total authorized per 10-K 2026-02-20) and tuck-in-only M&A discipline — no diworsification
- DCF base-case $262.85 vs. $183.48 price (valuation block) = 43% upside if growth assumptions hold
- Q2 2026 beat and FY guidance raised to $732-738M (narrative) confirms execution quality
- No earnings-quality red flags: no restatements, no major accounting changes per 10-Q filed 2026-08-04 ('no material changes to critical accounting estimates')
Red flags
- PEG ~2.9 is a clear Lynch overpayment signal for a stalwart growing at 11%
- Stock not neglected: heavy institutional ownership, post-earnings 14% spike, 68% prior rally (narrative) — the easy money is gone
- AI could commoditize core vulnerability scanning products over 3-10 year horizon, threatening the subscription moat
- Revenue growth is solid but not accelerating — stalwart plateau risk; EPS outpacing revenue growth relies on buybacks and leverage, not top-line expansion
- Insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (narrative) — routine but directionally unhelpful
- Analyst price target cited at only 7% upside post-rally (narrative), suggesting Street already well-aware of the story
Howard Marks — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence
Through the Marks risk lens, the central question is not whether Qualys is a good business — it demonstrably is — but whether the price already embeds too much optimism, leaving insufficient margin of safety. The evidence is mixed, tilting slightly negative from a risk-first perspective.
ON THE POSITIVE SIDE: The balance sheet is genuinely clean. Per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and confirmed in the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, Qualys carries no financial debt (debt-to-equity is listed as null in fundamentals, with $250M in cash and a further ~$485M in marketable securities as of June 2026). This is a fortress structure with zero refinancing risk and no covenant exposure — precisely the kind of balance sheet that can survive a bad scenario without permanent impairment. The FCF margin of 45.5% and operating cash flow of $309M (FY2025 per fundamentals) confirm the business generates real cash, not accounting income. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85/share vs. the current price of $183.48 (43% upside per the valuation block) is a genuine data point, and the bear-case DCF of $201.59 still sits above the current price, suggesting the business is not obviously overpriced on a pure cash-flow basis. Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (cited in the 10-Q filed 2026-05-05 and the 10-K filed 2026-02-20) confirms customer retention and modest upsell.
ON THE RISK SIDE — WHERE THE MARKS LENS BITES HARD: The stock has rallied approximately 68% from its 52-week low of $74.51 to its current $183.48, and surged 14% in after-hours following Q2 earnings per the narrative digest. The narrative explicitly notes the stock is now 8.96% below its 52-week high of $201.54 — we are near the top of a recent sentiment swing, not at the point of capitulation or revulsion that Marks prizes. The narrative confirms multiple bullish signals converging: institutional accumulation post-earnings (Pacer, Empowered, Sei all added), retail enthusiasm on social media, call options activity, and a 'Peter Lynch GARP screen' pass. This is precisely 'buying at the peak of popularity' territory. The bull case — AI-driven security demand, channel strength, subscription stickiness — is the obvious first-level consensus view; there is no variant insight here. The narrative itself notes the 'AI-Driven Innovation' framing lacks concrete revenue attribution, which is a warning that the AI premium may be speculative.
Embedded expectations are elevated: P/E of 32x, P/FCF of 20.85x, and P/S of 9.49x price in continued compounding. The DCF relies on 11% FCF growth sustained for 5 years at a 7.43% WACC with 2.5% terminal growth — reasonable but not conservative. The terminal value constitutes 81.6% of enterprise value per the valuation block, meaning most of the intrinsic value depends on a long-duration assumption that is highly sensitive to discount-rate changes. This is not the asymmetric setup Marks would reward: the downside is protected (no debt, real FCF), but the upside is already substantially priced in, and the bar to clear is high. Revenue growth of 11% YoY is solid but not exceptional for a stock trading at 9.5x sales.
AI DISRUPTION ANGLE: For Qualys specifically, AI is a two-sided sword. On the positive side, AI-driven vulnerability detection and security automation are growth drivers that could expand the TAM. On the negative side, AI could commoditize vulnerability scanning — a core legacy product — as open-source and big-platform competitors (Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike) increasingly embed similar capabilities into broader suites. This risk is not priced in; the market is pricing the AI tailwind without discounting the AI commoditization threat. Marks would note that the crowd is only seeing one side.
CONCLUSION: This is a high-quality business with a safe capital structure and genuine FCF, which prevents an 'avoid' verdict. But the risk/return skew is not favorable at current prices: sentiment is bullish, the stock is near its 52-week high after a large rally, consensus is uniformly constructive, and the DCF upside is modest (~43%) and dependent on optimistic terminal value assumptions. The margin of safety exists in the balance sheet but not clearly in the price. A Marks-style investor waits for the pendulum to swing back toward fear before committing capital.
Key points
- Zero financial debt, $250M cash + ~$485M marketable securities (10-Q 2026-08-04): balance sheet can survive severe stress with no permanent impairment risk
- 45.5% FCF margin and $304M FCF (FY2025 fundamentals): genuine cash generation, not accounting artifacts
- DCF base case $262.85/share (43% upside) with bear case $201.59 still above current $183.48 — some margin of safety exists on a going-concern basis
- Net dollar expansion rate 103-104% (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-05-05): customer retention strong, modest upsell
- No leverage, no refinancing wall, no covenant exposure — the one structural feature Marks would fully endorse
Red flags
- Stock has rallied ~146% from 52-week low of $74.51 to $183.48, and surged 14% post-Q2 earnings (narrative digest) — near peak of sentiment swing, not a point of fear or capitulation
- Bull consensus is the obvious first-level view: AI tailwinds, channel strength, institutional accumulation — no variant insight available; 'buying at peak of popularity' dynamic
- Terminal value is 81.6% of enterprise value (valuation block) — DCF is highly sensitive to long-duration assumptions; modest WACC shift materially erodes intrinsic value
- AI commoditization risk unpriced: competitors embedding vulnerability management in broader platforms could pressure Qualys's core product pricing over a 3-10 year horizon, but market prices only the AI tailwind
- P/E 32x, P/S 9.49x, P/FCF 20.85x — elevated embedded expectations; bar to sustain valuation is high; 7% analyst price target upside post-rally (narrative) leaves minimal margin for error
- 'AI-Driven Innovation' management framing cited in narrative but lacks concrete revenue attribution — AI premium may be speculative sentiment rather than fundamental repricing
Paul Singer — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence
Qualys is a well-run, highly profitable cybersecurity SaaS business with exceptional FCF margins (~45%), a clean balance sheet with net cash, and steady subscription revenue. However, it largely fails the Singer/Elliott test: the self-help gap is narrow, the capital allocation record is actually quite disciplined, and there is no obvious structural misfit or segment-level inefficiency visible in the filings. The company is essentially a single-segment, cloud-delivered vulnerability management platform — no conglomerate discount to unlock, no obvious underperforming division to separate. The primary activist angle that does exist is capital allocation: as of the 10-K filed 2026-02-20, the board authorized $1.6B cumulative in share repurchases, and shares outstanding declined from ~36.5M (10-K 2024-12-31) to ~35.7M (10-K 2025-12-31), indicating active buyback execution. FCF is $304M annually against a ~$6.3B market cap, yet cash and marketable securities are substantial (cash ~$250M per fundamentals plus ~$485M in marketable securities per 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, a total liquidity pool of roughly $735M). The question is whether this cash hoard is excessive relative to operating needs — it appears to be, given capex of only ~$5M annually (fundamentals). However, management IS returning capital via buybacks, so this is not a pure hoarding story. Revenue CAGR of ~11% (fundamentals) is solid but not explosive for SaaS, and net dollar expansion of 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-05-05; 10-K filed 2026-02-20) is adequate but not a standout moat indicator. Operating margin of 33% (fundamentals) is healthy but the question of whether it is below comparable peers cannot be answered from this fact base — no peer margin data is provided. Governance details (share structure, board composition, proxy) are absent from the filings excerpted, making it impossible to assess entrenment or lever availability. AI risk is real but cuts both ways: Qualys has integrated AI/ML (Blue Hexagon acquisition per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) but the commoditization threat from AI-native competitors is a genuine long-term concern. On the DCF: intrinsic value of $262.85/share vs. $183.48 current price implies 43% upside — a meaningful gap, but the DCF uses 10.96% FCF growth (revenue CAGR-derived) which may be optimistic given 11% top-line growth and already-high margins; 81.6% of the DCF sits in terminal value, making the number sensitive to assumptions. The bear case of $201/share is only 10% above current price, limiting downside protection from a valuation floor perspective. Without identifiable governance levers, segment complexity to exploit, or a documented pattern of value-destroying capital allocation, this is a 'watch' — the assets are high quality but the activist angle is thin.
Key points
- Exceptional FCF quality: $304M FCF on $669M revenue (45.5% FCF margin per fundamentals) provides a genuine cash-generative floor to the thesis
- Substantial cash/securities hoard: ~$735M in cash plus marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04) against only ~$5M annual capex — potential for accelerated capital return if pressed
- Active buyback program: $1.6B cumulative authorization per 10-K filed 2026-02-20; share count declined modestly, indicating real (if gradual) execution
- Net dollar expansion 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-05-05; 10-K filed 2026-02-20) — adequate retention but not a standout competitive moat signal
- Single-segment, cloud-native model eliminates sum-of-the-parts opportunity but also means no sprawl discount or integration complexity to fix
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85 vs. $183.48 current price (valuation block) — 43% upside on base, but 81.6% residual in terminal value means significant assumption sensitivity
- Revenue CAGR ~11% and operating margin ~33% (fundamentals) — solid but insufficient to determine whether margins are below peer benchmarks (peer data absent from fact base)
Red flags
- No segment complexity or conglomerate discount: single-product-line SaaS leaves no SOTP lever to pull — this is the core limitation for an Elliott-style thesis
- Governance and share structure entirely absent from available filings excerpts: cannot assess dual-class stock, board tenure, staggered elections, or poison pill — the lever question is unanswerable from this fact base
- Self-help gap not quantifiable: no peer margin comparison available; cannot prove margins are persistently below what a differently managed business would achieve
- DCF bear case of $201/share (valuation block) is only ~10% above current price of $183.48 — limited downside floor if activist thesis fails and growth disappoints
- Capital allocation is already reasonably active — management IS buying back stock and not making large, value-destroying acquisitions (most recent was Blue Hexagon at $10M per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) — limiting the activist indictment
- AI commoditization risk: vulnerability management scanning is increasingly commoditized by AI-native tools; if AI lowers the cost and barriers to what Qualys charges for, pricing power erodes (unverified by fact base but a structural concern)
- Revenue growth of ~11% is moderate for SaaS; at 9.5x price-to-sales (fundamentals), valuation requires sustained growth and margin hold — limited margin of safety for an event-driven floor
- Insider selling in June 2026 by CLO and a director (narrative) under 10b5-1 plans — routine but directionally noted; no offsetting insider buying disclosed
Benjamin Graham — 🔴 avoid · 32/100 · high confidence
Qualys is a profitable, established SaaS business with genuine earnings power, but it fails nearly every quantitative Graham test. The stock trades at P/E of 32x (more than double Graham's defensive cap of 15x), P/B of 11.3x (combined P/E x P/B = 361, far above Graham's 22.5 ceiling), and price-to-sales of 9.5x. There is no dividend record disclosed in any filing or the narrative — the company instead runs a share repurchase program (10-K filed 2026-02-20 references $1.6B total authorized buybacks). The balance sheet is materially weak by Graham standards: current ratio is only 1.41 (vs. Graham's floor of 2.0), and current liabilities of $467M nearly match current assets of $658M, leaving a thin working capital cushion of ~$190M (fundamentals, fiscal year 2025). Graham required current assets at least twice current liabilities; Qualys does not meet this. Net current assets (current assets minus ALL liabilities, i.e., the net-net test): $657.6M - $533.9M = $123.7M, or ~$3.47/share — the stock trades at $183.48, roughly 53x net current asset value, the antithesis of a net-net. The DCF-based intrinsic value of $262.85/share offers a 43% upside, but Graham would not endorse a two-stage DCF anchored in optimistic growth assumptions (11% FCF growth for 5 years, terminal growth 2.5%) as a conservative estimate of value — 81.6% of that DCF value is terminal value, making it heavily dependent on forecasts, precisely the kind of speculation Graham warned against. On the positive side: earnings have been positive and growing every year in the fact base (2021-2025), FCF margin is excellent at 45%, ROIC is 31%, and revenue has compounded at ~11% CAGR. Net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% (10-Q filings 2026) confirm business durability. But strong business quality does not compensate for paying a price that embeds an optimistic future — Graham's core discipline is to never pay for growth that has not yet occurred. The stock's 52-week range ($74.51 to $201.54) shows Mr. Market has been deeply pessimistic as recently as the past year, meaning a patient Graham investor could have purchased at a far lower price. At $183.48 — only 9% below the 52-week high — the market is now optimistic, and Graham's instruction is to sell to the optimistic market, not buy from it. AI/disruption note: Qualys operates in cybersecurity/vulnerability management, and AI both enhances its offering (it acquired Blue Hexagon AI/ML assets per 10-K 2025-02-21) and poses competitive threat as AI-native security platforms emerge. This is a watch item for moat durability, but it does not alter the valuation verdict.
Key points
- P/E of 32x vs. Graham's defensive ceiling of 15x — more than double the threshold
- P/B of 11.3x; combined P/E x P/B = 361, vastly exceeding Graham's 22.5 rule
- Current ratio of 1.41 fails Graham's minimum of 2.0 (fundamentals, FY2025)
- Net-net value ~$3.47/share vs. $183.48 price — stock is 53x net current asset value
- No dividend record found in any filing or narrative — share buybacks substitute but do not satisfy Graham's dividend-reliability criterion
- DCF intrinsic value $262.85 offers upside but relies 81.6% on terminal value — Graham rejects growth-dependent valuation
- Earnings positive and growing 2021-2025, FCF margin 45%, ROIC 31% — the business quality is real, but price is wrong for a Graham investor
- Stock is near 52-week high ($183 vs. $201 high) — Mr. Market is optimistic, not pessimistic
Red flags
- Price embeds aggressive growth assumptions with zero margin of safety on a Graham asset or earnings basis
- Current ratio 1.41 — fails balance sheet strength test; liabilities $534M vs. current assets $658M
- No dividends paid — fails Graham's dividend reliability criterion
- P/E x P/B product of ~361 vs. Graham's maximum of 22.5
- Net-net value ~$3.47/share is irrelevant as a floor — stock priced at 53x above it
- Terminal value comprises 81.6% of DCF — intrinsic value estimate is speculative, not conservative
- Insider sales in June 2026 (narrative) prior to earnings rally — not alarming in isolation, but noted
Walter Schloss — 🔴 avoid · 18/100 · high confidence
Qualys is a high-quality SaaS cybersecurity business, but it is the precise opposite of a Schloss deep-value statistical bargain. My approach requires cheapness anchored in hard, tangible assets — ideally near or below tangible book value — with a depressed price and a strong balance sheet built on real property. None of these conditions are met here. Price-to-book is 11.31x (10-K 2026-02-20 / fundamentals block). Tangible book is even worse: total stockholders' equity is $561M (fundamentals, FY2025), and virtually all of the asset base is either cash/marketable securities ($250M cash plus ~$729M in marketable securities per the 10-Q 2026-08-04 excerpts), deferred costs, or intangibles — not bricks, machinery, or working capital in the classical Schloss sense. The company has no significant tangible operating assets to anchor a liquidation floor. Price-to-sales is 9.49x and price-to-FCF is 20.85x — both far above any threshold I have ever paid. The stock sits at $183.48, only 9% below its 52-week high of $201.54, and has recently rallied 14% on earnings (per the narrative). Schloss bought what was beaten down, forgotten, and near multi-year lows — not stocks near all-time highs on momentum. The balance sheet does have a clean leverage profile (debt-to-equity is null/zero per fundamentals, and the 10-K confirms the company carries no long-term financial debt), which is a genuine positive, and the $250M in cash plus ~$480M in marketable securities (10-Q 2026-08-04 excerpts) provides genuine financial durability. FCF margins of 45% (FY2025 fundamentals) are impressive. However, these virtues belong to a growth/quality framework, not a value-asset framework. The entire investment thesis rests on recurring subscription revenue, AI/security narrative tailwinds, and earnings growth projections — exactly the kind of intangible, forecast-dependent story I systematically avoided. Insider selling was noted in June 2026 (CLO and Director sales per narrative), though under 10b5-1 plans. Share repurchase program ($1.6B authorized per 10-K 2026-02-20) returns cash but does not create a margin of safety in the assets. In sum: a fine business at a rich price with an intangible value thesis. Not a Schloss name.
Key points
- Price-to-book of 11.31x (fundamentals block) is far above any threshold Schloss ever applied; tangible book anchor is absent given the asset-light SaaS model
- Stock is near 52-week high ($183.48 vs. $201.54 high), recently rallied 14% post-earnings per narrative — the opposite of beaten-down and out-of-favor
- Balance sheet is debt-free with $250M cash and ~$480-729M marketable securities (10-Q 2026-08-04), which is a genuine positive for durability
- FCF of $304M on 45% margins (FY2025 fundamentals) is excellent but belongs to a quality/growth lens, not a hard-asset value lens
- No tangible operating assets (plant, real estate, inventory) to anchor a liquidation floor; intangible assets are only ~$3-4M net book (10-K 2026-02-20)
- $1.6B in total buyback authorization (10-K 2026-02-20) shows capital return discipline but at rich prices, not value-creative from a Schloss standpoint
Red flags
- Price-to-book 11.31x — extreme premium to book, let alone tangible book; no margin of safety in assets
- Stock near 52-week high, not near multi-year lows; entirely wrong entry-price profile for statistical deep-value approach
- Entire thesis rests on SaaS subscription growth, AI narrative, and earnings projections — no verifiable hard-asset floor
- Insider selling noted in June 2026 (CLO and Director per narrative), though under pre-set 10b5-1 plans
- Business model is inherently complex and intangible (cloud-delivered security platform); difficult to appraise assets independently from filings alone
- P/FCF of 20.85x and P/S of 9.49x confirm premium pricing across all metrics relevant to a value buyer
Fact base appendix
Price
- last_close: 183.48
- as_of: 2026-08-08
- high_52w: 201.54
- low_52w: 74.51
- range_source: provider
- pct_below_52w_high: -8.96
Fundamentals
- last_price: 183.48
- market_cap: 6347490782
- fifty_two_week_high: 201.54
- fifty_two_week_low: 74.51
- beta: 0.6250781
- currency: USD
- exchange: NASDAQ NMS - GLOBAL MARKET
- sector: Technology
- industry: Technology
- price_source: finnhub
- bars: 1
- entity: Qualys, Inc.
- fiscal_year: 2025
- revenue: 669125000
- revenue_period: 2025-12-31
- net_income: 198300000
- net_income_period: 2025-12-31
- operating_income: 221952000
- operating_income_period: 2025-12-31
- operating_cash_flow: 309400000
- operating_cash_flow_period: 2025-12-31
- capex: 4990000
- capex_period: 2025-12-31
- total_assets: 1095081000
- total_assets_period: 2025-12-31
- total_liabilities: 533928000
- total_liabilities_period: 2025-12-31
- current_assets: 657616000
- current_assets_period: 2025-12-31
- current_liabilities: 467338000
- current_liabilities_period: 2025-12-31
- stockholders_equity: 561153000
- stockholders_equity_period: 2025-12-31
- cash_and_equivalents: 250258000
- cash_and_equivalents_period: 2025-12-31
- shares_outstanding: 35675926
- operating_margin: 0.3317
- net_margin: 0.2964
- roe: 0.3534
- debt_to_equity: None
- current_ratio: 1.4072
- roic: 0.3125
- free_cash_flow: 304410000
- fcf_margin: 0.4549
- pe_ratio: 32.01
- price_to_fcf: 20.85
- price_to_sales: 9.49
- revenue_cagr: 0.1096
- revenue_cagr_years: 3
- fundamentals_source: edgar_companyfacts
- price_to_book: 11.31
- earnings_yield: 0.0364
- peg: 2.92
Filings reviewed
- 10-Q (2026-08-04) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784326000035/qlys-20260630.htm
- 8-K (2026-08-04) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784326000034/qlys-20260804.htm
- 8-K (2026-06-11) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784326000024/qlys-20260610.htm
- 10-Q (2026-05-05) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784326000015/qlys-20260331.htm
- 8-K (2026-05-05) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784326000013/qlys-20260505.htm
- 10-K (2026-02-20) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784326000008/qlys-20251231.htm
- 10-Q (2025-11-04) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784325000038/qlys-20250930.htm
- 10-K (2025-02-21) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1107843/000110784325000009/qlys-20241231.htm
Other sources
- [news] Insider Sell: Bruce Posey Sells Shares of Qualys Inc (QLYS) - GuruFocus
- [news] London Co. of Virginia Sells 66,300 Shares of Qualys, Inc. $QLYS - MarketBeat
- [news] Clark Capital Management Group Inc. Purchases 291,192 Shares of Qualys, Inc. $QLYS - MarketBeat
- [news] Qualys (QLYS) Soars As Earnings Beat And AI Security Push Ignite Rally - StocksToTrade
- [news] Qualys, Inc. Stock 12‑Month Price Target Raised to $171.94, Implies 7% Upside - TradingView
- [news] Qualys Q2 Earnings Beat on Channel Strength, FY26 Guidance Raised - Yahoo Finance
- [news] Qualys, Inc. Q2 2026 Earnings Call Summary - Yahoo Finance
- [news] Qualys stock delivers 68% return after InvestingPro Fair Value signal By Investing.com - Investing.com
- [news] Pacer Advisors Inc. Boosts Stock Position in Qualys, Inc. $QLYS - MarketBeat
- [news] Qualys (QLYS) Stock Jumps 14% After Hours: Here's Why Qualys Shares Jump 14% After Hours on Strong Q2 Res - Benzinga
- [news] Qualys Inc (QLYS) (Q2 2026) Earnings Call Highlights: AI-Driven Innovation and Raised Guidance ... - Yahoo Finance
- [news] Qualys’s chief legal officer Bruce Posey sells $94,668 in shares - Investing.com
- [news] Qualys director Wendy Pfeiffer sells $55,275 in company stock - Investing.com
- [news] Qualys (QLYS) legal chief sells 865 shares under 10b5-1 trading plan - Stock Titan
- [news] QUALYS (QLYS) director Wendy Pfeiffer sells 500 shares under Rule 10b5-1 plan - Stock Titan
- [news] BI Asset Management Fondsmaeglerselskab A S Acquires 27,484 Shares of Qualys, Inc. $QLYS - MarketBeat
- [news] Qualys, Inc. 2026 Q2 - Results - Earnings Call Presentation (NASDAQ:QLYS) 2026-08-04 - Seeking Alpha
- [news] Qualys (NASDAQ: QLYS) grows Q2 2026 revenue and net income - Stock Titan
- [news] Qualys, Inc. (NASDAQ: QLYS) lifts 2026 guidance after 11% Q2 growth - Stock Titan
- [news] Price to sales forward of Qualys, Inc. – NASDAQ:QLYS - TradingView
- [news] 3L7A Forecast — Price Target — Prediction for 2027 - TradingView
- [news] Price to earnings forward of Qualys, Inc. – FWB:3L7A - TradingView
- [news] Qualys, Inc. $QLYS Shares Purchased by Empowered Funds LLC - MarketBeat
- [news] Qualys Inc (QLYS) Earnings Forecast: Future EPS & Revenue Growth Estimates - TradingKey
- [news] Qualys Inc. (NASDAQ:QLYS) Passes Peter Lynch GARP Screen as a Compelling Investment Opportunity - ChartMill
- [news] QLYS (NASDAQ) Form 144: Insider reports 13,200 RSUs; prior 10b5-1 sales listed - Stock Titan
- [news] Qualys, Inc. Actuals & Estimates (NASDAQ:QLYS) - TradingView
- [news] QLYS News | QUALYS INC (NASDAQ:QLYS) - ChartMill
- [news] Sei Investments Co. Purchases 10,569 Shares of Qualys, Inc. $QLYS - MarketBeat
- [news] Qualys Stock: Great Quarter, Better Business, Wrong Price (NASDAQ:QLYS) - Seeking Alpha
- [discussion] $QLYS That sale cost me a lot. But it was the most expensive thing in my portfolio at the time and I
- [discussion] @Jblack500 @cynicaloptimist @BustaCapital @IsabellaDC @WAJeff @No_Face_character
Yo Jeff $EAT r - [discussion] @Jblack500 @WAJeff @cynicaloptimist @BustaCapital @IsabellaDC @No_Face_character
$QLYS - nice - [discussion] @Jblack500 @WAJeff @cynicaloptimist @BustaCapital @IsabellaDC @No_Face_character Do $YOU $SPCG $QLY
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS $KALA Z
- [discussion] [Bullish] $COMP $QLYS Ok
- [discussion] After Hours Top Gainers PT2
$CISS $MGPI $RITR $UFG $QLYS
- [discussion] $QLYS this stock is showing a lot more character than I expected.
- [discussion] Ticker NEXR has barely 550,000 shares outstanding.
The only comparable
- [discussion] $QLYS whoever wanted out appears to be out.
- [discussion] [Bearish] $QLYS numbers wasn’t that impressive to be up like that 🩸🩸🩸🩸
- [discussion] [Bearish] $QLYS way overvalued 🩸🩸🩸
- [discussion] $QLYS Q2 '26 Earnings Results & Recap
• Reported GAAP EPS of $1.50 up 15.38% YoY • Reported
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS hell yeah! Thanks SaaSpocalypse and Mythos!
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS wow
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS breaking out of 4wt and pushing 200d
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS good look
- [discussion] $QLYS 130 Call 7/17 at 1.35 🚨 (new avg)
- [discussion] TRUST
$QLYS 130 Call 7/17 at 1.45
- [discussion] $QLYS 130 CALL 7/17 1.45 🗻
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS broke the 105 I mentioned on 18May; now, hitting the wall at 115.3 with a minor chan
- [discussion] @BustaCapital @WAJeff @IsabellaDC @Jblack500 @No_Face_character @cynicaloptimist $HYPE.X it $SMCI $
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS Mothly MacD pretty stretched. Kinda like
- [discussion] [Bullish] New Analysis!!!
$QLYS
https://onlytradersfans.com/threads/analisis-qualys.10661/
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS what a boost
- [discussion] [Bullish] $QLYS You want to see a break and hold above 105 to see a sustained rally. GL.
- [discussion] $QLYS back on radar.
- [discussion] $QLYS near 5yr lows
- [discussion] $QLYS Current Stock Price: $90.90 Contracts to trade: $90.0 QLYS May 15 2026 Call Entry: $2.90 Exit:
- [earnings_call] Qualys Q4 2025 Earnings Call
Data gaps
- Dataset completeness: 61 of 61 source documents were dropped to fit the prompt budget — the council did not see them.
Generated 2026-08-08T07:34:10 · est. cost $0.99
What each investor thinks
Chuck Akre Quality
pass · 78Qualys is a capital-light, high-margin SaaS franchise in cybersecurity vulnerability management that meets the Akre three-legged stool with meaningful strength on two legs and reasonable (if not exceptional) marks on the third. First leg — extraordinary business economics: ROIC of 31.25% and ROE of 35.34% (fundamentals block, FY2025) are genuinely high and are NOT leverage-driven — the company carries no net debt (cash/equivalents of $250M per 10-K filed 2026-02-20, with total marketable securities of ~$478M at Dec 31 2025 per same filing). FCF margin of 45.49% on $669M revenue (FY2025 fundamentals) and operating margin of 33.17% reflect a capital-light cloud delivery model with capex of only $4.99M against $304M FCF (fundamentals, FY2025) — near-zero reinvestment in plant/equipment, confirming structural capital efficiency. Second leg — management skill and integrity: no restatements are indicated (10-K filed 2026-02-20 cover page checks 'no' for error corrections requiring recovery analysis); critical accounting estimates unchanged per multiple 10-Qs (2026-08-04 and 2026-05-05 filings each confirm 'no material changes'); net dollar expansion rate of 103%-104% across multiple periods (10-Q 2026-08-04, 10-Q 2026-05-05, 10-K 2026-02-20) reflects genuine customer retention economics. Share count is declining — 36.48M shares as of Feb 2025 (10-K filed 2025-02-21) versus 35.68M as of Feb 2026 (10-K filed 2026-02-20), consistent with a $1.6B cumulative buyback authorization (10-K 2026-02-20 notes board expanded to $1.6B). Insider 10b5-1 sales noted in narrative are routine and small relative to market cap. Third leg — reinvestment runway: this is the most nuanced leg. Revenue CAGR of ~11% over three years (fundamentals) and net dollar expansion barely above 100% suggest the core vulnerability management market is maturing. However, management cites AI-driven innovation and channel strength (narrative, Q2 2026), and FY2026 guidance raised to $732-738M from $721-727M after Q2 beat of $182M (+11% YoY per narrative). The company is expanding into broader CAASM/risk quantification use cases, and its cloud-native delivery model is extensible. The runway is real but not explosive — this is a compounder, not a hypergrowth story. Valuation: at $183.48, the stock trades at 20.85x price-to-FCF (fundamentals) and the two-stage DCF places intrinsic value at $262.85/share (valuation block, WACC 7.43%, terminal growth 2.5%), implying 43% upside. Even the bear case in the DCF is $201.59, above current price. At ~21x FCF for a near-50% FCF-margin, no-debt, 10%+ growing franchise in critical infrastructure security, the price is GARP-reasonable by Akre standards. AI risk: AI could commoditize some scanning/detection functions over a 3-10 year horizon, but vulnerability management and compliance workflows are deeply embedded in enterprise processes with high switching costs. More likely, AI enhances Qualys's detection capabilities (consistent with the Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition noted in 10-K 2025-02-21 for network detection) rather than displacing them. Overall: two and a half legs are solidly intact. The partial concern is reinvestment runway (11% growth is solid but not spectacular, and NDR barely above 100%). The business is a genuine compounder, the balance sheet is fortress-clean, returns on capital are exceptional without leverage, and the price is reasonable relative to intrinsic value. This clears the Akre bar for a pass, though not at peak conviction.
Terry Smith (Fundsmith) Quality
pass · 78Qualys passes the Fundsmith quality screen on nearly every dimension I care about. The business is asset-light, subscription-based cybersecurity SaaS with no debt, exceptional cash conversion, and a durable moat rooted in switching costs and mission-critical positioning in enterprise vulnerability management. Let me work through the criteria systematically. ROCE/returns on capital: ROIC of 31.25% (fundamentals block) and ROE of 35.3% for FY2025 are well above any plausible cost of capital. Operating margin of 33.2% and net margin of 29.6% (FY2025, fundamentals) are both high and have been improving — net income grew from $71M in 2021 to $198M in 2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20). These are not single-year aberrations. Cash conversion: FCF of $304M vs net income of $198M in FY2025, giving a FCF/net income conversion ratio of 153% — exceptional. The business generates more cash than it reports in profit, which is exactly what I look for. FCF margins have been consistently 38-45% across the five-year history (fundamentals block), never materially dipping. This is not an accrual story. Capital intensity: Capex of only $5.0M against $669M revenue (0.75% of revenue, FY2025), and $4.99M capex per fundamentals. The company describes capital expenditures as 'mainly related to purchases of computer equipment' (10-Q filed 2026-08-04). This is about as asset-light as a business can be. Recurring revenue: Qualys is a pure subscription model — deferred revenue balances confirm advance billing; net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-05-05 cites 104% as of March 2026; 10-K filed 2026-02-20 cites 103% for both 2025 and 2024). Customers are staying and spending slightly more each year. The repeat-purchase nature of security subscriptions is precisely the kind of 'essential consumable sold repeatedly' that I favour. Balance sheet: Net cash position — $250M cash (fundamentals) plus ~$487M in marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04 shows total fair value of marketable securities of $485M at June 2026), against total liabilities of only $534M, of which a large portion is deferred revenue (a quality liability, not financial debt). Debt-to-equity is listed as null, implying no financial debt. This is a fortress balance sheet. Acquisitions: The only disclosed acquisitions are small tuck-ins — Blue Hexagon for $10M in 2022 and TotalCloud for a small sum in 2021 (10-K filed 2025-02-21). No serial roll-up, no large goodwill creation, no 'adjusted' earnings masking integration costs. Total intangibles net are only ~$3M at June 2026 (10-Q filed 2026-08-04). Valuation: Price-to-FCF of 20.85x (fundamentals) is the key metric for me. An FCF yield of ~4.8% for a business compounding FCF at 10-11% (revenue CAGR 10.96% per fundamentals) with 45% FCF margins is not cheap, but it is defensible for quality of this calibre. The two-stage DCF gives intrinsic value of $262.85 vs current price of $183.48, implying ~43% upside (valuation block, WACC 7.43%). Even the bear case DCF of $201.59 is above current price. P/E of 32x and P/S of 9.5x are elevated in absolute terms but the FCF yield and cash conversion make the FCF multiple the right lens — and 20.85x FCF for a 30%+ ROIC, near-zero capex, recurring-revenue business is not overvaluation in my framework. I score this 78 rather than higher because: (1) revenue growth of ~11% is solid but not exceptional for a security SaaS — the net dollar expansion rate of 103% suggests modest upsell dynamics, not a land-and-expand powerhouse; (2) the stock has rallied sharply (near 52-week high, up from $74.51 low) so the margin of safety has compressed; (3) AI disruption risk (see below) is real even if manageable. On AI: vulnerability management and asset risk scoring are becoming AI-augmented, which could be a tailwind (Qualys integrating AI into its platform, narrative cites 'AI-Driven Innovation') or a headwind if AI-native competitors undercut on price. The switching-cost moat from deep enterprise integration provides near-term protection, but this is a space to monitor over a 5-10 year horizon. Overall: a high-quality, cash-generative, asset-light SaaS business with strong returns on capital, clean financials, no debt, and a price that offers a reasonable margin of safety relative to intrinsic value. A pass.
Michael Mauboussin Quality
pass · 74Qualys presents a compelling ROIC-vs-WACC spread that is the core question for this lens. ROIC of 31.25% against a WACC of 7.43% (per the valuation block) represents a ~24-point spread — wide by any standard. The franchise is grounded in real, identifiable moat sources: switching costs (cloud-delivered vulnerability management platform creates deep workflow integration and compliance-reporting dependencies), scale economics (shared cloud platform spreads infrastructure costs across ~10,000+ enterprise customers, enabling the exceptional 45.5% FCF margin on $669M revenue per fundamentals block), and network/data effects (aggregated scan data across the installed base creates proprietary threat-intelligence signals competitors cannot replicate easily). The net dollar expansion rate of 103–104% (cited in both the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04) confirms customers are not leaving and are expanding — the clearest real-time moat validator I track. The expectations question is where I must be careful: the DCF implies an intrinsic value of $262.85/share versus $183.48 current price — a 43% margin of safety in the base case. The DCF uses 11% FCF growth (the 3-year revenue CAGR), a 7.43% WACC, and a 2.5% terminal growth rate. That 11% growth assumption is achievable — Q2 2026 delivered 11% YoY revenue per the narrative, and FY2026 guidance of $732–738M (raised post-Q2 per narrative) implies roughly 9–10% full-year growth. So the embedded expectation is not heroic; in fact the current price embeds a growth assumption below the DCF base. The bear case DCF at $201.59 still sits above the current $183.48 — a rare configuration where even a pessimistic scenario suggests upside. That said, I must temper conviction: 81.6% of the DCF enterprise value sits in the terminal value (per valuation block 'residual_value_pct': 0.816), which is extreme sensitivity. A 100bp increase in WACC or a 50bp reduction in terminal growth dramatically compresses that value. The moat trajectory question is the key risk: AI-enabled security platforms (CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender, etc.) are converging on vulnerability management from adjacent positions, which could compress Qualys's pricing power and expansion rate over a 5–7 year horizon — the very window that dominates terminal value. The 'AI-Driven Innovation' headline in the narrative is unsubstantiated with specific revenue attribution in any filing, which is a yellow flag. Capital allocation is disciplined: capex is trivially small ($5.0M in 2025 per fundamentals), buybacks are active (share count fell from 36.5M in Feb 2025 to 35.7M in Feb 2026 per 10-K filings), and the $1.6B cumulative buyback authorization per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 reflects an ongoing program. FCF conversion from net income is excellent — $304M FCF on $198M net income in 2025. The base rate concern: high-ROIC software franchises with 30%+ spreads do mean-revert, but the timeline is often 10+ years when switching costs are real. The 104% NDE rate is the most important leading indicator — if it drops below 100%, the moat is eroding. For now it is stable-to-improving.
Charlie Munger Quality
pass · 74Qualys is a durable, asset-light cloud security business that passes the most important Munger tests: consistently high returns on capital, genuine switching costs, clean accounting with FCF well in excess of GAAP earnings, and a balance sheet with net cash. The business model is easy to understand — subscription-based vulnerability management and security compliance delivered via a multi-tenant cloud platform, billed in advance, generating large and predictable deferred-revenue balances. ROIC of 31.3% (fundamentals block, fiscal year 2025) and ROE of 35.3% are well above any reasonable hurdle rate and have been sustained across multiple years in the history provided. FCF conversion is exceptional: $304M of free cash flow on $198M of net income in FY2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20), a ratio greater than 1.5x, which is the hallmark of high-quality earnings. Operating margins of 33% and FCF margins of 45% are not accidental — they reflect the platform's genuine operating leverage and low incremental delivery cost once the cloud infrastructure is built. The moat is real but debatable in permanence: enterprise security buyers face high switching costs (deep integration with IT asset inventories, compliance workflows, audit trails), and Qualys's cloud-native, agent-based architecture creates stickiness evidenced by a net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Qs filed 2026-05-05 and 2026-08-04), meaning the installed base grows without net churn. This is a moat characteristic, not a commodity. Capital allocation has been disciplined: capex of only $5M on $669M of revenue (10-K FY2025) makes this an almost capital-free business in the physical sense, and the board has authorized $1.6 billion in cumulative repurchases (10-K filed 2026-02-20), returning cash to shareholders rather than empire-building. Shares outstanding have declined (36.5M at Feb 2025 vs 35.7M at Feb 2026 per 10-K filings), confirming real per-share accretion rather than dilution. Debt-to-equity is null in the data, and the balance sheet shows $250M cash plus ~$485M in marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04) against $534M total liabilities, yielding a strongly net-cash position — exactly the fortress balance sheet Munger prefers. Accounting is clean: no goodwill bloat (intangible assets net only $3M as of June 2026 per 10-Q), no restatements flagged, no aggressive revenue recognition red flags, and the 10-K explicitly confirms no material changes to critical accounting estimates. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85/share versus a current price of $183.48 implies 43% upside at base case assumptions (WACC 7.4%, 11% near-term FCF growth, 2.5% terminal). Even the bear case of $201.59 is above today's price, providing a margin of safety. The price-to-FCF of 20.9x for a business compounding owner earnings at 10%+ with 45% FCF margins and net cash is not cheap, but it is fair — precisely the 'great business at a fair price' that Munger pays up for rather than a cigar butt. The PEG of 2.92 and P/S of 9.5x are elevated but not heroically so for this quality tier. On AI disruption: this is the key risk to assess carefully. AI could cut both ways — it could commoditize vulnerability scanning tools as open-source LLM-powered alternatives emerge, threatening the moat from below; but it also expands the attack surface enterprises must manage and elevates the urgency of what Qualys sells. Management cited 'AI-Driven Innovation' in Q2 2026 (narrative), though specific product detail is not in the fact base. On balance, AI is likely a modest tailwind near-term and a medium-term watch item rather than an existential threat, given the depth of enterprise integration. Key concerns preventing a higher score: revenue CAGR of only 11% (fundamentals block) is modest for a SaaS company at this valuation; the competitive landscape includes well-resourced rivals (Tenable, CrowdStrike, Rapid7) whose dynamics are not detailed in the fact base; and the narrative notes insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans, which is routine but worth noting. The stock's 68% prior-period run and only ~7% sell-side upside (narrative) suggest the market has already partially recognized quality. Nevertheless, on a Munger quality screen, this is a genuine pass — not a screaming bargain but a high-quality compounder at a fair price that one could hold for years.
Valuation Referee (Damodaran-style) Referee
pass · 72The DCF provided in the fact base produces an intrinsic value of $262.85/share versus a current price of $183.48, implying ~43% upside at the base case. The bear-case sensitivity is $201.59 — still above the current price — which means QLYS trades below even the conservative scenario in this model. That is a meaningful margin of safety by Damodaran standards. Let me stress-test the underlying assumptions before accepting that conclusion.
GROWTH ASSUMPTION: The DCF uses 10.96% FCF growth (sourced from the 3-year revenue CAGR per the fact base). Historical revenue: $411M (2021) → $489M (2022) → $554M (2023) → $608M (2024) → $669M (2025). The 3-year CAGR 2022-2025 is approximately 10.9%. Q2 2026 revenue was $182M (+11% YoY) per the narrative, and FY2026 guidance was raised to $732-738M, implying ~10% growth. So 10.96% is consistent with both recent history and near-term guidance — not heroic. The expectation implied is not above-base-rate; it matches demonstrated performance.
MARGIN/FCF QUALITY: FCF margin has been remarkably consistent: 42.9% (2021), 37.5% (2022), 42.5% (2023), 38.2% (2024), 45.5% (2025). The 2025 FCF of $304M on $669M revenue is exceptional. Operating margin was 33.2% (2025 per fundamentals). Net dollar expansion rate was 103-104% (per 10-Q filings), indicating durable retention with modest upsell. These are genuine numbers from filings, not narrative.
ROIC vs. WACC: ROIC is reported at 31.25% (fundamentals block) vs. a WACC of 7.43% used in the DCF. The spread is enormous — well above cost of capital — meaning growth is genuinely value-creating. Capex is minimal ($5.0M in 2025 per fundamentals), consistent with a capital-light SaaS model. Sales-to-capital ratio is very high; reinvestment needs are low relative to the growth delivered, which is internally consistent for a cloud-based SaaS business.
WACC CRITIQUE: The 7.43% WACC uses beta of 0.625. This is a low beta for a technology company. A reasonable challenge: at beta of 0.8-1.0, cost of equity rises to ~8.5-9.5%, compressing the DCF value. Using a 9% WACC with the same growth assumptions, the terminal value would shrink materially. However, even under that stress, given the 43% upside in the base case, there is likely still positive margin of safety — though the bear case at $201.59 might not hold. The fact base does not provide enough detail to compute a full re-run, so I flag this as the primary uncertainty.
TERMINAL VALUE RISK: 81.6% of enterprise value is in terminal value (per the valuation block). Terminal growth of 2.5% is roughly at nominal GDP — defensible. But with 81.6% terminal value weight, WACC sensitivity is very high. This is a legitimate concern: if WACC is 1-2% higher than modeled, the intrinsic value could fall below current price.
REINVESTMENT CONSISTENCY: Capex was $5.0M in 2025 (per fundamentals). OCF was $309M. The growth story is funded primarily by platform economics, not heavy capital expenditure — consistent with a SaaS business where R&D (partially expensed) and the shared cloud platform drive growth. The 10-Q (filed 2026-08-04) notes capital expenditures of $5.4M for the six months ended June 30, 2026, still minimal.
STORY-TO-NUMBERS CHECK: The narrative cites 'AI-Driven Innovation' and channel strength. From a Damodaran perspective, these are plausible but need to be grounded. The 103-104% net dollar expansion rate (from both 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) is the key metric — it confirms customers are staying and modestly expanding, consistent with a sustainable mid-single-digit to low-double-digit growth story. No heroic assumptions needed.
AI DISRUPTION (DAMODARAN FRAME): Qualys operates in vulnerability management/cybersecurity. AI could be a double-edged sword: it may enhance Qualys's product (they acquired Blue Hexagon's AI/ML network detection per 10-K filed 2025-02-21), but it also lowers barriers for new entrants and could commoditize vulnerability scanning. The net effect is uncertain over 3-10 years. For valuation purposes, the growth rate of ~11% already embeds a deceleration scenario (not hypergrowth), so AI disruption risk is partially priced into the conservative assumption set.
WHY NOT HIGHER SCORE: (1) WACC of 7.43% may be too low for a tech company — this is the biggest DCF risk and I cannot fully resolve it from the fact base; (2) 81.6% terminal value dependency means intrinsic value is highly sensitive to discount rate; (3) The narrative's 'AI-Driven Innovation' claims are unsubstantiated in filings — no product revenue attribution; (4) Competition from larger platforms (not quantified in available data) could erode the 103% net expansion rate. Score of 72 reflects a genuine but not slam-dunk margin of safety that depends partly on accepting a sub-8% WACC.
AI & Disruption Referee (Christensen-style) Referee
pass · 72Qualys occupies a specific and defensible position in the cybersecurity stack: cloud-based vulnerability management, compliance, and attack surface management delivered as an agent-based and agentless SaaS platform. The Christensen disruption test requires asking whether AI can do the job Qualys does — continuously scanning, cataloguing, and prioritizing vulnerabilities across enterprise assets — cheaper, faster, or good-enough without Qualys. The answer is nuanced but ultimately more favorable than the average software intermediary.
The core job Qualys does is NOT a knowledge-work or matching intermediary function. It is a technical sensing and classification system: its scanners ingest telemetry from agents deployed on endpoints, cloud workloads, and network devices, match observed states against a curated vulnerability knowledge base (including CVE mapping, CVSS scoring, and proprietary intelligence), and produce prioritized remediation queues. This is infrastructure, not arbitrage. The stickiness comes from agent deployment at the endpoint level, integration into ITSM/CMDB workflows, and compliance reporting tied to audit requirements (10-K filed 2026-02-20 references subscription-based recurring revenue collected in advance, consistent with deep workflow integration). Net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% across 2024-2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20; 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) confirm customers are not quietly churning or shrinking spend.
AI as a threat vector: The legitimate disruption risk is that generative AI and LLM-based security tools (from CrowdStrike, Microsoft Defender/Security Copilot, or AI-native entrants) could commoditize vulnerability prioritization — the analytical layer on top of the scan data. Microsoft Security Copilot, for instance, can already help a security analyst interpret CVE data and draft remediation plans. If customers perceive that 'good-enough' AI-driven triage is available through their existing Microsoft/Google/CrowdStrike bundle, Qualys's analytical premium could erode. This is the hyperscaler bundling risk and it is real. However, it attacks the highest-layer analytical product, not the core sensor/agent infrastructure, which is where switching costs are deepest.
AI as a tailwind: The narrative (Aug 5 2026 earnings call summary in the fact base) cites 'AI-Driven Innovation' as a growth driver. The Blue Hexagon acquisition (10-K filed 2025-02-21) introduced AI/ML-based network detection capabilities — 'behavior patterns including active vulnerability exploitation, identification of advanced network threats, and adaptive risk mitigation.' This suggests Qualys is embedding AI into its own detection engine rather than being bypassed by it. The expansion of the attack surface driven by AI-generated code, shadow IT proliferation, and cloud-native workloads structurally enlarges the vulnerability management TAM — more assets to scan, more CVEs to track, more compliance regimes to satisfy. Qualys as the scanning infrastructure benefits from these tailwinds even if the analytics layer commoditizes.
The falsifiable call: Evidence that AI IS displacing Qualys would be: net dollar expansion rates falling below 100% (contraction in existing accounts), customers citing Microsoft or CrowdStrike as replacement for VM workloads, average contract values declining despite expanding asset footprints, or an AI-native entrant (e.g., a cloud-provider-native scanner) undercutting on price. Evidence that AI is NOT displacing it: continued 103-104%+ NDE, growing compliance and CNAPP product attach, and rising FCF margins (FCF margin rose to 45.5% in FY2025 from 38.1% in FY2024 per fundamentals block). Current evidence tilts toward the latter but the Microsoft Security Copilot bundling risk deserves monitoring. Management's framing of AI as pure tailwind (per narrative) with no disclosed discussion of displacement risk is a modest concern — but the acquisition of Blue Hexagon and the agent-infrastructure moat suggest this is not pure denial.
Net: Qualys is not a disintermediation target in the classical sense. Its moat is technical infrastructure (agents on endpoints, proprietary scan data, compliance workflow integration), not matching/optimization that a model can replicate from the outside. The hyperscaler bundling risk is real at the analytics layer. Score 72 — a cautious pass that acknowledges the risk is manageable if the company continues embedding AI into its own platform and if NDE rates hold.
Forensic Short-Seller (Chanos/Einhorn-style) Referee
pass · 72Applying forensic short-seller tests to Qualys, the accounting quality is genuinely strong, which is the primary finding — this is not a short. The core Chanos/Einhorn test (earnings vs. cash) comes out clean or better: net income of $198.3M in FY2025 is actually LOWER than operating cash flow of $309.4M and free cash flow of $304.4M (fundamentals block). FCF margin of 45.5% on FY2025 revenue of $669M is exceptional for a SaaS company. Across the historical table, FCF has consistently exceeded or tracked near net income every year (2021: NI $71M vs FCF $176M; 2022: NI $108M vs FCF $183M; 2023: NI $151.6M vs FCF $235.8M; 2024: NI $173.7M vs FCF $231.8M; 2025: NI $198.3M vs FCF $304.4M). This is the opposite of an accrual fraud pattern — cash consistently and materially exceeds reported earnings, suggesting conservative revenue recognition and real cash conversion. Revenue recognition: Qualys collects subscription fees in advance (noted in both the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and 10-Q filed 2026-08-04 under market risk discussion: 'limit credit exposure by collecting subscription fees in advance'). Deferred revenue on the balance sheet ($467M current liabilities as of 2025-12-31 per fundamentals) acts as a cash-in-advance buffer. This structure is the opposite of aggressive revenue recognition — revenue is recognized after cash is received. Net dollar expansion rate: 103-104% as disclosed across multiple filings (10-K 2026-02-20, 10-Q 2026-05-05 citing 104% as of March 31, 2026), indicating modest but stable customer expansion with no evidence of cohort decay. Capitalized costs: Intangible assets from acquisitions are de minimis and rapidly amortizing — developed technology net book value was only $4.2M as of December 31, 2025 (10-K filed 2026-02-20), down from $6.8M at end of 2024. Capex is micro at $5.0M for FY2025 (fundamentals block), confirming the asset-light cloud delivery model. No evidence of aggressive capitalization of R&D or customer acquisition costs. Share count and buybacks: Shares outstanding fell from approximately 36.5M (Feb 2025 per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) to 35.7M (Feb 2026 per 10-K filed 2026-02-20), confirming buybacks are actually reducing share count, not merely offsetting SBC dilution. The board authorized $200M additional repurchase in FY2025, bringing total authorized to $1.6B (10-K filed 2026-02-20) — this is accretive repurchase by the evidence available. Balance sheet: No debt disclosed (debt_to_equity is null in fundamentals; total liabilities of $533.9M vs. current liabilities of $467.3M suggests the bulk is deferred revenue, not financial debt). Net cash position: $250.3M cash plus ~$485M in marketable securities (10-Q filed 2026-08-04 shows total marketable securities fair value of $485.4M), giving a substantial net cash position. No refinancing risk whatsoever. Governance: No auditor changes, no restatements indicated (10-K cover page language confirms no error corrections requiring recovery analysis, per both 10-K filings). Insider selling flagged in narrative (CLO and director sold modest amounts in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans) — amounts are small (~$95K and ~$55K per narrative) and pre-established, not a red flag. No CFO turnover or related-party issues found in filings. Bears and red flags worth noting: (1) Valuation is rich — P/FCF of ~20.8x and P/S of ~9.5x (fundamentals) for ~11% revenue CAGR is not cheap; the forensic lens does not score on valuation richness per se but notes that if growth decelerates, the multiple compression risk is real. (2) Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% is only barely above 100% — not the 120%+ land-and-expand story; customer base is not rapidly expanding ARPU. (3) AI narrative cited as driver in Q2 2026 earnings (narrative) lacks specificity in available filings — 'AI-Driven Innovation' headline without revenue attribution is a governance/disclosure concern worth watching. (4) The kill question: What would make this a short? A sustained deceleration in revenue growth below ~8% combined with FCF margin compression AND evidence of deferred revenue drawdown (current deferred revenue shrinking) would signal demand exhaustion. None of those signals are present in current data. The bear case is not falsifiable from current filings. Overall forensic verdict: This is an accounting-quality name, not a short candidate. The only lens-appropriate score below 70 would require finding earnings-cash divergence, aggressive capitalization, or governance rot — none of which are present. Score 72 reflects the clean accounting (strong pass on core tests) offset by the rich valuation and modestly decelerating growth metrics that a forensic analyst would flag as forward risk.
Warren Buffett Quality
watch · 62Qualys presents several characteristics I find genuinely attractive: a capital-light SaaS subscription model with very high free cash flow conversion (~45% FCF margin in 2025 per fundamentals), consistent profitability with net margins near 30%, and essentially zero debt (net cash position with ~$250M cash plus ~$478M in marketable securities per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20). ROIC of 31% and ROE of 35% are exceptional and achieved without leverage — that is exactly the kind of return profile I associate with genuine competitive advantage. Capex is trivially small ($5M on $669M revenue in 2025 per fundamentals), so owner earnings closely approximate reported free cash flow. The net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (cited across multiple 10-Q filings for 2025-2026) suggests customers stay and modestly expand — a hallmark of switching costs in enterprise software. Revenue has grown steadily from $411M (2021) to $669M (2025), a 3-year CAGR of ~11%, and Q2 2026 showed 11% YoY growth with guidance raised to $732-738M per the narrative. The share count has been shrinking — from 36.5M shares (Feb 2025 per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) to 35.7M (Feb 2026 per 10-K filed 2026-02-20) — indicating management is buying back stock, which is rational capital allocation when the business generates substantial excess cash. The repurchase authorization has grown to $1.6B total per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20. These are marks of honest, shareholder-friendly stewardship. However, I have meaningful reservations. First, valuation: at $183.48 with a P/E of 32x and price-to-FCF of ~20.8x, I am paying a full price. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85/share implies 43% upside, which sounds appealing, but 82% of that value sits in the terminal value — a highly assumption-sensitive figure. The bear case of $201.59 is only modestly above current price, offering thin margin of safety. A wonderful business at a fair price beats a fair business at a wonderful price, but I still want a cushion. Second, the moat's durability is my principal uncertainty. Vulnerability management and cloud security is a contested space. I can observe that margins have held or improved and the dollar expansion rate has been stable, but I cannot fully assess whether Qualys's technological position versus CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Tenable, and others is widening or narrowing from this fact base. The competitive dynamics in enterprise cybersecurity software are genuinely difficult to forecast a decade out — this is at the edge of my circle of competence. Third, AI represents a double-edged risk here: management cites 'AI-Driven Innovation' (narrative), but the fact base provides no revenue attribution or product specifics. AI could enhance Qualys's threat detection capabilities (the Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition per 10-K 2025-02-21 is directionally positive), but it could also commoditize vulnerability scanning if larger platform players (Microsoft, CrowdStrike) bake equivalent capability into broader security suites at lower incremental cost. That risk is real and unresolved. The business quality is genuinely high — this is not a mediocre business. But at current prices, with a thin bear-case margin of safety and moat durability questions I cannot fully resolve, I would watch for a better entry rather than act today.
Philip Fisher Growth
watch · 58Qualys is a legitimate SaaS cybersecurity business with real recurring revenue, high margins, and strong cash generation — all features I admire. However, through my growth lens, the critical question is whether the organic sales growth runway is long, visible, and accelerating or at least durable at above-industry rates. The fact base reveals a 3-year revenue CAGR of roughly 11% (10-K filed 2026-02-20, fundamentals block), which is respectable but not exceptional for a cybersecurity SaaS firm operating in a market where peers like CrowdStrike are growing 20-30%+. The net dollar expansion rate — a clean proxy for organic expansion within the installed base — was 103% for fiscal year 2025 and 104% as of Q1/Q2 2026 (10-Q filed 2026-05-05, 2026-08-04). This is healthy but not outstanding; it indicates modest upsell/cross-sell momentum, not a platform that is rapidly capturing wallet share. Revenue grew 11% YoY in Q2 2026 per the narrative, and full-year 2026 guidance of $732-738M implies approximately 10% growth — consistent with the historical trend but showing no acceleration. On margins, Qualys is genuinely impressive: operating margin of 33.2% and FCF margin of 45.5% for fiscal 2025 (fundamentals block) are among the best in software. These are margins I associate with a durable, well-run franchise. The model is asset-light with capex of only $5M on $669M revenue (10-K filed 2026-02-20), and operating cash flow of $309M demonstrates real cash generation, not accounting fiction. The concern is whether these superior margins reflect pricing power and genuine competitive moat, or whether they come partly at the cost of underinvestment in R&D and go-to-market relative to faster-growing rivals. The fact base does not provide explicit R&D dollar amounts or R&D-as-a-percent-of-revenue, which is a significant gap for my assessment — I cannot verify whether Qualys is investing adequately in its product pipeline to sustain the franchise. The Blue Hexagon AI/ML acquisition for $10M (10-K filed 2025-02-21) and TotalCloud acquisition were small tuck-ins, not transformative product bets; total acquired intangible cost is $40.1M (10-Q filed 2026-08-04), suggesting a relatively modest acquisition-driven R&D supplement. Management's 'AI-Driven Innovation' messaging is noted in the narrative but lacks substantiation — no concrete product launches, no revenue attribution, no customer wins are documented in the available fact base. This is precisely the kind of promotional language I am skeptical of without corroboration. The scuttlebutt dimension is thin: the narrative provides retail sentiment and some institutional buying signals, but no independent customer, supplier, or competitor color that would let me assess whether Qualys truly owns a defensible position in vulnerability management or is slowly being commoditized by better-resourced competitors. The share repurchase program totaling $1.6B authorized (10-K filed 2026-02-20) is capital return to shareholders rather than reinvestment in growth — not inherently wrong, but it signals a business in harvest mode more than a high-growth compounder. Shares outstanding declined from 36.5M (2024 10-K) to 35.7M (2025 10-K), confirming meaningful buyback activity. For a Fisher-style long-term growth holding, I want to see management plowing capital into the franchise, not primarily returning it. On management integrity: no restatements, clean audit opinions, and the 10-K cover pages confirm no error corrections (10-K filed 2026-02-20). The fact base does not reveal candor issues or evasiveness, but the lack of a full earnings transcript limits my ability to apply the scuttlebutt test to management communication quality. AI disruption is a double-edged sword for Qualys: cybersecurity spending is accelerating partly because AI creates new attack surfaces, which benefits QLYS as a vulnerability management platform. However, AI also enables better-resourced platform players (Microsoft, Palo Alto) to bundle vulnerability management into broader security suites, potentially commoditizing QLYS's standalone offering. The 'AI-Driven Innovation' narrative suggests management is aware of this but the product response is not yet documented with specificity. The DCF from the valuation block shows $262.85 intrinsic value per share versus $183.48 current price, a 43% upside, using 11% FCF growth and 7.43% WACC. The bear case of $201.59 still implies upside, suggesting the price is not egregiously stretched on a DCF basis. However, the terminal value represents 81.6% of enterprise value, making the valuation highly sensitive to long-term growth assumptions — and 11% terminal-period growth fading to 2.5% perpetuity is the key risk if competitive intensity accelerates. Synthesis: Qualys is a high-quality, well-managed business with genuinely superior economics, but it is growing at a rate more consistent with a mature market leader than a Fisher-style compounding grower. The missing R&D data, unsubstantiated AI claims, and lack of independent scuttlebutt corroboration prevent a confident pass. I assign a watch rather than a clear buy.
Joel Greenblatt Value
watch · 58Qualys is a genuinely high-quality business — its ROIC and FCF characteristics are exceptional — but the earnings yield (EBIT/EV) is too thin to earn a full Magic Formula pass. Let me work through the inputs. EBIT for FY2025 is $221.952M (fundamentals block). Enterprise Value: market cap $6,347M + net debt (negative, so subtract excess cash). Cash and equivalents are $250.258M per fundamentals, but the 10-K and 10-Q filings show substantial additional marketable securities — short-term ($195.7M at Dec 31 2025) and long-term ($250.9M at Dec 31 2025), totaling roughly $696M in cash+securities. No meaningful debt is evident from filings (debt-to-equity is null in fundamentals; no debt schedule cited in excerpts). So EV ≈ $6,347M - $696M = ~$5,651M. EBIT/EV = $221.952M / $5,651M ≈ 3.9%. That is a low earnings yield — roughly a 25x EBIT multiple — which is expensive on a Greenblatt basis. The bar for a Magic Formula pass is typically earnings yields in the high single digits or above. On ROIC, the picture is far better. Using Greenblatt's preferred denominator (net working capital + net fixed assets): net working capital = current assets $657.6M - current liabilities $467.3M = $190.3M; net fixed assets are minimal given the asset-light SaaS model (capex only $5M/year, no heavy PP&E disclosed in excerpts). Greenblatt ROIC = $221.952M / ~$190M (approximating net fixed assets as near-zero for a cloud-native SaaS) = very high, likely well above 100% on tangible capital. This is a superb business on quality. The problem is price. At ~3.9% earnings yield, the stock fails the cheapness screen decisively. The DCF model (valuation block) shows a base intrinsic value of $262.85 vs. current price $183.48, implying 43% upside — which is encouraging — but the DCF leans heavily on terminal value (81.6% of EV per valuation block), making it sensitive to growth and WACC assumptions. There is no special-situation catalyst visible (no spinoff, restructuring, or recapitalization disclosed in any filing). Revenue CAGR is 11%, net dollar expansion rate is 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-08-04 and 10-K filed 2026-02-20), and FCF margin is 45.5% (FY2025) — all hallmarks of a durable, high-quality franchise. But Greenblatt's formula demands both axes. On quality: strong pass. On price/earnings yield: fail at current levels. AI risk is real but double-edged: AI-driven vulnerability surface expansion likely increases demand for Qualys's cloud-based scanning and risk quantification, but AI could also accelerate commodity competition from hyperscalers. No concrete AI revenue attribution is available in the fact base. Net: AI is modestly positive for demand, modestly negative for competitive moat durability — not a decisive factor either way at this juncture.
Bruce Greenwald Value
watch · 58Qualys has genuine franchise characteristics — high ROIC (31%), fat FCF margins (~45%), recurring subscription revenue, and net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% — that suggest real customer captivity through switching costs and scale economics within vulnerability management. The EPV case is compelling in isolation, but the market price demands significant growth assumptions that require validating the durability of the moat against intensifying competition and AI disruption. My EPV calculation: normalized NOPAT ≈ operating income of ~$222M (2025, from fundamentals) adjusted for taxes at ~21% effective rate ≈ ~$175M NOPAT; maintenance capex appears minimal (capex $5M vs. D&A which is larger), so distributable earnings are roughly at or above NOPAT. Capitalizing ~$175-190M at WACC of 7.43% yields EPV of roughly $2.35-2.55B enterprise value, or ~$73-78/share after adding back ~$250M net cash (35.7M shares). The current price of $183.48 is roughly 2.4x my EPV estimate — meaning the market is paying heavily for growth, not just earnings power. The two-stage DCF in the fact base yields $262.85/share but 81.6% of that value sits in the terminal value, which is precisely the Greenwald trap — far-horizon speculation masquerading as value. Asset reproduction value: Qualys's tangible assets are modest (total assets $1.1B, largely financial assets/marketable securities ~$485M plus receivables); the hard-to-reproduce asset is the installed customer base and cloud platform built over 25+ years. Rebuilding that customer captivity would take a competitor enormous sales, marketing, and engineering spend over many years — this intangible reproduction cost is real and substantial, validating that EPV >> tangible reproduction value and suggesting a genuine moat exists. The moat test passes directionally: EPV far exceeds tangible assets, confirming franchise economics. However, the current price is 2.4x EPV, meaning I am being asked to pay for 15+ years of moat-protected growth at the current margin of 0%, not 30-40% safety. Revenue CAGR of ~11% (3-year, from fundamentals) is respectable but not explosive, and net dollar expansion at 103-104% (10-K filed 2026-02-20; 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) is solid but not accelerating. Q2 2026 revenue of $182M at +11% YoY (narrative) with FY2026 guidance of $732-738M implies continued ~10-11% growth — adequate but not the high-growth justification needed to pay 2.4x EPV. The FCF margin of 45.5% (2025) and price-to-FCF of 20.85x are more palatable than the EPV gap suggests, but FCF yield of ~4.8% at current price is thin for a value investor who needs a margin of safety. AI dimension: Qualys positions itself as an AI-enhanced security platform (narrative cites 'AI-Driven Innovation'), and the 2022 acquisition of Blue Hexagon's AI/ML network detection capability (10-K filed 2025-02-21) suggests organic integration of AI into the product. However, AI also represents a disruption risk — larger platforms (Microsoft, CrowdStrike, Palo Alto) are embedding vulnerability management into broader AI-driven security suites, potentially commoditizing Qualys's niche. The switching cost moat (agents deployed, workflows embedded) is real but not impregnable against platform consolidation. Insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (narrative) is routine but noted. No restatements, no related-party concerns, no aggressive accounting flags in the filings reviewed. Critical accounting estimates are unchanged per 10-Q filed 2026-08-04. The verdict is 'watch' rather than 'pass' because while the franchise quality is genuine, the price-to-EPV ratio of ~2.4x demands growth assumptions I am unwilling to pay for without a margin of safety. A price in the $100-120 range (1.3-1.5x EPV, providing ~25-35% safety margin) would be a clear buy; at $183 I am paying for the growth story, not the earnings power.
Ray Dalio Risk
watch · 55Qualys presents an interesting macro case: it is a cloud-native cybersecurity subscription business with exceptional balance-sheet resilience and cash generation, but it is nonetheless a single-regime dependent name — its valuation primarily reflects a low-WACC, high-growth, disinflation environment, and it shows limited regime robustness across Dalio's four boxes. The positives from a macro/risk lens are real: net cash position (cash and equivalents of $250.3M per fundamentals block, plus ~$485M in marketable securities per the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, against negligible capex of ~$5M and total liabilities of $534M), FCF margin of 45.5% (FY2025, fundamentals), and near-zero debt — meaning no floating-rate refinancing exposure, no maturity wall, and no dependence on capital markets to fund operations. This passes the balance-sheet resilience and self-funding test cleanly. The subscription model with up-front billing (deferred revenue visible in working capital flows per both 10-Qs) provides some insulation against demand shocks, and cybersecurity spending has historically been relatively non-discretionary. The net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (per 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and 10-Q filed 2026-05-05) suggests reasonable retention stickiness. However, from a regime-robustness perspective, Qualys is a high-multiple tech equity that embeds multiple years of growth at a 7.43% WACC (per DCF). In a stagflationary scenario — rising inflation eroding real returns, rates higher for longer compressing terminal value multiples — the stock's 81.6% terminal-value dependency (per valuation block) is a significant vulnerability. The intrinsic value is $262.85 (base DCF) vs. $183.48 current price, implying upside, but that DCF assumes 10.96% FCF growth and a 7.43% WACC; a 200bp WACC increase would substantially compress the terminal value. Inflation pass-through is untested: while SaaS pricing can be adjusted at renewal, the 103% net dollar expansion rate is only modestly above flat, suggesting pricing power exists but is not exceptional. Revenue CAGR of ~11% (3-year, per fundamentals) is solid but not transformational, and the stock at 9.49x P/S and 20.85x P/FCF assumes the current growth/disinflation regime persists. Geographic diversification is partial — some international exposure (EUR, GBP, INR, CAD hedged per 10-Q filings) but concentration data not provided in the fact base. AI disruption is a dual-edged factor: Qualys benefits from AI driving more complex attack surfaces requiring vulnerability management, but AI could also enable lower-cost competitive entry or allow platform vendors (Microsoft, CrowdStrike) to bundle equivalent capabilities, compressing Qualys's pricing power over a 5-10 year horizon — a real tail risk that is not reflected in the current valuation. The DCF's terminal growth assumption of 2.5% against a 10.96% near-term growth phase assumes a smooth landing that Dalio's framework would stress-test harder. The stock is not a disaster from a macro lens — the clean balance sheet and recurring revenue base make it meaningfully more resilient than most tech equities — but it is not a regime-agnostic compounder either; it is a quality growth name priced for a benign macro environment.
Stanley Druckenmiller Risk
watch · 52QLYS is a clean, profitable, high-FCF SaaS security business that just delivered an earnings beat with raised guidance — the fundamental direction is modestly positive. However, assessed through the Druckenmiller lens, the setup falls short of a high-conviction, asymmetric, catalyst-driven position. The second derivative of growth (rate of change acceleration) is insufficiently dramatic: revenue grew ~11% YoY in Q2 2026 (narrative digest, 10-Q filed 2026-08-04) and the 3-year revenue CAGR per fundamentals block is 10.96% — solid but not inflecting sharply upward. EPS grew 15.4% YoY (narrative), partly from operating leverage rather than top-line acceleration. The FY2026 guidance raise of ~$11M on a ~$732-738M base (narrative) is constructive but only a ~1.5% uplift — not the kind of explosive estimate revision that warrants maximum sizing. Net dollar expansion rate has been stable at 103-104% (10-Q filings, 2026-08-04 and 2026-05-05; 10-K 2026-02-20) — respectable retention, but not accelerating. On the liquidity/macro front, the fact base provides no explicit Fed or monetary regime data, which limits confidence; QLYS carries no debt (debt_to_equity is null per fundamentals, net cash position of ~$250M cash per 10-K 2026-02-20), so it is not a rate-sensitive leveraged story — a neutral, not a tailwind. The tape is the brightest signal: stock rallied 14% after-hours on Q2 earnings (narrative), is ~9% below the 52-week high ($201.54), has bounced sharply off the 52-week low of $74.51, and institutional buyers stepped in post-earnings (narrative). Price action confirms the bull thesis — this is not a broken tape. However, the 68% prior-period rally cited in the narrative means much of the re-rating may already be priced. The DCF intrinsic value (valuation block) implies 43% upside at $262.85/share vs. $183.48 current, which is real margin of safety — but the DCF is a long-duration instrument (81.6% terminal value weight), making it macro-rate sensitive and not the tight, time-bound asymmetric bet Druckenmiller prefers. The 'why now' catalyst is somewhat diffuse: AI-driven security tailwinds are real but the AI revenue attribution is unsubstantiated per the narrative caveats. No specific product cycle, policy shift, or hard inflection point is identifiable with conviction. This is a good business on a positive trajectory — pass for a quality-growth investor — but lacks the explosive second-derivative acceleration, the defined catalyst timing, and the macro-liquidity tailwind that would justify a concentrated, maximum-conviction Druckenmiller-sized position. It sits in 'watch' territory: hold/initiate small, wait for a clearer inflection signal or a macro regime shift that turns liquidity conditions more explicitly favorable.
Seth Klarman Value
watch · 52Qualys is a high-quality SaaS cybersecurity business with genuinely exceptional cash flow characteristics — 45.5% FCF margins in FY2025 ($304M on $669M revenue per fundamentals block), a net cash balance sheet (cash and equivalents of $250M per FY2025 fundamentals, with large marketable securities portfolio visible in both the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04), and no meaningful financial leverage (debt-to-equity is null/not reported, current ratio 1.41). The company is real and the cash flows are real. However, from a strict Klarman margin-of-safety standpoint, the entry price does not offer a compelling discount to a deliberately conservative intrinsic value. The DCF in the fact base pegs intrinsic value at $262.85/share with 43% upside from the $183.48 close — that is encouraging at face value — but the DCF relies on the revenue CAGR of ~11% as the FCF growth rate, a 7.43% WACC (using a low beta of 0.625), and an 81.6% terminal value weight. These are not conservative inputs by my standards: any disappointment in growth, any multiple compression, or any WACC normalization collapses the terminal value which dominates at 82% of enterprise value. A stress test at 6% growth and 9% WACC would produce a materially lower intrinsic value, likely near or below current price — the bear case sensitivity of $201.59 is only 10% above market, providing thin downside protection. The business does not offer asset-value downside protection in the Klarman sense: P/B is 11.3x, tangible assets are negligible relative to market cap (intangible assets net book value is only ~$3-4M per the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04 and 10-K filed 2026-02-20), and a liquidation scenario would return far less than market price. The 'floor' is entirely a going-concern cash-flow story. Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (per multiple 10-Q filings and the 10-K filed 2026-02-20) is solid but not exceptional, and 3-year revenue CAGR of ~11% is moderate for a company priced at 9.5x sales and 20.9x FCF. There is no special-situation catalyst — no forced selling, no restructuring, no complexity creating an orphaned security; the post-earnings +14% rally noted in the narrative suggests the opposite of forced selling. Insider selling in June 2026 under 10b5-1 plans (noted in narrative) is routine but directionally unhelpful. AI risk is a genuine two-sided factor: Qualys benefits from AI-driven security spending tailwinds, but AI could also commoditize vulnerability scanning and expose the company to better-resourced competitors (CrowdStrike, Microsoft, Palo Alto). Management cited 'AI-Driven Innovation' but the narrative explicitly notes this lacks concrete revenue attribution — unverified as a differentiator. Balance sheet quality is genuinely strong: large marketable securities portfolio ($485M fair value as of June 30, 2026 per the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, plus $218M cash excluded from that total), share repurchase program with $1.6B total authorized (per 10-K filed 2026-02-20), and capex of only $5M/year. This is a company with real capital return discipline. At roughly 20-21x FCF, the price is fair-to-slightly-elevated for a steady ~11% grower — not the deep discount that warrants conviction. I would watch for a pullback toward $130-150 where the FCF yield rises to 6-7% and the margin of safety becomes real rather than notional.
Peter Lynch Growth
watch · 52Qualys is a stalwart/slow-grower cybersecurity SaaS company — not a fast grower by Lynch criteria. Revenue CAGR is ~11% over 3 years (fundamentals block), and the business is easily explainable in one sentence: Qualys sells cloud-based vulnerability management and security compliance subscriptions to enterprises. The story is clean, recurring, and understandable. But the PEG is the killer here: the fact base reports a PEG of 2.92 (fundamentals block), which is nearly 3x Lynch's preferred ceiling of 1.0. At a P/E of 32 (fundamentals block) against a revenue CAGR of ~11% and EPS growth implied at roughly 10-15%, the stock is priced like a fast grower while growing like a stalwart. Lynch's rule is simple: you want to pay a P/E at or near the growth rate; you're paying more than double. On the positive side, the balance sheet is excellent — net cash position (cash and equivalents $250M per 2025 10-K, plus ~$479M in marketable securities per filings, against minimal debt; debt-to-equity shown as null suggesting no meaningful funded debt), FCF margin of 45.5% (fundamentals block), and operating cash flow of $309M against capex of only $5M (fundamentals block) — this company funds itself entirely internally, which Lynch loves. The net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (10-Q filings, both March and June 2026 periods) confirms modest but durable customer retention and upsell. There is no diworsification risk — the company's only acquisitions are small tuck-ins (Blue Hexagon for $10M in 2022 per 10-K filed 2025-02-21, TotalCloud in 2021), consistent with core-focused capital discipline. Share buybacks are active ($1.6B total authorization per 10-K filed 2026-02-20), which is shareholder-friendly. Q2 2026 showed $182M revenue +11% YoY and EPS +15.4% YoY (narrative), with FY2026 guidance raised to $732-738M — these are stalwart-type results, steady and predictable. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85 vs. current price $183.48 (valuation block) suggests 43% upside on a base case, which is genuinely attractive for a stalwart if the growth sustains. However, Lynch would note that institutional ownership is substantial (multiple large institutions referenced in narrative), analyst coverage is active, and the stock just ran 14% AH on earnings and 68% prior — the neglected-stock edge is entirely absent. AI/technology disruption is a dual-edged factor: AI security spending is a tailwind for vulnerability management (Qualys explicitly cited 'AI-Driven Innovation' in Q2 narrative), but AI could also commoditize scanning and assessment tools, enabling open-source or hyperscaler-native alternatives to erode QLYS's moat over a 5-10 year horizon. This is a real risk for a subscription business whose core product (cloud-based vulnerability scanning) is becoming a commodity in cloud-native environments. Net assessment: solid stalwart with excellent cash generation and clean balance sheet, but the PEG of ~2.9 is far above Lynch's comfort zone, the stock is well-followed and not neglected, and growth is steady rather than accelerating. A Lynch stalwart target would be to take 30-50% gains and move on — but at current valuations, the entry point for that trade is questionable. Watch, not buy.
Howard Marks Risk
watch · 52Through the Marks risk lens, the central question is not whether Qualys is a good business — it demonstrably is — but whether the price already embeds too much optimism, leaving insufficient margin of safety. The evidence is mixed, tilting slightly negative from a risk-first perspective.
ON THE POSITIVE SIDE: The balance sheet is genuinely clean. Per the 10-K filed 2026-02-20 and confirmed in the 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, Qualys carries no financial debt (debt-to-equity is listed as null in fundamentals, with $250M in cash and a further ~$485M in marketable securities as of June 2026). This is a fortress structure with zero refinancing risk and no covenant exposure — precisely the kind of balance sheet that can survive a bad scenario without permanent impairment. The FCF margin of 45.5% and operating cash flow of $309M (FY2025 per fundamentals) confirm the business generates real cash, not accounting income. The DCF intrinsic value of $262.85/share vs. the current price of $183.48 (43% upside per the valuation block) is a genuine data point, and the bear-case DCF of $201.59 still sits above the current price, suggesting the business is not obviously overpriced on a pure cash-flow basis. Net dollar expansion rate of 103-104% (cited in the 10-Q filed 2026-05-05 and the 10-K filed 2026-02-20) confirms customer retention and modest upsell.
ON THE RISK SIDE — WHERE THE MARKS LENS BITES HARD: The stock has rallied approximately 68% from its 52-week low of $74.51 to its current $183.48, and surged 14% in after-hours following Q2 earnings per the narrative digest. The narrative explicitly notes the stock is now 8.96% below its 52-week high of $201.54 — we are near the top of a recent sentiment swing, not at the point of capitulation or revulsion that Marks prizes. The narrative confirms multiple bullish signals converging: institutional accumulation post-earnings (Pacer, Empowered, Sei all added), retail enthusiasm on social media, call options activity, and a 'Peter Lynch GARP screen' pass. This is precisely 'buying at the peak of popularity' territory. The bull case — AI-driven security demand, channel strength, subscription stickiness — is the obvious first-level consensus view; there is no variant insight here. The narrative itself notes the 'AI-Driven Innovation' framing lacks concrete revenue attribution, which is a warning that the AI premium may be speculative.
Embedded expectations are elevated: P/E of 32x, P/FCF of 20.85x, and P/S of 9.49x price in continued compounding. The DCF relies on 11% FCF growth sustained for 5 years at a 7.43% WACC with 2.5% terminal growth — reasonable but not conservative. The terminal value constitutes 81.6% of enterprise value per the valuation block, meaning most of the intrinsic value depends on a long-duration assumption that is highly sensitive to discount-rate changes. This is not the asymmetric setup Marks would reward: the downside is protected (no debt, real FCF), but the upside is already substantially priced in, and the bar to clear is high. Revenue growth of 11% YoY is solid but not exceptional for a stock trading at 9.5x sales.
AI DISRUPTION ANGLE: For Qualys specifically, AI is a two-sided sword. On the positive side, AI-driven vulnerability detection and security automation are growth drivers that could expand the TAM. On the negative side, AI could commoditize vulnerability scanning — a core legacy product — as open-source and big-platform competitors (Microsoft Defender, CrowdStrike) increasingly embed similar capabilities into broader suites. This risk is not priced in; the market is pricing the AI tailwind without discounting the AI commoditization threat. Marks would note that the crowd is only seeing one side.
CONCLUSION: This is a high-quality business with a safe capital structure and genuine FCF, which prevents an 'avoid' verdict. But the risk/return skew is not favorable at current prices: sentiment is bullish, the stock is near its 52-week high after a large rally, consensus is uniformly constructive, and the DCF upside is modest (~43%) and dependent on optimistic terminal value assumptions. The margin of safety exists in the balance sheet but not clearly in the price. A Marks-style investor waits for the pendulum to swing back toward fear before committing capital.
Paul Singer Value
watch · 52Qualys is a well-run, highly profitable cybersecurity SaaS business with exceptional FCF margins (~45%), a clean balance sheet with net cash, and steady subscription revenue. However, it largely fails the Singer/Elliott test: the self-help gap is narrow, the capital allocation record is actually quite disciplined, and there is no obvious structural misfit or segment-level inefficiency visible in the filings. The company is essentially a single-segment, cloud-delivered vulnerability management platform — no conglomerate discount to unlock, no obvious underperforming division to separate. The primary activist angle that does exist is capital allocation: as of the 10-K filed 2026-02-20, the board authorized $1.6B cumulative in share repurchases, and shares outstanding declined from ~36.5M (10-K 2024-12-31) to ~35.7M (10-K 2025-12-31), indicating active buyback execution. FCF is $304M annually against a ~$6.3B market cap, yet cash and marketable securities are substantial (cash ~$250M per fundamentals plus ~$485M in marketable securities per 10-Q filed 2026-08-04, a total liquidity pool of roughly $735M). The question is whether this cash hoard is excessive relative to operating needs — it appears to be, given capex of only ~$5M annually (fundamentals). However, management IS returning capital via buybacks, so this is not a pure hoarding story. Revenue CAGR of ~11% (fundamentals) is solid but not explosive for SaaS, and net dollar expansion of 103-104% (10-Q filed 2026-05-05; 10-K filed 2026-02-20) is adequate but not a standout moat indicator. Operating margin of 33% (fundamentals) is healthy but the question of whether it is below comparable peers cannot be answered from this fact base — no peer margin data is provided. Governance details (share structure, board composition, proxy) are absent from the filings excerpted, making it impossible to assess entrenment or lever availability. AI risk is real but cuts both ways: Qualys has integrated AI/ML (Blue Hexagon acquisition per 10-K filed 2025-02-21) but the commoditization threat from AI-native competitors is a genuine long-term concern. On the DCF: intrinsic value of $262.85/share vs. $183.48 current price implies 43% upside — a meaningful gap, but the DCF uses 10.96% FCF growth (revenue CAGR-derived) which may be optimistic given 11% top-line growth and already-high margins; 81.6% of the DCF sits in terminal value, making the number sensitive to assumptions. The bear case of $201/share is only 10% above current price, limiting downside protection from a valuation floor perspective. Without identifiable governance levers, segment complexity to exploit, or a documented pattern of value-destroying capital allocation, this is a 'watch' — the assets are high quality but the activist angle is thin.
Benjamin Graham Value
avoid · 32Qualys is a profitable, established SaaS business with genuine earnings power, but it fails nearly every quantitative Graham test. The stock trades at P/E of 32x (more than double Graham's defensive cap of 15x), P/B of 11.3x (combined P/E x P/B = 361, far above Graham's 22.5 ceiling), and price-to-sales of 9.5x. There is no dividend record disclosed in any filing or the narrative — the company instead runs a share repurchase program (10-K filed 2026-02-20 references $1.6B total authorized buybacks). The balance sheet is materially weak by Graham standards: current ratio is only 1.41 (vs. Graham's floor of 2.0), and current liabilities of $467M nearly match current assets of $658M, leaving a thin working capital cushion of ~$190M (fundamentals, fiscal year 2025). Graham required current assets at least twice current liabilities; Qualys does not meet this. Net current assets (current assets minus ALL liabilities, i.e., the net-net test): $657.6M - $533.9M = $123.7M, or ~$3.47/share — the stock trades at $183.48, roughly 53x net current asset value, the antithesis of a net-net. The DCF-based intrinsic value of $262.85/share offers a 43% upside, but Graham would not endorse a two-stage DCF anchored in optimistic growth assumptions (11% FCF growth for 5 years, terminal growth 2.5%) as a conservative estimate of value — 81.6% of that DCF value is terminal value, making it heavily dependent on forecasts, precisely the kind of speculation Graham warned against. On the positive side: earnings have been positive and growing every year in the fact base (2021-2025), FCF margin is excellent at 45%, ROIC is 31%, and revenue has compounded at ~11% CAGR. Net dollar expansion rates of 103-104% (10-Q filings 2026) confirm business durability. But strong business quality does not compensate for paying a price that embeds an optimistic future — Graham's core discipline is to never pay for growth that has not yet occurred. The stock's 52-week range ($74.51 to $201.54) shows Mr. Market has been deeply pessimistic as recently as the past year, meaning a patient Graham investor could have purchased at a far lower price. At $183.48 — only 9% below the 52-week high — the market is now optimistic, and Graham's instruction is to sell to the optimistic market, not buy from it. AI/disruption note: Qualys operates in cybersecurity/vulnerability management, and AI both enhances its offering (it acquired Blue Hexagon AI/ML assets per 10-K 2025-02-21) and poses competitive threat as AI-native security platforms emerge. This is a watch item for moat durability, but it does not alter the valuation verdict.
Walter Schloss Value
avoid · 18Qualys is a high-quality SaaS cybersecurity business, but it is the precise opposite of a Schloss deep-value statistical bargain. My approach requires cheapness anchored in hard, tangible assets — ideally near or below tangible book value — with a depressed price and a strong balance sheet built on real property. None of these conditions are met here. Price-to-book is 11.31x (10-K 2026-02-20 / fundamentals block). Tangible book is even worse: total stockholders' equity is $561M (fundamentals, FY2025), and virtually all of the asset base is either cash/marketable securities ($250M cash plus ~$729M in marketable securities per the 10-Q 2026-08-04 excerpts), deferred costs, or intangibles — not bricks, machinery, or working capital in the classical Schloss sense. The company has no significant tangible operating assets to anchor a liquidation floor. Price-to-sales is 9.49x and price-to-FCF is 20.85x — both far above any threshold I have ever paid. The stock sits at $183.48, only 9% below its 52-week high of $201.54, and has recently rallied 14% on earnings (per the narrative). Schloss bought what was beaten down, forgotten, and near multi-year lows — not stocks near all-time highs on momentum. The balance sheet does have a clean leverage profile (debt-to-equity is null/zero per fundamentals, and the 10-K confirms the company carries no long-term financial debt), which is a genuine positive, and the $250M in cash plus ~$480M in marketable securities (10-Q 2026-08-04 excerpts) provides genuine financial durability. FCF margins of 45% (FY2025 fundamentals) are impressive. However, these virtues belong to a growth/quality framework, not a value-asset framework. The entire investment thesis rests on recurring subscription revenue, AI/security narrative tailwinds, and earnings growth projections — exactly the kind of intangible, forecast-dependent story I systematically avoided. Insider selling was noted in June 2026 (CLO and Director sales per narrative), though under 10b5-1 plans. Share repurchase program ($1.6B authorized per 10-K 2026-02-20) returns cash but does not create a margin of safety in the assets. In sum: a fine business at a rich price with an intangible value thesis. Not a Schloss name.
Want this on a name you own?Send a ticker; we convene the full council on it.
Request Analysis →