Watch · 48/100 · high confidence

NATIONAL BEVERAGE CORP (FIZZ) — Council Assessment

🟡 WATCH · Score 48/100 · high confidence

A fortress-balance-sheet, high-ROIC beverage franchise (LaCroix) trading at fair value with zero margin of safety and eroding growth — quality without a runway.

As of 2026-06-27. 18 lenses weighed in, 0 abstained. Sources: 6 filings, 15 news, 15 discussion.

360 narrative — news & sentiment digest

FIZZ (National Beverage Corp) — Investment Brief

Recent Developments

Stock buyback initiated (Oct 2025): Management announced commencement of share repurchase program; however, retail commentary (Apr 2026) noted minimal buyback activity in the most recent quarter.
Q2 2026 earnings (Dec 2025): Results described as showing "resilience," with net income gains reported.
Q3 2026 (Winter quarter) (Mar 2026): Increased net income and improved margins reported; however, gross profit gains accompanied a sales slip.
UBS downgrade (Jun 2026): Analyst cut price target citing "weak trends."
Q4 2026 earnings due (Jul 1, 2026 AMC): Wall Street consensus expecting $0.47 EPS.

Management Commentary

No earnings-call transcript provided. Characterizations are drawn from press releases only:

Management framed recent quarters as demonstrating "resilience and commitment to maximize shareholder performance" (Q2 Dec 2025).
Margin improvement narrative evident, though top-line revenue headwinds acknowledged in press.

Bull Narrative

Retail optimism (modest): Scattered social-media bullish calls from individual traders (May–Jun 2026), with some framing beverage sector broadly as attractive.
Margin expansion: Q3 data highlighted improved gross profit margins despite sales pressure.
Shareholder returns: Buyback program announced; signaling management confidence (though actual execution weak).
GuruFocus quality score of 77 (Jun 2026) suggests decent fundamentals relative to peers.

Bear Narrative

Revenue headwinds: Seeking Alpha (Mar 2026) titled piece "Revenue Growth Headwinds Persist Through Q3 2026 and Beyond"—suggests structural top-line challenges.
Sales decline with margin props: Mar 2026 BevNET headline: "Increases Gross Profit As Sales Slip"—margin gains masking volume/revenue weakness.
UBS analyst downgrade (Jun 2026): Cited "weak trends" and cut price target; suggests deteriorating momentum.
Five-year underperformance: simplywall.st (Feb 2026) noted past five years "has not been profitable" for investors, implying prolonged weakness.
Buyback skepticism: Retail observer questioned minimal share repurchase in recent quarter, hinting management's professed commitment is hollow.

Retail Sentiment

Mixed-to-cautiously-bullish, low conviction.

A handful of individual traders posted bullish technical or sector calls (May–Jun 2026), but without elaboration or analysis depth.
One retail post (May 2026) highlighted call-option trade for modest ROI (~51% over 21 days), indicating short-term speculation rather than fundamental conviction.
Buyback question (Apr 2026) reflects disappointment with capital allocation execution.
Overall volume of retail chatter is light; no organized bull or bear thesis dominates forums.

Caveats

No earnings-call transcript: Cannot assess management tone, guidance specificity, or Q&A candor. Press releases alone are curated and lack depth.
Analyst coverage thin: Only UBS downgrade cited; no bull-side target or detailed equity research provided.
Historical data opaque: "Increased net income" and "improved margins" lack absolute figures, YoY context, or segment breakdown.
Hype/low-quality sources: Technical-analysis articles (TradingKey, TradingView) and price-target snippets are noise; forward P/E data without narrative is uninformative.
Retail discussion sparse and unsubstantiated: No quality due diligence visible; mostly one-liners or sector-rotation groupings.
Q4 FY2026 not yet reported (due Jul 1, 2026): Current snapshot lacks most recent quarter data.

Summary

FIZZ presents a mixed picture dominated by revenue decay offset by operational leverage. Management is framing margin improvement as a positive, but the underlying revenue slip and UBS downgrade suggest market skepticism about durability. The buyback program appears underexecuted. Retail interest is muted and largely tactical (option trades, sector rotation). Without an earnings call or deeper analyst research, conviction is hard to justify either way; the June UBS cut is a yellow flag on near-term momentum.

Bull case

FIZZ is a genuinely high-quality, capital-light franchise: ROIC/ROE of ~46-47%, 19.6% operating margins, ~14% FCF margin ($170M FCF), zero long-term debt, $149M cash and a 2.95x current ratio. CFO exceeds net income (clean accruals) and the forensic short-seller finds no accounting or solvency red flags. LaCroix has real brand recognition and recession-resilient repeat demand. The DCF ($33.47) already sits near price with a bull case of $43.79 if sparkling-water demand re-accelerates or capital returns ramp — an optionality supported by an idle cash pile and buyback authorization.

Bear case

The consensus across nearly every lens is that this is a mature-to-eroding franchise priced to perfection. Revenue CAGR is only 1.8% over 3 years with actual sales slippage in recent quarters, margins propped by cost discipline rather than volume — a classic franchise-erosion pattern. LaCroix has lost share to Bubly, AHA, Topo Chico, Spindrift and private label. PEG of 9.0 and P/B of 7.66x price in quality/growth the business isn't delivering. The DCF offers ~2.3% base-case upside against a $28.74 bear (~12% downside), with 76% of value in terminal value — highly sensitive to a 2.5% perpetuity that flat revenue contradicts. UBS cut its target on 'weak trends,' five-year investor returns are negative, and the announced buyback is barely executed, undermining capital-allocation credibility. There is no reinvestment runway and no catalyst.

Dissent — where the council disagrees

The sharpest split is on direction versus quality. Druckenmiller (AVOID 22) and the growth lenses — Fisher (22), Lynch (32), Schloss (28) — argue the tape and the second derivative are both wrong: declining sales, negative estimate revisions, no 'why now,' and a PEG of 9 make this a backward-looking cheap trap. Against them, the quality camp (Terry Smith 62, Buffett 58, Munger 58, Greenblatt 58) concedes the business is excellent but explicitly refuses to buy at fair value with no margin of safety. Notably, the two 'PASS' scores (72) come from the Forensic Short-Seller and the AI/Disruption referees — but both pass on ABSENCE of their specific risk (no fraud, no AI threat), NOT on investment attractiveness; both flag structural revenue erosion as the real problem. That distinction matters: no lens actually endorses buying at $32.73. The disagreement on price direction, combined with unanimous agreement on zero margin of safety, keeps this firmly a Watch, not a Pass.

Key risks

Structural top-line erosion: 1.8% CAGR with volume declines masked by margin/cost leverage that can reverse
Competitive moat leaking to Bubly, AHA, Topo Chico, Spindrift and private label with no evidence of widening
Valuation with no cushion: DCF fair value ~= price, 76% terminal-value dependence, bear case ~12% downside
Capital allocation credibility: buyback announced but barely executed; $149M cash sitting idle with no reinvestment runway
Governance/disclosure opacity: no earnings-call transcripts, press-release-only communication, historically concentrated control

Catalysts

Q4 2026 earnings (Jul 1) — consensus $0.47 EPS; upside surprise unlikely given UBS downgrade
Meaningful buyback execution or special dividend deploying the idle cash pile
Volume/revenue re-acceleration in sparkling water reversing the sales-slip trend
A takeout — clean balance sheet and brand could attract a strategic acquirer

DCF valuation (finance-expert model)

two-stage DCF, Gordon terminal value, CAPM-weighted WACC.

Intrinsic value: $33.47/share vs price $32.73 → +2% (bear $28.74 · base $33.47 · bull $43.79).

Step	Value
Base free cash flow	$170M
FCF growth (yrs 1-5)	2.0% (revenue CAGR)
WACC (β 0.785)	8.2%
Terminal growth	2.5%
PV of explicit FCF	$716M
PV of terminal (residual) value	$2.3B (76% of EV)
Enterprise value	$3.0B
less Net debt	$-149M
= Equity value	$3.1B
/ Shares (94M) = intrinsic/share	$33.47

Short-sell evaluation

🚫 AVOID SHORTING

Despite decelerating fundamentals and a rich-looking PEG, FIZZ is a poor short. The forensic case is empty: accruals are negative (CFO > net income), FCF is positive and consistent, there is zero long-term debt, $149M cash, and no refinancing, covenant, or going-concern risk. The valuation is fair, not egregious (DCF $33.47 vs $32.73; P/E 16.4x; P/FCF 18x) — the ~12% downside to the bear case is not the collapse a short needs, especially against unlimited-loss asymmetry. The stock is already near its 52-week low, ~32% off its high, meaning much of the bad news is priced in and a small-cap ($3.1B) with founder-concentrated ownership carries real squeeze/takeout risk. This is a slow-fade value trap for longs, not an actionable short.

Pros (the short could work)

PEG of 9.0 and P/B of 7.66x price in growth/quality a 1.8%-grower cannot sustain — multiple-compression risk
Structural revenue erosion with sales slipping while margins are propped by cost cuts (reversible)
UBS downgrade on 'weak trends,' negative estimate revisions, and five years of negative investor returns
Terminal-value-heavy DCF (76%) means modest growth disappointment drives value toward the $28.74 bear case
Idle capital and underexecuted buyback signal limited near-term support for the price

Cons (what kills the short)

Fortress balance sheet: zero debt, $149M cash, 2.95x current ratio — no solvency or refinancing catalyst to force a decline
Clean accounting: CFO exceeds net income, consistent positive FCF ($170M) — no forensic red flag to exploit
Stock already near 52-week low with much bad news priced in; limited incremental downside vs. unlimited short risk
Small-cap with concentrated founder control creates real takeout and short-squeeze risk
Durable high ROIC (46%), recession-resilient staple demand, and buyback optionality can support the floor

Council scorecard

Lens	School	Stance	Score	Conf
Forensic Short-Seller (Chanos/Einhorn-style)	referee	🟢 pass	72	medium
AI & Disruption Referee (Christensen-style)	referee	🟢 pass	72	high
Terry Smith (Fundsmith)	quality	🟡 watch	62	medium
Warren Buffett	quality	🟡 watch	58	medium
Joel Greenblatt	value	🟡 watch	58	medium
Charlie Munger	quality	🟡 watch	58	medium
Chuck Akre	quality	🟡 watch	52	medium
Ray Dalio	risk	🟡 watch	52	medium
Valuation Referee (Damodaran-style)	referee	🟡 watch	52	medium
Benjamin Graham	value	🟡 watch	52	medium
Bruce Greenwald	value	🟡 watch	52	medium
Howard Marks	risk	🟡 watch	52	medium
Michael Mauboussin	quality	🟡 watch	52	medium
Seth Klarman	value	🟡 watch	48	medium
Peter Lynch	growth	🔴 avoid	32	high
Walter Schloss	value	🔴 avoid	28	high
Stanley Druckenmiller	risk	🔴 avoid	22	high
Philip Fisher	growth	🔴 avoid	22	high

Member reasoning

Forensic Short-Seller (Chanos/Einhorn-style) — 🟢 pass · 72/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ passes the forensic short-seller screen because the primary red flags are largely absent. The core earnings-vs-cash test is clean: net income of $186.8M vs operating cash flow of $206.7M means CFO exceeds net income, producing a negative accrual ratio — the opposite of what a short thesis requires. FCF is positive at $170.4M with a 14.2% FCF margin, consistent over 5 years (ranging 9.1%-15.7%). The balance sheet is fortress-like: zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio of 2.95, debt/equity of 0.0. There is no refinancing dependence, no debt wall, no covenant stress. ROIC of 46.5% and ROE of 46.7% suggest genuine economic returns, not accounting-inflated metrics. Revenue recognition appears straightforward (consumer beverages, no percentage-of-completion or complex contracts). No evidence of capitalized costs masking expense. The primary forensic concerns that do exist are: (1) revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over 3 years with recent sales slippage (BevNET Mar 2026 headline confirms volume weakness masked by margin improvement — a potential demand deterioration signal worth monitoring); (2) the stock buyback announced Oct 2025 appears underexecuted per retail commentary, raising capital allocation credibility questions; (3) PEG of 9.01 is extremely elevated for a 2% grower, suggesting the market is pricing in growth that isn't materializing; (4) UBS downgraded citing 'weak trends' Jun 2026; (5) the stock sits at its 52-week low ($32.73 vs $47.89 high), implying a ~32% drawdown from peak — not consistent with a richly-valued story stock ripe for a short. The governance picture lacks obvious red flags: no auditor changes cited, no restatements, no 8-K going-concern language. The kill question for a short would be: sustained revenue decline accelerating into negative territory, FCF turning negative, or SBC masking earnings — none of these are currently present. This is a slow-growth, cash-generative consumer staple with clean accounting; forensic short discipline does not find actionable fraud or structural collapse risk here.

Key points

CFO ($206.7M) exceeds net income ($186.8M) — negative accrual ratio, the opposite of a short red flag
FCF positive and consistent across all 5 historical years ($104M-$170M range); FCF margin stable ~14%
Zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio 2.95 — no financing dependence or debt wall risk
Revenue recognition straightforward (consumer beverages); no evidence of aggressive accounting or non-GAAP manipulation
ROIC 46.5% and ROE 46.7% appear to reflect genuine economic returns given asset-light model
Buyback program underexecuted — minor governance credibility concern but not a fraud signal
Revenue growth flat/declining (1.8% CAGR, Q3 2026 sales slip) — structural volume weakness is the real bear case, not accounting manipulation

Red flags

Revenue declining in volume terms while margins improve — demand deterioration masked by pricing/cost leverage, a potential demand cliff signal
PEG of 9.01 is egregiously high for a 1.8% revenue grower; market pricing in growth that structurally cannot materialize
UBS downgrade Jun 2026 citing weak trends; stock at 52-week low suggests institutional exodus beginning
Buyback announced but barely executed — management credibility gap on capital allocation promises
No earnings call transcript available; press-release-only communication is a minor governance yellow flag for forensic purposes
Seeking Alpha Mar 2026: 'Revenue Growth Headwinds Persist Through Q3 2026 and Beyond' — analyst sees structural not cyclical headwind

AI & Disruption Referee (Christensen-style) — 🟢 pass · 72/100 · high confidence

National Beverage Corp (LaCroix/sparkling water) is a physical consumer packaged goods business. The 'job' it does for customers is manufacturing, distributing, and marketing flavored sparkling water and other beverages in cans/bottles to retail shelves. AI cannot manufacture a can of sparkling water, cannot replace the physical distribution network, cannot substitute for the carbonation and flavoring IP, and cannot disintermediate the grocery/convenience channel relationship. This is about as far from a digital intermediary or knowledge-work business as exists in the investment universe. The AI disruption thesis here is genuinely weak on the demand-destruction side. Where AI could matter: (1) supply chain optimization — a modest tailwind allowing better demand forecasting, route efficiency, and procurement; (2) marketing/advertising efficiency — AI lowers cost of creative and targeted digital ads, a small cost tailwind; (3) on the threat side, AI-driven consumer preference data could help better-resourced competitors (KO, PEP, Monster) identify whitespace flavors and launch faster, marginally compressing FIZZ's first-mover niche advantage in better-for-you sparkling water. The real risks to FIZZ are NOT AI — they are: flat to declining revenue (3-yr CAGR of ~1.8%), intensifying competition from both large-cap incumbents and smaller health-beverage entrants (Zevia, et al.), a concentrated product mix, governance opacity (Nick Caporella-era concentration of control), and the UBS downgrade citing weak trends. The DCF intrinsic value of ~$33.47 vs. current price ~$32.73 implies essentially zero margin of safety, and 76% of enterprise value is terminal value — meaning the entire investment thesis depends on a 2.5% perpetuity growth assumption that flat revenue trends directly contradict. This is the real risk the other lenses should be flagging. From a pure disruption lens, however, the physical beverage manufacturing and distribution moat is not AI-commoditizable. The falsifiable call: evidence that AI is NOT a material threat would be continued flat-to-declining revenue driven by competition and consumer preference shifts — none of which is AI-caused. Evidence that would change this view: if AI-powered product development by large CPG players dramatically accelerates SKU proliferation that outflanks FIZZ's innovation pace, or if AI-driven direct-to-consumer beverage customization platforms meaningfully disintermediate the retail channel (highly speculative, long time horizon). Neither is plausible at scale within 3-5 years. Score 72 reflects that AI is a modest tailwind (cost efficiency) with no meaningful threat — a pass — but not a high score because the business has real non-AI challenges that cap upside.

Key points

Physical beverage manufacturing/distribution is not susceptible to AI disintermediation — no digital intermediary function exists to remove
AI represents a modest cost tailwind: supply chain forecasting, route optimization, and cheaper marketing creative
No hyperscaler can bundle carbonated sparkling water production — the physical product is the moat element AI cannot replicate
Management's silence on AI in filings is appropriate and not a red flag here — it genuinely is not material to the core operation
AI could marginally accelerate competitor product development cycles, but FIZZ's distribution and brand are physical, not algorithmic
The real valuation risk is ~2.3% DCF upside with 76% terminal value dependence — a no-margin-of-safety problem unrelated to AI

Red flags

Better-resourced CPG incumbents (KO/PEP) using AI-powered consumer insight platforms could more rapidly identify and exploit flavor/format niches that FIZZ currently occupies
AI-driven direct-to-consumer personalized beverage platforms are a very long-run speculative threat to retail shelf dependency — not material in 3-5 year window
Revenue CAGR of 1.8% and UBS downgrade suggest competitive pressure that AI could amplify if large competitors use it to accelerate innovation pipelines

Terry Smith (Fundsmith) — 🟡 watch · 62/100 · medium confidence

National Beverage Corp (LaCroix) is a legitimate quality candidate — it is an established, profitable consumer staples business with genuine repeat-purchase demand, meaningful operating margins, zero debt, and strong cash conversion. However, several metrics fall short of Fundsmith's demanding bar, and the revenue trajectory introduces real doubts about whether a genuine moat exists. ROCE/ROIC of ~46% is exceptional and well above the cost of capital, clearing Smith's first test with ease. Operating margins of 19.6% and net margins of 15.6% are respectable for a beverage company. FCF conversion is solid: FCF of $170M vs net income of $187M gives ~91% cash conversion, which is acceptable (not perfect, but the gap is modest and capex is only 3% of revenue). The balance sheet is fortress-clean: zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio of 2.95 — Smith would approve entirely. The asset-light characteristics are real: capex/revenue is ~3%, and the business generates FCF margins of ~14%. Where FIZZ falters under the Fundsmith lens: (1) Revenue growth is essentially flat — 1.8% CAGR over 3 years, with recent quarters showing outright volume/sales declines masked by margin management. A truly moated business with genuine pricing power should compound revenue at least in the mid-single digits. LaCroix's market share has been eroded by private label and competitor entry (Bubly, Spindrift, etc.), suggesting the 'moat' is narrower than it appears. (2) The PEG of 9x is alarming — Smith pays up for quality but expects the growth to justify the premium. At ~2% revenue CAGR, paying P/E 16x looks fair but the business offers no reinvestment runway to compound at the ROCE it currently earns. (3) The DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 vs current price $32.73 leaves essentially zero margin of safety (2.3% upside). Smith's three-step process demands not overpaying — at fair value with no discount, the risk/reward is asymmetric downward. (4) UBS downgrade citing 'weak trends' and Seeking Alpha analysis on persistent revenue headwinds suggest the top-line pressure is structural, not cyclical. Smith would want evidence the moat is widening, not contracting. (5) No earnings call transcript available — Smith would want to hear management's candid assessment of competitive dynamics and reinvestment opportunities. The buyback announcement with minimal execution is a mild negative signal on capital allocation discipline.

Key points

ROIC of 46.5% is exceptional and decisively clears Fundsmith's 20%+ ROCE threshold
Zero long-term debt and $149M cash — balance sheet is exactly what Smith requires, no leverage risk
FCF of $170M vs net income $187M = ~91% cash conversion, backed by real cash not accruals
Capex only $36M on $1.2B revenue (~3%) confirms genuinely asset-light model
Operating margin 19.6% reflects real pricing power in sparkling water segment
P/E 16.4x and P/FCF 18x are not expensive in absolute terms for a quality business
Repeat-purchase consumer staples demand is durable and recession-resilient
DCF base case $33.47 essentially equals current price — minimal margin of safety

Red flags

Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over 3 years, with recent quarters showing outright volume declines — a moated business should grow faster
LaCroix brand has lost meaningful market share to Bubly, Spindrift, private label — moat appears to be eroding rather than compounding
PEG ratio of 9x is dangerously high given the near-zero growth trajectory; quality premium without growth is a value trap
DCF upside of only 2.3% at current price — Fundsmith demands a fair price for a great business; here fair value = market price with no buffer
UBS price target cut citing 'weak trends' corroborates structural top-line deterioration, not cyclical softness
No reinvestment runway visible: high ROIC but nothing to reinvest it into at high rates given stagnant growth
Buyback program announced but barely executed — raises questions about management capital allocation discipline
Five years of flat-to-negative stock returns despite excellent underlying returns metrics suggests market already sees the growth ceiling

Warren Buffett — 🟡 watch · 58/100 · medium confidence

National Beverage Corp. (FIZZ) is an understandable consumer beverage business centered on LaCroix sparkling water and other flavored beverages — clearly within my circle of competence. The economics are attractive in several respects: zero long-term debt, a current ratio near 3x, ROE of 47% and ROIC of 46% achieved without leverage, operating margins near 20%, and consistent free cash flow generation ($104M–$170M over the past five years). These are hallmarks of a business with genuine pricing power and brand equity. However, the moat is narrower and less durable than I typically require. LaCroix dominated the sparkling water category but has faced significant competitive encroachment from Pepsi's Bubly, Coca-Cola's AHA, private-label store brands, and premium competitors. Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over three years, and the BevNET/Seeking Alpha narrative of persistent top-line headwinds, suggests the moat is leaking. A truly durable moat — like See's Candies or Coca-Cola — would defend volume even as margins hold. Here, margins are holding but volume appears to be slipping, which is a warning sign. On valuation, the DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 is essentially at the current price of $32.73, offering a mere 2.3% upside — no margin of safety whatsoever on a base-case basis. The bear scenario puts intrinsic value at $28.74, implying meaningful downside risk. The PEG of 9 is extreme, reflecting the mismatch between a fair-to-rich price and near-zero growth. I require a margin of safety; paying fair value for a business with a potentially eroding moat is not my style. Management capital allocation is mixed: the buyback was announced but underexecuted (retail observers noted minimal actual repurchases), which raises concerns about follow-through. No long-term debt and strong cash generation are genuine positives. But the UBS downgrade, five-year investor underperformance, and absence of a clear growth catalyst mean I would want to pay substantially less — perhaps 20-30% below current price — before committing capital. This is a watchlist business, not a buy today.

Key points

ROE of 47% and ROIC of 46% with zero long-term debt — exceptional capital efficiency for a consumer staples business
Consistent FCF generation: $104M–$170M annually over five years, with FCF margin of ~14% in FY2024
Operating margin of 19.6% demonstrates pricing power and operational discipline in a commodity-adjacent category
Zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio of 2.95 — fortress balance sheet capable of self-funding through downturns
Business is fully understandable: flavored sparkling water and beverage brands sold through retail channels
DCF intrinsic value ($33.47) approximately equals current price ($32.73) — no margin of safety at present levels

Red flags

Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over three years signals competitive erosion of LaCroix's early-mover advantage against Bubly, AHA, and private label
Margin improvement masking volume/unit decline — a pattern that historically precedes more serious deterioration when pricing power eventually buckles
PEG ratio of 9.0 is extreme; the market is pricing quality without growth, and I don't pay premium prices for stagnant top lines
Buyback announced October 2025 but minimal actual execution — management credibility on capital allocation is questionable
UBS cut price target June 2026 citing 'weak trends'; five-year investor returns have been negative per simplywall.st
No earnings call transcript available — cannot assess management candor, tone on competitive threats, or forward guidance quality
Bear DCF scenario of $28.74 implies ~12% downside from current price with no offsetting margin of safety buffer

Joel Greenblatt — 🟡 watch · 58/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ is an operating beverage business with meaningful EBIT and tangible capital — squarely within Greenblatt's applicable universe. Running the Magic Formula: EBIT of $235.5M on an EV of approximately $2.91B (market cap $3.06B + $0 debt - $149M excess cash) yields an earnings yield (EBIT/EV) of ~8.1%. That is decent but not exceptional — roughly in the top third of the market rather than the top decile where Greenblatt's formula fires strongest. On the return-on-capital side, tangible invested capital (net working capital + net fixed assets) must be estimated: current assets $352.6M minus current liabilities $119.6M = net working capital of $233M; net fixed assets require capex and depreciation context not fully disclosed, but with $36.3M capex annually and a capital-light manufacturing model, rough net PP&E is likely $150-200M (fact base doesn't provide gross/net PP&E directly — a data gap). Using a midpoint of $175M net fixed assets, invested capital ≈ $408M, giving ROIC (EBIT/IC) of roughly 58% — genuinely high and characteristic of a quality consumer franchise. So the business scores well on the quality axis but only moderately on the cheapness axis. The two-stage DCF puts intrinsic value at $33.47 versus $32.73 price — essentially zero margin of safety. Bull case is $43.79, bear is $28.74, so the stock is priced for the base case with no discount. Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over three years and ongoing top-line weakness (sales slipping per BevNET, UBS downgrade on weak trends) threaten the terminal value assumption. The 76% residual value weighting on the terminal value in the DCF is a vulnerability. No special-situation catalyst is present — this is a steady-state compounder, not a spinoff/restructuring. Capital allocation is questionable: buyback announced but barely executed per retail commentary. PEG of 9x confirms the market is not pricing in growth. This is a good business — high ROIC, zero debt, strong FCF conversion — but it is not a bargain on the earnings yield dimension at current prices. Greenblatt's formula rewards the combination; FIZZ delivers one leg strongly and the other adequately but not compellingly.

Key points

EBIT/EV earnings yield ~8.1% — respectable but not top-decile cheap for Magic Formula purposes
Estimated ROIC ~55-60% on tangible invested capital — genuinely high-quality consumer franchise
Zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio 2.95 — fortress balance sheet with no EV distortion from leverage
FCF conversion strong: $170M FCF on $235M EBIT implies ~72% conversion, confirming real operating earnings
DCF intrinsic value $33.47 vs $32.73 price — essentially at fair value, no margin of safety
Revenue CAGR only 1.8% over 3 years; UBS downgrade and BevNET sales-slip headline confirm structural top-line headwind
No special-situation catalyst — no spinoff, restructuring, or forced-selling dynamic to create a timing edge

Red flags

Earnings yield ~8.1% is adequate but not the screaming cheapness Greenblatt's formula demands for a top-ranked name
Revenue growth near-zero threatens terminal value, which comprises 76% of DCF — DCF most sensitive to growth assumption
Buyback program announced but minimally executed — misalignment between stated and actual capital allocation behavior
Net PP&E not explicitly disclosed in fact base, making invested capital estimate imprecise — data gap reduces confidence
PEG ratio of 9x signals market already pricing in quality premium, not a bargain
UBS price target cut (Jun 2026) on 'weak trends' is a negative near-term momentum signal
Five years of negative total return per simplywall.st — quality franchise but chronically mispriced at premium, not discount

Charlie Munger — 🟡 watch · 58/100 · medium confidence

National Beverage Corp (LaCroix sparkling water brand) is a reasonably understandable business — a branded beverage company with a simple product, modest capital requirements, and identifiable distribution economics. The circle of competence question passes: this is a consumer staples brand, not a black box. The quality metrics are genuinely attractive in isolation: ROIC of 46.5%, ROE of 46.7%, zero long-term debt, FCF margin of ~14%, and operating margins of ~20%. These are not mediocre numbers — they suggest the business has operated with pricing power and brand strength at its peak. The balance sheet is clean and conservative: $149M cash, $0 long-term debt, current ratio of ~2.95. Owner earnings (FCF of $170M on a $3.06B market cap) yield roughly 5.6%, and the P/E of 16.4x is not egregious for a quality consumer brand. The DCF puts intrinsic value at $33.47 vs. $32.73 price — essentially fair value, not a bargain, but not a bubble either. HOWEVER, the Munger quality lens raises serious concerns on moat durability. Revenue CAGR is only 1.8% over 3 years — barely inflation. The LaCroix brand faced well-documented competitive pressure from Bubly (PepsiCo), Topo Chico (Coca-Cola), and private label sparkling water. Net income actually declined from 2020 to 2022 before recovering, suggesting the moat is under pressure rather than compounding. The most recent quarters show sales slipping while margins are propped by cost management — a pattern Munger would identify as a franchise in slow erosion rather than one compounding intrinsic value. The 'reinvestment runway' test fails: capex is modest ($36M), the business generates copious cash, but there is no evident high-return reinvestment opportunity — free cash is not being deployed at 46% returns on incremental capital; those ROIC figures reflect the asset-light legacy base, not reinvestment capacity. Management behavior is mixed: the buyback announced in Oct 2025 appears largely unexecuted (retail commentary noted minimal repurchases), which is a mild governance concern. No earnings call transcripts available, limiting candor assessment. The PEG of 9x is alarming — paying growth multiples for a near-flat grower. UBS cutting its target citing 'weak trends' (Jun 2026) and the Seeking Alpha narrative of persistent revenue headwinds corroborate the structural concern. Five-year investor underperformance confirms the moat is not producing compounding per-share value. Inversion test: could this permanently impair capital? Not easily — the balance sheet is fortress-like, there is no debt, and the brand still generates $170M FCF. This is not a zero scenario. But the 'wonderful company' standard requires compounding intrinsic value, and FIZZ appears to be a good-but-not-great business at a fair-but-not-cheap price. That is precisely the trap Munger warns against — the fair business at a mediocre price masquerading as quality. I score it 58: quality balance sheet and returns history pass, but deteriorating moat, zero reinvestment runway, stagnant revenue, and essentially no margin of safety in the DCF keep this in 'watch' territory. I would not pay current prices without clearer evidence the LaCroix franchise can resume volume growth.

Key points

ROIC 46.5% and ROE 46.7% are genuinely impressive and suggest historical pricing power and brand strength
Zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio 2.95 — fortress balance sheet that survives downturns
FCF of $170M on $3B market cap yields ~5.6% owner earnings, P/E 16.4x is reasonable but not cheap for a stagnant grower
Business model is simple and understandable — branded sparkling water, asset-light, direct distribution
DCF intrinsic value $33.47 vs $32.73 price — essentially no margin of safety; bull case $43.79 requires growth acceleration not evidenced in recent results
Inversion test passes on capital impairment — no debt, strong FCF; this is not a zero scenario

Red flags

Revenue CAGR only 1.8% over 3 years — the franchise is not compounding; net income declined 2020-2022 before partial recovery
Sales slipping in recent quarters (Q3 2026 'sales slip') while margins propped by cost cuts — classic eroding-franchise pattern Munger flags
No reinvestment runway at high incremental returns — excess cash not being redeployed at 46% ROIC; those returns are on legacy asset base
Competitive pressure from PepsiCo (Bubly), Coca-Cola (Topo Chico), and private label eroding LaCroix moat without clear pricing power evidence
PEG of 9x is absurd for a ~2% grower — market still pricing in some quality premium that fundamentals no longer justify
Buyback announced Oct 2025 but minimal actual repurchases — management capital allocation execution questioned by retail observers
UBS target cut Jun 2026 on 'weak trends'; five-year shareholder underperformance per simplywall.st confirms franchise is not compounding per-share value
No earnings call transcript available — cannot assess management candor, forward guidance, or competitive response strategy

Chuck Akre — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

National Beverage Corp (LaCroix/sparkling water) is a legitimate franchise business with genuinely impressive return economics — ROIC of 46.5%, ROE of 46.7%, zero long-term debt, and FCF margins around 14-15%. On two of Akre's three legs (extraordinary business economics, capital-light franchise), FIZZ earns real marks. However, the third leg — reinvestment runway — is critically weak, and management integrity/skill raises yellow flags. Revenue has grown at only 1.8% CAGR over three years, with Q3 2026 actually showing a sales slip while margins were propped by operational leverage. This signals a mature, potentially saturated market position with no demonstrated ability to reinvest FCF at high rates back into the business. The company sits on $149M cash and has zero long-term debt but has produced negligible top-line growth — capital is piling up or being returned rather than compounding. On management: the buyback program announced Oct 2025 appears poorly executed per retail observations, LaCroix brand has faced market share pressures from intensifying sparkling water competition, and there are no earnings call transcripts to assess candor. The PEG ratio of 9.01 is alarming — this is not a growth compounder at current speed. The DCF yields an intrinsic value of $33.47 vs current price of $32.73, implying essentially zero margin of safety (2.3% upside). The sensitivity bear case is $28.74 — downside materially exceeds upside at current prices. The DCF itself is conservative with only 2% FCF growth, which actually seems appropriate given recent stagnation. For an Akre-style holding, I need all three legs and the ability to compound FCF per share — FIZZ fails the reinvestment runway test and offers no valuation cushion. The business quality is real but incomplete as a compounder.

Key points

ROIC 46.5% and ROE 46.7% with zero long-term debt — genuinely capital-light franchise economics that Akre would admire
LaCroix brand provides real but pressured franchise with pricing power in sparkling water category
FCF conversion is solid: $170M FCF on $1.2B revenue at ~14% FCF margin, P/FCF of 17.98x is reasonable
Current ratio 2.95x and $149M net cash position reflects financial strength and conservative balance sheet
Revenue CAGR only 1.8% over 3 years — the reinvestment runway is the critical missing leg
DCF intrinsic value $33.47 vs current $32.73 — essentially no margin of safety; bear case $28.74 implies meaningful downside risk

Red flags

Reinvestment runway critically absent: 1.8% revenue CAGR suggests saturated/mature market with no high-return reinvestment opportunities for abundant FCF
Buyback program announced Oct 2025 but retail commentary notes minimal execution — capital allocation integrity under question
No earnings call transcripts available — cannot assess management candor, which Akre weights heavily
UBS cut price target June 2026 citing 'weak trends' — external validation of deteriorating business momentum
Sales volume declining in Q3 2026 (margins up only via cost efficiency) — structural revenue headwinds per Seeking Alpha and BevNET
PEG ratio of 9.01 signals market paying for quality that isn't compounding — inappropriate price for the growth rate
Five-year investor underperformance noted (simplywall.st) — market has already punished stagnation, but valuation hasn't cheapened enough to provide a buffer
Growing competition in sparkling water (Zevia, private label) threatens moat durability

Ray Dalio — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ (National Beverage Corp.) is a consumer staples-adjacent beverage company whose macro profile is genuinely mixed from a Dalio risk-lens perspective. On the positive side: zero long-term debt (debt/equity = 0.0), $149M cash, current ratio of ~2.95, and $170M in annual free cash flow make this about as balance-sheet-resilient as a consumer company can be. It can fund operations through a severe credit contraction without touching capital markets — a key Dalio criterion. Revenue is non-discretionary (beverages, anchored by LaCroix sparkling water), providing some regime robustness; people drink soda in recessions and booms alike. The 19.6% operating margin and 46.7% ROE signal genuine operational efficiency. HOWEVER, the macro stress-test reveals meaningful weaknesses: (1) Revenue is essentially flat — 1.8% CAGR over 3 years — with sales actually slipping in recent quarters, suggesting the LaCroix franchise is maturing and losing ground to competition. In a stagflationary regime (rising costs, weak consumer), this revenue stagnation could become contraction if aluminum/packaging/logistics costs surge and pricing power proves limited. (2) Geographic concentration is almost entirely domestic U.S. — no FX diversification, no real-asset hedge, no international revenue stream to buffer a U.S.-specific downturn or dollar weakening. (3) The DCF shows near-zero upside (2.3%) at current price with 76% of value in the terminal value — priced as if the current regime persists indefinitely, leaving minimal cushion for a growth deceleration or rate-regime shift. The WACC of 8.23% with terminal growth of 2.5% is aggressive; if rates stay higher-for-longer and terminal growth drops to 1.5%, intrinsic value could fall 15-25%. (4) Inflation pass-through is uncertain — FIZZ doesn't disclose detailed input-cost dynamics in available filings, but commodity-exposed COGS (aluminum cans, high-fructose alternatives, water) in a sustained inflationary regime could compress already-tested margins. Q3 2026 showed 'sales slip' with gross profit gains — that margin prop could reverse if input cost tailwinds unwind. (5) UBS recently cut its price target citing 'weak trends,' and Seeking Alpha flagged persistent revenue headwinds. (6) Correlation to equity markets is moderate (beta ~0.79) — it's a partial diversifier but not an uncorrelated stream. (7) The buyback program announced in Oct 2025 appears underexecuted, raising governance questions about capital allocation discipline. Overall: the pristine balance sheet is a genuine macro virtue (survives a deleveraging), but the revenue stagnation, domestic concentration, uncertain inflation pass-through, and terminal-value-dependent valuation prevent a 'pass' verdict. This is a 'watch' — hold with conditions if already owned, but not a compelling add at current price from a regime-robustness standpoint.

Key points

Zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio ~2.95 — exceptional balance sheet resilience; can survive a credit contraction or deleveraging without capital markets access
$170M annual FCF, 46.7% ROE, 19.6% operating margin — strong operational quality that persists across moderate macro regimes
Non-discretionary beverage demand provides some regime robustness (people drink sparkling water in recessions); not purely cyclical
Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over 3 years with recent sales slipping — structural top-line stagnation that could tip negative in stagflation
76% of DCF value sits in terminal value, priced at 2.5% terminal growth and 8.23% WACC — high valuation sensitivity to regime shifts; only 2.3% upside at base case
Almost entirely U.S.-domestic revenue — no geographic or FX diversification, concentrated exposure to U.S. consumer and input-cost dynamics

Red flags

Single-country revenue concentration: no international diversification to buffer U.S.-specific macro shocks or dollar weakness
Terminal-value-heavy DCF with minimal upside margin of safety — valuation assumes current regime persists; a sustained higher-for-longer rate or lower terminal growth scenario materially impairs intrinsic value
Revenue stagnation/decline trend (recent 'sales slip' per BevNET, UBS downgrade citing weak trends) — in stagflation, flat nominal revenue becomes real contraction
Inflation pass-through unproven at scale: commodity input costs (aluminum, logistics) in sustained inflationary regime could reverse current margin props
Buyback program announced but minimally executed — governance red flag on capital allocation credibility
No real-asset, commodity, or inflation-escalator revenue hedge; no geographic diversification to act as an uncorrelated return stream

Valuation Referee (Damodaran-style) — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ trades at $32.73 against a DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 — essentially at fair value with only 2.3% upside in the base case. The two-stage DCF uses a 2% FCF growth assumption (sourced from the 3-year revenue CAGR of 1.82%) which is internally consistent with the historical growth trajectory. The WACC of 8.23% is defensible for a low-beta (0.79) consumer staples company with zero long-term debt and significant cash ($149M). However, the terminal value dominates at 76% of enterprise value, creating enormous sensitivity to terminal growth assumptions — a structure that demands scrutiny. The business fundamentals are genuinely high-quality: 19.6% operating margin, 46.7% ROE, 46.5% ROIC, zero long-term debt, $170M FCF on $1.2B revenue (14.2% FCF margin), and a current ratio of 2.9x. ROIC of 46.5% dramatically exceeds the WACC of 8.23% — this is a value-creating machine. But the reinvestment story is thin: capex is only $36M against $206M operating cash flow, implying the company is not aggressively reinvesting. The sales-to-capital ratio is high precisely because reinvestment is low, but the growth it funds is also very low (revenue CAGR of 1.82%). This is a mature, cash-generative business in harvest mode rather than growth mode. The implied expectations at current price are modest — low-single-digit growth, stable margins — which are achievable given history. However, there is no margin of safety: the DCF base case gives $33.47 vs $32.73 price, meaning you are essentially paying full value. The bear case of $28.74 implies 12% downside. The bull case of $43.79 implies 34% upside, but requires growth and margin assumptions above the base. The PEG of 9.01 screams that the market is paying a quality premium inconsistent with growth, and at P/FCF of 18x on near-zero organic growth, the pricing requires the current superior economics to persist indefinitely without competitive erosion — a heroic assumption for a branded beverage company facing volume headwinds (UBS downgrade, Seeking Alpha revenue headwind thesis, BevNET 'sales slip'). The terminal growth assumption of 2.5% exceeds the DCF's own FCF growth assumption of 2%, creating mild internal inconsistency: you are growing faster in perpetuity than in the explicit forecast period. The story-to-numbers translation is coherent but uninspiring: a mature, high-ROIC, low-growth beverage company priced to perfection. You don't need heroic assumptions to justify the price, but you also need everything to go right to avoid negative returns. For a Damodaran-style valuation discipline, this is a 'fairly priced quality business' — not a bargain, not egregiously overvalued, but lacking the margin of safety required to rate it a clear buy.

Key points

DCF intrinsic value ($33.47) essentially equals current price ($32.73), leaving virtually no margin of safety — the base case barely covers current pricing
ROIC of 46.5% far exceeds WACC of 8.23%, confirming this is a genuinely value-creating business with strong competitive returns on capital
Terminal value at 76% of enterprise value creates enormous input sensitivity; terminal growth of 2.5% slightly exceeds the explicit-period FCF growth rate of 2%, a mild inconsistency
Revenue CAGR of only 1.82% over 3 years and current revenue headwinds (UBS downgrade, sales slipping per BevNET) make even 2% FCF growth a baseline-case assumption, not a conservative one
Zero long-term debt, $149M cash, 2.95x current ratio — balance sheet is fortress-grade, reducing financial risk and supporting WACC assumption
Capex of only $36M vs $206M operating cash flow signals a harvest-mode business; high ROIC is sustainable only if moat holds against competition in better-for-you beverages
P/FCF of 18x and PEG of 9.01 on 1.82% growth implies market is pricing durable excess returns, not growth — a quality premium that requires sustained competitive advantage

Red flags

No margin of safety: bull/bear DCF range ($28.74–$43.79) straddles the current price tightly; bear case implies 12% downside with no offsetting catalyst
Terminal value dominates (76%) and terminal growth (2.5%) exceeds near-term FCF growth (2%), meaning the valuation math leans heavily on a perpetuity assumption that may not survive competitive disruption
Revenue is structurally slowing: UBS cut price target citing 'weak trends' and Seeking Alpha noted headwinds 'persist through Q3 2026 and beyond' — making even the modest 2% growth assumption uncertain
Volume/revenue slip masked by margin expansion is a yellow flag — operational leverage can reverse faster than investors expect if volumes decline further
Buyback program announced but minimally executed per retail commentary — suggests management either sees limited value at current prices or has capital allocation discipline concerns
Five-year investor returns described as 'not profitable' per simplywall.st — sustained underperformance despite strong underlying economics implies multiple compression risk or structural issues not yet captured in the DCF
PEG of 9.01 is extremely elevated for a near-zero-growth company, implying the quality premium embedded in the price will require perpetual excess returns — inconsistent with competitive dynamics in branded beverages

Benjamin Graham — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

National Beverage Corp presents a genuinely mixed picture under Graham's value framework. On the positive side, the balance sheet is exceptionally clean: zero long-term debt, current ratio of 2.95 (well above Graham's 2.0 minimum), and net cash of $149M. Earnings have been positive and largely stable across the five-year history visible ($142M-$187M net income), with no loss years in the record. Operating margins of 19.6% and ROIC of 46.5% reflect a genuine competitive position in LaCroix sparkling water. However, the stock fails on the most fundamental Graham test — margin of safety. At $32.73, the stock trades at 16.4x trailing P/E, right at Graham's defensive ceiling of 15x, and at 7.66x book value — the P/E x P/B product is 125.6, vastly exceeding Graham's 22.5 threshold. The DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 offers essentially zero margin of safety (2.3% upside), confirming the stock is fully priced. Net current asset value (NCAV) is approximately $352.6M current assets minus $193.8M total liabilities = $158.8M, or roughly $1.70/share — the stock trades at 19x NCAV, the antithesis of a net-net. Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over three years raises Grahamian concern about earnings growth sustainability (Graham wanted ~one-third EPS growth over a decade). UBS downgraded citing weak trends. The dividend situation is unclear from the filings — no consistent dividend record is visible in the fact base, which is a meaningful omission. The PEG of 9.01 is egregious. The buyback announcement with minimal execution is a yellow flag. In sum: excellent business quality but priced for quality, not at a value investor's discount.

Key points

Zero long-term debt and current ratio of 2.95 — passes Graham's balance sheet tests convincingly
Trailing P/E of 16.4x is modestly above Graham's 15x ceiling; P/E x P/B of 125.6 far exceeds his 22.5 composite threshold
DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 vs. $32.73 price — essentially no margin of safety; Graham required at least one-third discount
NCAV per share approximately $1.70; stock trades at ~19x NCAV — not remotely a net-net situation
Stable earnings over five visible years with no loss years — positive signal for earnings stability
Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% raises doubt about the one-third decade earnings growth Graham required
No clear dividend record in the fact base — significant gap for Graham's defensive stock criteria
UBS price target cut citing weak trends is a contemporary confirmation of the bear case Graham would heed

Red flags

P/E x P/B product of ~125.6 vs. Graham's 22.5 rule — wildly outside value parameters
Price-to-book of 7.66x: paying far above asset value with no margin of safety on the balance sheet
Margin of safety is effectively zero — DCF base case is barely above current price, bear case is $28.74 (12% downside)
Revenue growth nearly flat (1.8% CAGR) suggesting maturation and limited earnings growth runway
Dividend history unclear/absent in filings — fails Graham's reliability test
Minimal share buyback execution despite announced program — capital allocation credibility questionable
PEG ratio of 9.01 signals market is pricing substantial growth that the business is not delivering

Bruce Greenwald — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ is a classic stable consumer-goods business with real operating history, making EPV analysis straightforward. Normalizing earnings: 5-year average net income ~$167.7M, 5-year average operating income available implies roughly consistent 19-20% operating margins. Using the most recent operating income of $235.5M, tax-affecting at ~21% gives NOPAT ~$186M. Maintenance capex: total capex is $36.3M; with revenues essentially flat (1.8% CAGR) and D&A not explicitly broken out in the fact base (a data gap), I'll treat capex as close to maintenance. Adjusted distributable earnings approximate FCF of ~$170M on a sustainable basis. Capitalizing at WACC of 8.23%: EPV ≈ $170M / 0.0823 ≈ $2.07B operating EPV. Adding net cash of $149M: equity EPV ≈ $2.22B, or ~$23.70/share on 93.6M shares. The current market price of $32.73 sits meaningfully above this EPV (~38% premium), which is the central concern. The asset reproduction value is harder to pin down precisely — tangible assets are modest (total assets $594M, liabilities $193M = book equity ~$400M, ~$4.27/share), but brand reconstruction and distribution network rebuild for LaCroix would cost meaningfully more than book. Still, even with a generous intangible reproduction premium of 2x book equity, reproduction value lands around $8-10/share in tangible terms, and perhaps $15-20/share including brand. EPV at ~$23.70 clearly exceeds asset reproduction value, which is a genuine positive signal — it suggests FIZZ does possess real franchise economics: LaCroix has customer captivity (habit formation in sparkling water), regional distribution advantages, and some brand loyalty. ROIC of 46.5% is extraordinarily high, consistent with a genuine moat, not a commodity business. However, the EPV-to-market-price gap is the problem: the market at $32.73 prices in either growth (3-year revenue CAGR is only 1.8% — barely above inflation) or a premium for moat quality that requires no margin of safety at current price. The DCF intrinsic value of $33.47/share uses only 2% growth assumptions, essentially matching EPV logic, and arrives nearly at parity with market price — meaning essentially zero margin of safety. The provided DCF's terminal value accounts for 76% of enterprise value, precisely the kind of long-horizon dependency I distrust. Revenue headwinds (sales slipping in recent quarters, UBS downgrade citing weak trends, Seeking Alpha noting persistent headwinds) raise the question of whether even flat earnings power is achievable. Franchise quality is real but not enough to justify buying with zero margin of safety. Watch, not buy.

Key points

EPV estimated at ~$23.70/share (capitalizing ~$170M sustainable FCF at 8.23% WACC, adding net cash) — market price at $32.73 represents ~38% premium to EPV with no margin of safety
EPV >> asset reproduction value confirms a real franchise: ROIC of 46.5% and LaCroix brand captivity (habit formation, switching costs from established sparkling water routines) indicate genuine barriers to entry
Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over 3 years barely exceeds inflation — earnings power is not growing, making any premium to EPV a bet on speculative improvement
DCF terminal value represents 76% of enterprise value — exactly the type of long-horizon dependency that conceals valuation risk; base-case DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 offers essentially 0% margin of safety at $32.73
Balance sheet is fortress-like: zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio 2.95 — asset floor is well-protected and reduces downside risk
Moat test is positive: EPV materially exceeds reproduction asset value, confirming franchise economics rather than a commoditized business where growth would be value-neutral

Red flags

Market price ~38% above estimated EPV — current valuation requires either durable above-trend growth or perpetual moat premium; neither can be bought at this price with a margin of safety
Revenue deteriorating at the margin: sales slipping in Q3 2026 with gross profit only rising through margin management — suggests earnings power may be at or near peak
UBS downgrade (Jun 2026) and Seeking Alpha's 'persistent headwinds' thesis signal the growth component of any bull case is fragile
Terminal value constitutes 76% of provided DCF — reliance on far-future assumptions is precisely where valuation errors compound; the EPV discipline strips this out and produces a lower, more honest number
Buyback program announced but minimally executed — capital allocation credibility is in question; cash accumulation without returns to shareholders reduces effective ROIC over time
PEG ratio of 9.01 signals market is pricing in growth that the 1.8% revenue CAGR cannot support; growth premium embedded in price is not justified by franchise-protected growth evidence

Howard Marks — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ presents a genuinely mixed risk/reward picture from a Marks-style perspective. The price is essentially at intrinsic value per the DCF ($32.73 vs. $33.47 base case), meaning there is virtually zero margin of safety — upside of 2.3% on a base case is not a bargain. The bull case of $43.79 offers some asymmetry but requires assumptions well above the company's demonstrated 1.8% revenue CAGR. On the structural side, FIZZ is a rare gem: zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio of 2.95, and 46.5% ROIC — the balance sheet cannot be criticized. This eliminates the permanent-loss risk from leverage, which is the first filter. However, the risk/reward is not compelling from a cycle-aware contrarian standpoint. The stock is trading at its 52-week high, not its low — there is no forced selling, no capitulation, no revulsion in the price. The pendulum has not swung to fear. UBS just cut its price target citing weak trends, and revenue growth has been anemic (1.8% CAGR over 3 years). The embedded expectations in the multiple (P/E 16.4x, P/FCF 18x, P/S 2.55x) are not demanding but also not screaming 'priced for disaster.' The PEG of 9.0 is alarming — growth is priced higher than growth warrants. Second-level: the consensus knows FIZZ has great margins and no debt; that is already in the price. The variant view would require either a revenue recovery (not visible in data) or a takeout/special-dividend catalyst (not signaled). The buyback program appears largely unexecuted per retail commentary, suggesting management is not deploying the balance sheet conviction one would hope for. The DCF is heavily terminal-value-dependent (76% of EV from terminal value), which means small assumption changes matter enormously — if revenue stagnates further, the bear case of $28.74 is credible, implying ~12% downside from current price. That is not catastrophic given no debt, but neither is it the asymmetric favorable skew Marks seeks. This is a quality company at a fair price, not a feared company at a panic price.

Key points

Zero long-term debt and $149M cash provide fortress balance sheet — permanent loss from insolvency essentially zero
DCF intrinsic value ~$33.47 vs. price $32.73: essentially no margin of safety at current price
P/E 16.4x and P/FCF 18x are moderate but not distressed or panic-priced multiples
Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over 3 years; DCF assumes 2% growth — modest but still requires execution
Stock trading at its 52-week high ($32.73 = 52w high in the price block) — no capitulation, no forced sellers
46.5% ROIC and 19.6% operating margin are exceptional operational metrics — already well-known to market
UBS downgrade on weak trends is a mild contrarian signal but not a full revulsion/forced-selling event
76% of DCF enterprise value is terminal value — extreme sensitivity to long-run assumptions given near-zero explicit-period growth

Red flags

Price at or near 52-week high — pendulum has NOT swung to fear; no margin of safety from a distressed-entry standpoint
2.3% DCF upside is effectively zero; no meaningful discount to intrinsic value to provide cushion
PEG ratio of 9.0 implies growth is being overpaid for relative to demonstrated 1.8% revenue trajectory
Revenue headwinds acknowledged by both Seeking Alpha and BevNET; top-line stagnation risk not priced out
Buyback program announced but poorly executed — capital allocation rhetoric not matching action
Five-year investor returns described as unprofitable (simplywall.st) — sustained underperformance despite quality balance sheet suggests market has re-rated downward for a reason
Terminal value dependence (76%) means bear case of $28.74 is quite reachable if growth disappoints even modestly

Michael Mauboussin — 🟡 watch · 52/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ presents a genuinely interesting expectations-investing puzzle. The ROIC/WACC spread is real and wide — ROIC of 46.5% against an estimated WACC of 8.2% is a substantial positive spread that would normally scream 'wide moat.' But I need to interrogate whether this spread is defensible or mean-reverting, and what the price is embedding. The DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 vs. current price of $32.73 implies the market has priced in almost exactly the base case: ~2% FCF growth perpetually, no improvement, no deterioration. That is a narrow expectations band with very little margin of safety. The key question is whether the ROIC spread is earned by a durable competitive advantage or is a function of favorable operating leverage in a maturing soda-water niche. On moat mechanics: FIZZ's LaCroix and other sparkling water brands have some brand intangible (consumer recognition) and modest scale advantages in production and distribution, but the mechanism is weak. There are no meaningful switching costs (consumers switch flavored sparkling water brands trivially), no network effects, and the IP is thin — competitors have successfully entered and eroded LaCroix's share dominance since ~2018. The five-year revenue CAGR of only 1.8% and the 'revenue headwinds persist' narrative from sell-side are consistent with a brand whose relative advantage has been partially competed away. The high ROIC figure (~46%) seems partially attributable to asset-light manufacturing and low capex (capex/revenue ~3%), but with minimal reinvestment opportunities — the company cannot deploy capital at high ROIC because the market isn't growing fast enough. This is the classic 'milking a narrow moat' situation. Distribution-wide thinking: the bull scenario (intrinsic $43.79) requires revenue acceleration that contradicts the current trend; the base ($33.47) is priced in; the bear ($28.74) is plausible if revenue continues slipping. PEG of 9.0 is alarming — paying a premium multiple for essentially zero growth. Management capital allocation is ambiguous: announced buyback but minimal execution, no debt, $149M cash pile sitting idle. The earnings yield of 8.1% at current price is reasonable, but absent a catalyst to close the expectations gap, this is a 'fair value' not a 'margin of safety' situation. I'd want to see evidence that the moat is strengthening (new SKUs gaining shelf space, distribution expansion, pricing power versus inflation) before upgrading. UBS downgrade citing 'weak trends' and BevNET's 'sales slip' reinforce that the moat trajectory is at best stable, more likely eroding modestly.

Key points

ROIC of 46.5% vastly exceeds WACC of 8.2%, an unusually wide spread — but the mechanism must be interrogated, not assumed durable
DCF at $33.47 vs price of $32.73 means virtually zero margin of safety; market has already priced the base case with no upside buffer
Revenue 3-year CAGR of only 1.8% and 'sales slip' in recent quarters suggest the moat is not expanding and top-line growth is structural, not cyclical
Moat assessment: Narrow, trajectory eroding. Some brand intangible, asset-light scale, but zero switching costs, no network effects, thin IP, and demonstrated competitor inroads since 2018
FCF generation ($170M, 14.2% margin) is healthy and consistent — this is a genuine cash cow — but reinvestment opportunities at high ROIC are limited given market stagnation
PEG of 9.0 flags that the market is not offering a growth discount; the earnings yield of ~8% is fair but not compelling on a risk-adjusted expectations basis
Capital allocation is suboptimal: $149M cash idle, buyback announced but barely executed, no M&A pipeline discussed — management is not creating value with excess capital
Bull scenario requires a demand re-acceleration for sparkling water that contradicts the current trend; fat tail is on the downside if revenue erosion accelerates

Red flags

Moat mechanism is weak: no switching costs, no network effects, brand advantage demonstrably competed away post-2018 LaCroix peak
DCF upside of only 2.3% means expectations are fully priced; any negative surprise destroys value with no cushion
Revenue headwinds structural, not cyclical: three consecutive years of near-flat growth, UBS downgrade citing 'weak trends' as of June 2026
PEG of 9.01 is inconsistent with a quality compounder — paying a premium multiple for commodity-like growth
Buyback announced but barely executed despite ample cash: capital allocation process is questionable, not disciplined
Five-year investor underperformance noted by sell-side — the stock has not rewarded holders despite decent FCF generation, suggesting the high ROIC does not translate to shareholder value creation at current valuation levels
No earnings call transcript available — cannot assess management's probabilistic thinking, guidance candor, or competitive strategy; process quality is opaque

Seth Klarman — 🟡 watch · 48/100 · medium confidence

FIZZ is a genuinely simple, asset-light consumer beverage business — not a special situation or distressed security where Baupost has its sharpest edge — but the Klarman lens is applicable because the question is whether a conservative intrinsic value can be estimated from normalized cash flow and whether the current price sits at a meaningful discount. The answer is: barely. The DCF intrinsic value of $33.47/share against a market price of $32.73 implies roughly 2.3% upside — effectively at fair value, with zero margin of safety. Against my own bar, this is not investable. However, there are genuine quality attributes (zero long-term debt, $149M cash, 2.95x current ratio, ~$170M in annual FCF, 46.7% ROE, 19.6% operating margins) that mean the downside case is not catastrophic. The bear scenario of $28.74 (per DCF sensitivity) implies ~12% downside from current price — modest capital risk but also modest protection. The business earns real, recurring cash flows and has a pristine balance sheet. What is missing entirely is any margin of safety, any catalyst, any evidence of forced or indiscriminate selling creating mispricing, or any complexity or special-situation element that would bring this into Baupost's highest-conviction territory. Revenue CAGR of only 1.8% over 3 years, persistent top-line weakness flagged by UBS and Seeking Alpha, and a PEG of 9x suggest the market is paying a full price for a slow-growth business. The buyback program is underexecuted, reducing the catalyst appeal. At $32.73, I would hold cash instead and wait for Mr. Market to offer a genuine discount — perhaps in the high $20s where a 15-20% margin of safety would emerge on normalized FCF.

Key points

Pristine balance sheet: zero long-term debt, $149M cash, 2.95x current ratio — downside floor is real
Free cash flow of $170M on $1.2B revenue (14.2% FCF margin) is durable and consistent across 2020-2024 history
Price/FCF of ~18x and P/E of 16.4x represent fair-value pricing, not a discounted price — DCF intrinsic at $33.47 vs $32.73 market, zero margin of safety
No special situation, no catalyst, no forced seller dynamic — this is a plain-vanilla mature beverage company trading at fair value
Revenue growth anemic at 1.8% CAGR, with UBS cutting price target on weak trends and Seeking Alpha noting persistent headwinds — growth assumptions underpinning even the 2% DCF growth rate are debatable
ROE of 46.7% and ROIC of 46.5% are exceptional quality metrics, but quality at the wrong price does not protect capital

Red flags

No margin of safety: DCF base case of $33.47 is only 2.3% above current price — any disappointment produces permanent capital loss
Revenue declining in most recent quarter (sales slip noted Mar 2026) while margins are propped by cost actions — quality of earnings concerns
PEG ratio of 9.0x is extreme for a 1.8% revenue CAGR business, suggesting market is pricing in quality premium not justified by growth
Buyback program announced but nearly no shares actually repurchased — management capital allocation discipline questionable
UBS downgrade with weak trend commentary (Jun 2026) and five-year investor underperformance signal structural value trap risk
Terminal value represents 76% of DCF enterprise value — the intrinsic value calculation is highly sensitive to terminal growth assumptions and WACC; small changes produce large swings confirming the bear case at $28.74

Peter Lynch — 🔴 avoid · 32/100 · high confidence

FIZZ is clearly a stalwart-category beverage company — not a fast grower. Revenue CAGR of just 1.82% over three years and net income hovering in the $140M-$187M range since 2020 confirm this is a slow-to-moderate grower at best. The Lynch framework for stalwarts requires buying at a reasonable price and selling into 30-50% gains, not holding forever. The critical problem here is the PEG ratio: the fact base reports a PEG of 9.01, which is catastrophically above my 1.0 threshold. Even being generous and using the P/E of 16.4x against any plausible EPS growth rate (revenue CAGR of ~1.8%, net income has grown from $158M in 2021 to $187M in 2024 — roughly 5-6% annualized at best), the implied PEG is still 2.5-3.0x, which is poor. You are paying a growth multiple for a mature, low-growth business. The DCF confirms this: intrinsic value of $33.47 vs. current price of $32.73 — essentially zero upside, with the terminal value comprising 76% of enterprise value, meaning you are buying a bond-like perpetuity at fair value, not a growth stock. On the positive side: FIZZ has an excellent balance sheet (zero long-term debt, $149M cash, current ratio of 2.95), strong ROIC of 46.5%, solid FCF margin of ~14%, and an understandable business (LaCroix sparkling water and flavored beverages). These are genuinely admirable characteristics. But the Lynch framework demands you pay the right price for even the best stalwart. Revenue is essentially flat — the top-line headwinds flagged by Seeking Alpha and BevNET (sales slipping even as margins improve) suggest the growth story is maturing or already mature. Operating margin expansion is a one-time lever, not a repeatable roll-out formula. The LaCroix franchise hit peak hype years ago and now faces intense competition. UBS cutting the price target on 'weak trends' just confirmed this. Buyback execution has been poor despite announcement. Five-year investor returns have been negative. For a Lynch stalwart, you want 30-50% upside at entry and a price that is below the historical P/E range — at $32.73, trading at the 52-week low with essentially zero DCF upside, this is fair value at best. I would not buy a stalwart at fair value with no growth catalyst.

Key points

Stalwart category: revenue CAGR 1.82%, net income growth ~5-6% annually — not a fast grower
PEG of 9.01 (reported) is catastrophically above my 1.0 threshold; even generous estimates yield PEG of 2.5-3.0x
Excellent balance sheet: zero long-term debt, $149M cash, 46.5% ROIC — genuinely admirable fortress financials
DCF intrinsic value $33.47 vs $32.73 price — essentially zero margin of safety for a stalwart purchase
LaCroix franchise understandable but maturing; top-line revenue headwinds persistent per Seeking Alpha and BevNET
FCF generation is real and consistent ($167M-$170M in 2023-2024), funding operations without debt

Red flags

PEG of 9.01 — paying far above growth rate, classic Lynch overpayment scenario for a stalwart
Revenue growth decelerating to near-zero (1.82% CAGR); sales slipping in Q3 2026 even as margins improve artificially
No repeatable roll-out formula: no unit expansion story, no new geographies, no product line driving compounding growth
UBS analyst downgrade citing 'weak trends' — momentum is negative, not neglected-and-overlooked
Buyback announced but minimally executed — management credibility on capital allocation is questionable
Five-year investor returns negative — stalwarts should at least keep pace with market; this one has not
DCF terminal value is 76% of enterprise value — you are buying a perpetuity, not a growth story

Walter Schloss — 🔴 avoid · 28/100 · high confidence

FIZZ is a profitable, clean-balance-sheet business, but it is the antithesis of a Schloss bargain. At $32.73, the stock trades at 7.66x price-to-book — far above tangible book value. There is no margin of safety in the assets; the entire valuation rests on earnings power and brand intangibles, not hard asset backing. The stock is at or near its 52-week high (the fact base shows last_close = high_52w = $32.73), the exact opposite of the beaten-down, out-of-favor names Schloss hunted. Positives do exist for a Schloss screen: zero long-term debt ($0 LTD), strong current ratio of 2.95x, $149M cash on balance sheet, and consistent free cash flow ($170M in FY2024). The business is simple, longstanding, and conservatively financed. But Schloss's core test is price vs. tangible assets, and at 7.66x book the stock fails categorically. Stockholders' equity is $400M against a $3.06B market cap — you are paying a massive premium over book. The DCF intrinsic value of $33.47/share offers only 2.3% upside at base, with no margin of safety. Revenue CAGR is a meager 1.8% over three years, and UBS just cut its price target citing weak trends. Schloss would not pay a nearly 8x book multiple for a slow-growth beverage company no matter how clean the balance sheet is. The price is simply not right for this discipline.

Key points

Price-to-book of 7.66x is deeply unattractive by Schloss standards — he sought stocks near or below tangible book, not 7-8x above it
Zero long-term debt and $149M cash are genuine positives; balance sheet quality is sound
Current ratio of 2.95x and consistent FCF ($167-170M in recent years) confirm financial durability
Stock is at its 52-week high ($32.73 = high_52w), the opposite of the depressed, out-of-favor entry point Schloss required
Revenue growing at only 1.8% CAGR — not a growth stock — yet priced at a premium that only makes sense if you extrapolate sustained high margins
DCF base case of $33.47 implies only 2.3% upside with a bear case of $28.74; no margin of safety in the price
No insider ownership or buying data available in the fact base; cannot confirm alignment
UBS downgrade citing weak trends adds to concern about near-term earnings support for the premium multiple

Red flags

P/B of 7.66x: paying nearly 8x net assets — Schloss's entire method breaks down at this price relative to book
At 52-week high — not beaten down, not out of favor, not a statistical bargain
Thesis depends entirely on earnings power and brand value (intangibles), not verifiable hard assets
Revenue slipping (Q3 2026 sales decline noted) while margins prop up earnings — masking underlying volume weakness
Buyback announced but minimally executed — raises questions about capital allocation candor
PEG of 9.01 confirms the market is pricing in far more growth than the 1.8% CAGR history supports; any growth disappointment collapses the multiple

Stanley Druckenmiller — 🔴 avoid · 22/100 · high confidence

FIZZ is a classic backward-looking 'cheap trap' — exactly what Druckenmiller's framework identifies as a primary disqualifier. The directional momentum is wrong on every dimension that matters to this lens. Revenue is barely growing (1.8% 3-year CAGR), the second derivative is negative with sales actually slipping in Q3 2026, UBS just cut its price target citing 'weak trends' and estimate revisions are flat-to-down, and the stock is sitting 32% below its 52-week high after a prolonged multi-year underperformance period (simplywall.st notes five years of investor losses). There is no earnings inflection thesis — margins are improving through cost discipline, not through volume acceleration, which is a late-cycle defensive posture, not an offensive catalyst. The macro/liquidity tailwind argument is also absent: FIZZ is a slow-growth consumer staple with 0.79 beta that offers no leverage to a Fed easing cycle the way a growth or cyclical name would. The buyback program was announced but barely executed, undermining the capital return catalyst. There is no definable 'why now' — Q4 earnings due July 1 with consensus at $0.47 EPS is unlikely to be a positive surprise given UBS's contemporaneous downgrade. The chart is in a downtrend from ~$48 to $32.73, with price at the 52-week low, which directly violates the 'don't fight the tape' principle. There is no asymmetric setup: the DCF intrinsic value is $33.47 vs. $32.73 current price — essentially zero upside in the base case, with a bear case of $28.74. A Druckenmiller-style bet requires a fat pitch with a large, well-defined upside and a small, well-defined downside. FIZZ offers neither. The only positives — zero long-term debt, 47% ROE, 19.6% operating margins, and $170M FCF — are real quality signals but are trailing metrics with no forward acceleration, making them irrelevant to a momentum/macro macro framework.

Key points

Revenue CAGR only 1.8% over 3 years with Q3 2026 showing outright sales decline — second derivative is negative
UBS downgrade June 2026 with price target cut citing 'weak trends' — analyst estimate revisions moving against the thesis
Stock is 32% below 52-week high of $47.89 at $32.73, near 52-week low of $31.21 — tape is in distribution, price confirms the bear
DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 offers only 2.3% upside vs current price — asymmetry is nearly zero, no fat pitch
No identifiable macro/liquidity catalyst — zero-beta consumer staple with 0.79 beta gains nothing from Fed easing relative to cyclicals or growth
Buyback announced but minimally executed per retail commentary — capital allocation credibility undermined

Red flags

Tape disagreement: stock in clear downtrend, near 52-week lows while bulls cite backward-looking quality metrics
Decelerating fundamentals: sales volumes slipping even as margins improve — margin improvement is masking volume deterioration, not a durable inflection
No forward earnings catalyst or estimate revision tailwind — Q4 EPS consensus flat at $0.47, UBS just cut
Five-year investor losses cited — chronic underperformance with no catalyst for regime change
Backward-looking cheap trap: P/E 16.4x appears reasonable but forward direction is wrong — exactly what Druckenmiller penalizes
No defined 'why now' thesis — cannot construct a concentrated, catalyst-driven position without a specific upcoming inflection point

Philip Fisher — 🔴 avoid · 22/100 · high confidence

National Beverage Corp (FIZZ) fails the Fisher growth lens on almost every criterion that matters to me. My central question is always: does this company have a durable, expanding franchise driven by genuine organic growth, R&D productivity, and management of exceptional caliber? FIZZ answers 'no' on nearly all counts. Revenue CAGR of 1.82% over three years is not just below-industry growth — it barely covers inflation. This is a volume-stagnant business where LaCroix, once a legitimate growth brand, has lost its early-mover advantage to a flood of competitors (Bubly, Spindrift, store brands). The Q3 2026 headline says it all: 'Increases Gross Profit As Sales Slip' — margin is being protected by cost squeezing, not by an expanding market position. UBS cutting its price target citing 'weak trends' corroborates what the numbers already show. R&D investment data is absent from the filings provided — a significant red flag in itself; no meaningful disclosure of product pipeline or innovation spend suggests this is a mature, commodity-adjacent CPG operator, not an innovative growth company. The scuttlebutt picture is equally uninspiring: retail commentary is thin, analyst coverage sparse, and the only substantive research signal (UBS, Seeking Alpha) is bearish on growth continuity. Management candor is limited to curated press releases with no earnings call transcript available — phrases like 'resilience and commitment to maximize shareholder performance' without accompanying substance are exactly the kind of promotional language I distrust. The announced buyback with minimal execution further signals either poor capital discipline or weak conviction. ROIC of 46% and FCF margins near 14% are genuinely admirable and reflect a well-run operation within its current footprint, but Fisher-style investing demands I can see the NEXT decade of growth, not just efficient management of a plateau. The DCF's 2% growth assumption matches reality and yields an intrinsic value of $33.47 — essentially at the current price — meaning even under the base case the market is paying fair value for a no-growth business. There is no margin of safety, no growth runway, and no identifiable R&D engine to justify a Fisher-style long-term hold.

Key points

Revenue CAGR of only 1.82% over three years — not remotely 'above-industry' growth; essentially flat in real terms
Operating margins of 19.6% and ROIC of 46% are impressive operationally but reflect efficient management of a mature franchise, not expansion
LaCroix brand has lost first-mover advantage; category now crowded with Bubly, Spindrift, private label — no visible moat widening
Zero R&D disclosure in available filings; no evidence of a productive product pipeline or new market development — a core Fisher disqualifier
DCF intrinsic value of $33.47 vs. $32.73 price = ~2% upside; no margin of safety even under base case
Cash-rich balance sheet ($149M, zero long-term debt) is healthy but not being deployed into growth reinvestment — buyback announced but barely executed

Red flags

Revenue declining in real volume terms; Q3 2026 BevNET: 'Sales Slip' while margins are propped by cost control — classic franchise erosion signal
No R&D line item visible in any SEC filing excerpt — fundamental absence of the innovation engine Fisher requires
UBS price target cut citing 'weak trends' as of June 2026 — corroborates stalling growth narrative
Management communication limited to press releases with promotional language; no earnings call transcript to assess candor
Five-year shareholder returns described as 'not profitable' by simplywall.st — long-term compounding story simply does not exist here
Stock at 52-week high ($32.73) despite weak revenue trends — limited downside protection if volume declines accelerate
PEG ratio of 9.01 is extraordinarily high for a 1.82% grower — market is pricing quality, not growth, leaving no runway for Fisher-style multi-year compounding

Fact base appendix

Price

last_close: 32.73
as_of: 2026-06-27
high_52w: 32.73
low_52w: 32.73
pct_below_52w_high: 0.0

Fundamentals

last_price: 32.73
market_cap: 3064578646
fifty_two_week_high: 47.89
fifty_two_week_low: 31.21
beta: 0.7853666
currency: USD
exchange: NASDAQ NMS - GLOBAL MARKET
sector: Beverages
industry: Beverages
price_source: finnhub
bars: 1
entity: National Beverage Corp.
fiscal_year: 2024
revenue: 1201354000
revenue_period: 2025-05-03
net_income: 186821000
net_income_period: 2025-05-03
operating_income: 235459000
operating_income_period: 2025-05-03
operating_cash_flow: 206696000
operating_cash_flow_period: 2025-05-03
capex: 36281000
capex_period: 2025-05-03
total_assets: 594020000
total_assets_period: 2025-01-25
total_liabilities: 193784000
total_liabilities_period: 2025-01-25
current_assets: 352570000
current_assets_period: 2025-01-25
current_liabilities: 119614000
current_liabilities_period: 2025-01-25
stockholders_equity: 400236000
stockholders_equity_period: 2025-01-25
cash_and_equivalents: 149222000
cash_and_equivalents_period: 2025-01-25
long_term_debt: 0
long_term_debt_period: 2023-04-29
shares_outstanding: 93620246
operating_margin: 0.196
net_margin: 0.1555
roe: 0.4668
debt_to_equity: 0.0
current_ratio: 2.9476
roic: 0.4648
free_cash_flow: 170415000
fcf_margin: 0.1419
pe_ratio: 16.4
price_to_fcf: 17.98
price_to_sales: 2.55
revenue_cagr: 0.0182
revenue_cagr_years: 3
fundamentals_source: edgar_companyfacts
price_to_book: 7.66
earnings_yield: 0.0808
peg: 9.01

Filings reviewed

8-K (2026-03-13) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/69891/000143774926008252/fizz20260312_8k.htm
10-Q (2026-03-12) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/69891/000143774926007987/fizz20260125_10q.htm
8-K (2025-12-12) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/69891/000143774925037735/fizz20251211_8k.htm
10-Q (2025-12-11) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/69891/000143774925037558/fizz20251025_10q.htm
10-K (2025-07-02) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/69891/000143774925022007/fizz20250503_10k.htm
10-K (2024-06-26) https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/69891/000143774924021311/fizz20240430_10k.htm

Other sources

[news] National Beverage Corp (FIZZ) Technical Analysis: Support, Resistance, Indicators & Moving Averages - TradingKey
[news] National Beverage Corp. Announces Commencement of Stock Buyback and Addresses Market Conditions - Yahoo Finance
[news] Price to earnings forward of National Beverage Corp. – NASDAQ:FIZZ - TradingView
[news] Price to earnings forward of National Beverage Corp. – TRADEGATE:20V - TradingView
[news] National Beverage Corp. Reports Increased Winter Quarter Net Income While Improving Margins - Business Wire
[news] National Beverage Corp. Second Quarter Results Underscore Resilience and Commitment to Maximize Shareholder Performance - Business Wire
[news] National Beverage Corp (FIZZ) Shares Fall 3.2% -- What GF Score of 77 Tells Investors - GuruFocus
[news] Is National Beverage Corp. (FIZZ) A Good Stock To Buy Now? - Insider Monkey
[news] National Beverage Corp. Increases Gross Profit As Sales Slip - BevNET.com
[news] The past five years for National Beverage (NASDAQ:FIZZ) investors has not been profitable - simplywall.st
[news] UBS cuts National Beverage stock price target on weak trends By Investing.com - Investing.com South Africa
[news] UBS cuts National Beverage stock price target on weak trends - Investing.com
[news] National Beverage Corp. Actuals & Estimates (BX:20V) - TradingView
[news] 20V Forecast — Price Target — Prediction for 2027 - TradingView
[news] National Beverage: Revenue Growth Headwinds Persist Through Q3 2026 And Beyond - Seeking Alpha
[discussion] Wall St is expecting 0.47 EPS for $FIZZ Q4 [Reporting 07/01 AMC] http://www.estimize.com/intro/fizz?
[discussion] Wall St is expecting 0.47 EPS for $FIZZ Q4 [Reporting 07/01 AMC] http://www.estimize.com/intro/fizz?
[discussion] [Bullish] $FIZZ Bullish, looks good.
[discussion] Wall St is expecting 0.47 EPS for $FIZZ Q4 [Reporting 07/01 AMC] http://www.estimize.com/intro/fizz?
[discussion] $FIZZ
[discussion] [Bullish] $FIZZ
[discussion] [Bullish] $REBN $BROS $FIZZ $COCO $BUD Beverage stocks.

DAVIDsTEA (DTEAF) Has Substantial Upsid

[discussion] Wall St is expecting 0.47 EPS for $FIZZ Q4 [Reporting 07/01 AMC] http://www.estimize.com/intro/fizz?
[discussion] $FIZZ $KDP $KO $PEP $ZVIA
[discussion] [Bullish] $FIZZ $KDP $KO $PEP 👉 ZVIA https://x.com/Zevia/status/2051406686834004043?s=20
[discussion] [Bullish] $FIZZ $KDP $KO $PEP 👉 $ZVIA Check out Zevia Soda! $ZVIA A growing competitor in the hea
[discussion] $FIZZ Current Stock Price: $34.20 Contracts to trade: $35.0 FIZZ May 15 2026 Call Entry: $0.18 Exit:
[discussion] Wall St is expecting 0.47 EPS for $FIZZ Q4 [Reporting 07/01 AMC] http://www.estimize.com/intro/fizz?
[discussion] [Bullish] $DTEAF $REED $ZVIA $LSF $FIZZ Beverage industry.

Now you know why the Pembroke Herit

[discussion] $FIZZ why did they barely buy back any shares last quarter?

Generated 2026-07-17T19:59:42 · est. cost $1.28

What each investor thinks

Forensic Short-Seller (Chanos/Einhorn-style) Referee

pass · 72

AI & Disruption Referee (Christensen-style) Referee

pass · 72

Terry Smith (Fundsmith) Quality

watch · 62

Warren Buffett Quality

watch · 58

Joel Greenblatt Value

watch · 58

Charlie Munger Quality

watch · 58

Chuck Akre Quality

watch · 52

Ray Dalio Risk

watch · 52

Valuation Referee (Damodaran-style) Referee

watch · 52

Benjamin Graham Value

watch · 52

Bruce Greenwald Value

watch · 52

Howard Marks Risk

watch · 52

Michael Mauboussin Quality

watch · 52

Seth Klarman Value

watch · 48

Peter Lynch Growth

avoid · 32

Walter Schloss Value

avoid · 28

Stanley Druckenmiller Risk

avoid · 22

Philip Fisher Growth

avoid · 22

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