Podcast episode
Episode 174: Auren Hoffman Wants to Make LiveRamp Great Again
agency ai-in-adtech identity m-and-a publisher-economics
TL;DR
LiveRamp founder Auren Hoffman joins Marketecture to argue that Publicis got a "steal" buying LiveRamp for $2.2B, because the data-connectivity "middleware" at LiveRamp's core retains ~70% market share despite a decade of product neglect — and becomes more valuable, not less, in an agentic-AI world where execution speed is the bottleneck. The back half covers Google I/O's shift to AI-first search, collapsing publisher traffic, and the grim economics of digital media (Vox carve-up, Amazon affiliate cuts, fire-sale valuations). Worth a listen if you care about identity/onboarding, LiveRamp's trajectory under an agency owner, or how AI is reshaping publisher monetization.
What was covered
- Publicis' ~$2.2B acquisition of LiveRamp. Hoffman calls it a "steal," noting LiveRamp's core "middleware" (data-routing plumbing that connects a marketer's data to other marketing platforms) still holds ~70% market share and represents ~70% of revenue but "7,000% of profit" — meaning the non-core products lose money. Terry Kawaja (cited) called it potentially the most impactful M&A since Google bought DoubleClick.
- LiveRamp's product critique. Hoffman argues customers and partners "all hated" the product but didn't switch because it's so embedded. He'd cut at least half of salaries (claiming 70–80% of staff don't work on the core product), kill the acquired peripheral products, and fix extractive per-channel/per-record pricing that discouraged adding connections. Today LiveRamp routes to fewer than 10 of a typical company's 700–800 martech tools; the goal is 100, then 1,000.
- The agentic-AI thesis. Ari Paparo argues if AI agents decide media moves, slow data execution (e.g., 24-hour waits to move an audience onto Meta) becomes the bottleneck — making fast connectivity infrastructure more valuable. Hoffman agrees, adding that in an AI world few assets retain network effects, and those that do "skyrocket."
- The history and the holdco politics. IPG acquired Acxiom but deliberately excluded LiveRamp; Scott Howe (LiveRamp CEO) bought LiveRamp for ~$310M, later sold Acxiom "at the peak," but then "lit the cash on fire" via bad acquisitions (Habu ~$200M, Data Plus Math) and poorly timed buybacks. Omnicom and Horizon Media are reportedly accelerating plans to move off LiveRamp; revenue is expected to decline near-term.
- Competitive/identity landscape. Discussion of ID5 (graph, distributed, weaker onboarding — Ari and Eric are investors), Hightouch (recently raised at a high valuation, ex-CDP), MediaWala, and MadConnect (Bob Walls, who pitches connectivity as the whole value). Question raised: is UID2/ID2 a hidden asset inside The Trade Desk, and should TTD have bought LiveRamp at its stock peak?
- Google I/O and AI-first search. Google's search box is becoming a text-prompt area; AI Overviews continue eating click-through traffic (cited drops of 30–50%). Condé Nast executives reportedly told staff to expect zero search traffic in the future. Hoffman criticizes Google for failing to do AI well on its own apps (Gmail, Calendar, Docs), citing privacy silos, lack of disruption risk, and EU regulation (Google was forced to remove a Calendar→Maps directions feature).
- Publisher economics collapse. Vox carve-up — James Murdoch bought the podcasts, New York Magazine, and Vox.com but not Eater/The Verge (going to a separate co under Ryan Pauley). Axios-cited fire-sale prices: BuzzFeed ($1.7B peak → $231M), CNET ($1.75B → $100M), Vice ($5.7B peak → $350M). Amazon cut affiliate fees ~5%, hurting publishers like Wirecutter (NYT licensed its review content to Amazon).
- New AI-economy plays. Parallel Web Systems "Index" (from ex-Twitter CEO Parag Agrawal) helps content owners track and get compensated for AI-agent usage (clients include The Atlantic, Fortune). IREN, a data-center company, bought a creative agency (Awaken). OpenAI bought TBPN earlier.
Notable claims & predictions
- Hoffman: "LiveRamp is a business that could definitely be a $100 billion business with the right product." He repeatedly frames the under-management as a massive unlock — "imagine if you just made them happy, or just made them not hate you."
- Hoffman: LiveRamp "was like MCP before MCP" — its core is connecting and moving data, and a modern stack could "instantly move data from any source to any source with pricing and weightings," which "is not that hard… that can be done very very very quickly."
- Hoffman: Scott Howe's two best moves were buying LiveRamp and selling Acxiom "at the very peak"; everything since (acquisitions, buybacks at "the highest point") destroyed value — "a bad place to be a shareholder."
- Hoffman on product leadership: Adam Foroughi (AppLovin) is "the most product oriented person in the ad tech ecosystem" and Jeff Green (Trade Desk) is second — "if he was a sales oriented guy, it would not be a successful company."
- Hoffman on Google: "There is no chance of someone switching off of Gmail… This is not a disruptible area," so Google deprioritizes AI in its apps, leaving "a really big opportunity for OpenAI and Anthropic to come in."
- Hoffman on services vs. software: The smart move now is "a software company masquerading as a services company" — services are easier to sell, and Publicis buying LiveRamp fits this (charging clients for data activation while L
Full analysis
Decision Council — Briefing Mode
Step 1 — Frame
The episode bundles two big themes ad-tech operators should care about:
- Publicis bought LiveRamp for ~$2.2B, and the founder says the buyer got a steal because the "middleware" — the plumbing that moves a marketer's data between platforms — still holds ~70% market share despite years of neglect, and gets more valuable in an agentic-AI world where execution speed is the choke point.
- Google's search box is now an AI prompt, AI Overviews are eating publisher click-throughs (30–50% drops cited), and digital media valuations are collapsing to fire-sale levels.
What's actually being decided (for the reader, not for Publicis): Two things. First, whether agencies owning the identity/onboarding layer changes how everyone else routes data — and whether you should reduce dependence on a now-agency-controlled pipe. Second, whether the open-web publisher model is structurally finished as a traffic-and-monetization play.
Reversibility: Type 1 for both. Migrating off an embedded onboarding vendor is painful and slow (that's the whole thesis). Rebuilding a search-traffic-dependent business is a multi-year pivot.
Forcing function: The LiveRamp deal has closed; Omnicom and Horizon are already moving to exit. Google I/O is shipped, not announced. The clock is running on both.
Proceeding — the framing is clear enough.
Step 2 — The Council
The Skeptic The load-bearing assumption is "70% share + embedded = durable moat." But the same episode says customers "all hated it," customer count was already declining year-over-year, and two major holdcos are sprinting for the exits the moment a rival agency owns the pipe. That's not a moat — that's switching cost buying time. And the "agentic AI makes connectivity more valuable" line is exactly what every legacy-infra vendor says when disruption looms. In plain terms: when a competitor owns your data router, you build your own off-ramp — and that's already happening.
The Operator Tuesday morning, if you're a buyer at Omnicom or an independent, you now route audience data through a pipe owned by Publicis — a direct competitor. That's a confidentiality and leverage problem before it's a technical one. The realistic move is multi-homing: keep LiveRamp for the legacy connections that can't move fast, stand up ID5, Hightouch, or MadConnect for the rest. Second-order effect at 90 days: onboarding fragments, nobody has one clean pipe, and "connectivity" becomes a procurement headache instead of solved infrastructure. For a non-specialist: the company that delivers your mail just got bought by your biggest rival, so everyone's quietly opening a P.O. box.
The Customer / End User (the publisher) For publishers this episode is genuinely bleak, and it's not the LiveRamp part — it's Google. If search sends 30–50% less traffic and Condé Nast is telling staff to plan for zero, the open-web ad model built on referral traffic is breaking, not bending. The Vox carve-up confirms the market's verdict: brands, podcasts, and creator-led content get bought; ad-dependent web properties get left on the table or sold for cents on the dollar. In plain terms: the front door to the internet is closing, and the businesses built around people walking through it are out of options that don't involve rebuilding.
The Market Analyst Two signals worth separating. The LiveRamp deal at ~2.5x revenue tells you the market priced identity infrastructure as a declining asset — Hoffman's "$100B business" is a founder's counterfactual, not a valuation. The real tell is strategic: an agency holdco buying the connectivity layer is the "software company masquerading as a services company" move — own the pipe, charge clients for activation. Expect Omnicom and WPP to respond, either by backing a neutral alternative (ID5, MadConnect) or buying one. The publisher fire-sale comps (BuzzFeed $1.7B→$231M, Vice $5.7B→$350M) aren't noise; they're the AI-search traffic collapse showing up in enterprise value. For a non-specialist: the buyers are voting, and they're paying full price for AI infrastructure and scrap prices for ad-funded content.
The Long-Term Thinker Three years out, the durable question isn't "who owns onboarding" — it's who owns the neutral connective tissue when agents do the buying. If Hoffman and Paparo are right that execution speed becomes the bottleneck, the prize goes to whoever runs the independent fast-routing layer, precisely because an agency-owned one is suspect to everyone outside that agency. That's the opening for The Trade Desk's UID2, ID5, or a Snowflake/Databricks-native approach. The Google story compounds differently: the open web's traffic economy doesn't recover, so the value migrates to owned audiences, first-party data, and platforms that don't depend on referral — which makes the connectivity layer more central, just maybe not LiveRamp's version of it.
Step 3 — The Tensions
1. Is embedded connectivity a moat or a melting ice cube? The Skeptic and Long-Term Thinker collide head-on. Same facts — 70% share, decade of neglect, agentic-AI tailwind — read as "durable infrastructure that skyrockets" or "incumbency that buys 24 months while everyone builds the off-ramp." The agency-ownership wrinkle tilts this: a neutral pipe is a moat; a competitor-owned pipe is a reason to leave.
2. Does AI make the data layer more valuable, or just move the value to a different owner? Hoffman says network-effect connectivity "skyrockets" in an AI world. The Market Analyst agrees the category wins but doubts LiveRamp specifically captures it — the value may accrue to whoever's neutral and fast, not whoever's incumbent and agency-owned.
3. Is the publisher collapse a cyclical valuation reset or a structural end-state? The Customer says structural — the traffic faucet is closing. A more optimistic read is that fire-sale prices plus AI-licensing plays (Parallel's Index, NYT licensing Wirecutter to Amazon) mean a new, smaller monetization model is forming. The episode leans structural and grim.
Step 4 — Synthesis
What this actually hinges on — two separable beliefs:
On LiveRamp/connectivity: It hinges on whether neutrality matters more than incumbency in the agent era. If buyers will route through a pipe their competitor owns, Hoffman's thesis holds and Publicis got a bargain. If they won't — and Omnicom and Horizon are already showing they won't — then the agency-ownership move accelerates fragmentation and opens the door for ID5, Hightouch, MadConnect, and UID2. The council leans toward neutrality wins: the moment a router is owned by one agency, every other agency has a reason to fund the alternative. That's an opportunity, not just a threat.
On Google/publishers: This is the higher-impact story for the broadest set of operators, and the council doesn't split much — it's grim and probably structural. If you run a business that depends on search referral traffic, the strategic question is no longer "how do we optimize" but "what do we own that doesn't route through Google." The early answers — first-party audiences, licensing content to AI platforms, creator/brand-led models, commerce — are real but smaller than what's being lost.
What to verify / de-risk:
- For agency and buy-side operators: audit your LiveRamp dependence now and stand up at least one neutral alternative. Don't wait for the migration to be forced.
- For identity/onboarding vendors (ID5, MadConnect, Hightouch): the agency-ownership of LiveRamp is your single best go-to-market argument in years — neutrality is now a feature you can sell. Move.
- For publishers: stop modeling search recovery. Pressure-test revenue under a zero-search-referral scenario and accelerate first-party and AI-licensing plays.
- For everyone: watch whether Omnicom/WPP back or buy a neutral connectivity layer in the next few quarters. That's the signal that confirms the thesis.
My view: The LiveRamp story is being told as "underpriced asset, huge unlock." The more useful read for operators is "the connectivity layer just lost its neutrality, and that's the disruption — for everyone who isn't Publicis." The bigger story by far is Google: a slow, irreversible reset of who can build a business on the open web. Identity is a chess move; search-to-AI is a regime change.
What did we miss? Is there a persona we should add for this specific decision? A General Counsel lens might earn its place here — an agency owning the data pipe that routes competitors' audience data raises real confidentiality, data-governance, and possibly antitrust questions that could shape how fast the exits happen.
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